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I. THE BASIS OF STATE POWER TO TAX NATIONAL BANKS
It has been assumed by most people and has been emphatically set
forth in court dicta that the power of the states to tax national banks
or national bank shares in the hands of individuals depends entirely
upon permissive legislation of Congress. The latest dictum of the
Supreme Court to this effect is found in the case of First National Bank
v. Anderson,2 where the court says:
"National banks are not merely private moneyed institutions but
agencies of the United States created under its laws to promote its fiscal
policies; and hence the banks, their property and their shares cannot be
taxed under state authority except as Congress consents and then only in
conformity with the restrictions attached to its consent." 3

The court has held this view for a long time, as is evidenced by the
early case of People v. Weaver,4 in which, speaking of the share method
of taxing national banks, authorized by act of Congress, Mr. Justice
Miller, delivering the opinion of the court, declared:
"That the provision which we have cited [U. S. Rev. Stats. § 5219]
was necessary to authorize the States to impose any tax whatever on these
bank shares, is abundantly established by the cases of McCulloch v. The
State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
9 id. 738; and Weston v. The City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449."5

In practically none of the cases in which this point has been raised
has the court seen fit to analyze the constitutional basis of the state's
power to tax national bank shares; instead, the court has rested entirely
upon the authority of earlier cases, and these all depend ultimately upon
2

269 U. S. 341, 347, 46 Sup. Ct. 135, 138.

3 In Bank of California v. Richardson (1919) 248 U. S. 476, 483, 39 Sup. Ct.

165, 166, Mr. Justice White, delivering the opinion of the court, and speaking of
Section 5219 of U. S. Revised Statutes which authorizes state taxation of national
bank shares, declared: "There is also no doubt from the section that it was intended to comprehensively control the subject with which it dealt and thus to
furnish the exclusive rule governing state taxation as to the federal agencies created
as provided in the section. All possibility of dispute to the contrary is foreclosed
by the decisions of this court. People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539; Mercantile Bank
v. New York, 121 U. S. 138, 154; Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173
U. S. 664; Covington v. First National Bank, 198 U. S. 100.,,
The bank's personal property is not subject to state taxation even after the
bank has passed into the hands of a receiver, the bank still retaining its character
as a federal instrumentality. Rosenblat v. Johnson (1881) 104 U. S. 462. The court
decided the case on authority of prior cases without discussing the problem involved. A tax levied on the bank on its capital stock, surplus, and undivided profits
is invalid. National Bank v. Adams (1922) 258 U. S. 362, 42 Sup. Ct. 323. A
franchise tax by a state upon national banks has also been held invalid. Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro (1899) 173 U. S. 664, 19 Sup. Ct. 537.
4 (1879) 100 U. S. 539.
5 100 U. S. 539, 543.
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the authority of McCulloch v. Maryland.6 But to cite McCulloch V.
Maryland as authority for the propositions quoted is to extend the
actual decision therein to a subject not covered by the reasoning of the
court and in fact expressly excluded from its operation. The case decided that a Maryland statute which imposed a tax on each bank note
issued by "Banks or branches thereof in the State of Maryland not
chartered by the legislature" or in lieu thereof an annual tax of $15,000
upon any such bank or branch, was invalid as applied to the United
States Bank. The privilege of issuing notes as a means of obtaining
money which it might lend profitably was deemed at this time to be one
of the most important features of successful banking. It was with these
facts in mind that Marshall wrote and with them in mind his general
expressions of opinion are to be read. The tax was not objectionable
because it would come eventually out of the pockets of the real owners
of the bank, as indeed any tax paid by the corporation would do, but
because the tax would operate directly to restrain a function deemed
important to the success of the bank. In other words, it tended to
"retard, impede and control" the operations of this bank which Congress
had constitutionally authorized as an aid to the fiscal transactions of
the government. In the words of Marshall, "the states have no power,
by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner
control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress
to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government.
This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy
which the constitution has declared."7 The case stands, therefore, for
the proposition that the state may levy no tax whatever on the functions, or privilege of exercising the functions, with which the bank has
been endowed by Congress. At the same time, however, it is to be
noted that the court expressly recognized that the state could tax the
property existing in the state independently of the entry of the bank,
including the land belonging to the bank and the capital invested therein
by the shareholders, provided these latter were not taxed discriminatorily. But the functions of the bank were created by the federal charter. Such a federal corporation and such functions had no previous
existence in the state and therefore the decision that these functions
were not taxable by the state did not, said the opinion, withdraw anything that had been previously within the taxing power of the states:
6 (1819) 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 316.
7 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436. The rule laid down in this quotation is still law.
Johnson v. Maryland (1920) 254 U. S. 51, 41 Sup. Ct. 16; Clallam County v.
U. S. (1923) 263 U. S. 341, 44 Sup. Ct. 121; Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi
(1928) 277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451; Long v. Rockwood (1928) - U. S. -, 48
Sup. Ct. 463.
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"This opinion does not deprive the states of any resources which they
originally possessed. It does not extend to a tax paid by the real property
of the bank, in common with the other real property within the state, nor
to a tax imposed on the interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold
in this institution, in common with other property of the same description
throughout the state. But this is a tax on the operations of the bank, and
is, consequently, a tax on the operation of an instrument employed by the
government of the Union to carry its powers into execution. Such a tax
must be unconstitutional." 8

This dictum seems to be a clear recognition by the court that the states
had power under the Constitution without a permissive law of Congress
to tax the real property of the bank and to tax national bank shares in
the hands of individuals.9 This part of McCulloch v. Maryland has
apparently been overlooked or ignored in the cases quoted from above.
The precise question whether or not the states have an original
right to tax national bank shares might perhaps have been presented
to the Supreme Court had Congress not seen fit in 1864 to enact a law
expressly recognizing, or granting, the power of the states to tax bank
shares and the real property of national banks.10 When the present
system of national banks was established in 1863 no provision was
made for state taxation of the banks or the shares therein. The following year, however, congressional consent was given to tax both the real
property of national banks and national bank shares in the hands of
individual citizens." This provision was altered in 186812 (becoming
8 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436.

9 See Alfred J. Schweppe, State Taxation of National Bank Stocks: Uncertainty
of its Constitutional Basis (1922) 6 MINNESOTA L. REv. 219.
10 Prior to 1863 a national bank existed in this country for only a total period
of forty years: The United States Bank 1791-1811 and the Second United States
Bank 1816-1836.
11 "Provided, That nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the
shares in any of the said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from
being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or undgr state authority, at the
place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate
than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of
such state: Provided further, That the tax so imposed under the laws of any state
upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed
the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of
the state where such association is located: Provided, also, That nothing in this
act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either state, county, or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed."
13 12
STAT. 112 (1864).
Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes, as adopted in 1868 and in force for
approximately fifty-five years, read as follows: "Nothing herein shall prevent all
the shares in any association from being included in the valuation of the personal
property of the owner or holder of such shares, in assessing taxes imposed by
authority of the State within which the association is located; but the legislature
of each State may determine and dis

the manner and place of taxing all the
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Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes), and remained as thus altered
until 1923,1- when it was again amended. It was further amended in
1926.14 Under this latest amendment the states are authorized, subject
shares of national banking associations located within the State, subject only to
the two restrictions, that the taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is
assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such
State, and that the shares of any national banking association owned b nondents of any State shall be taxed in the city or town"where the ban is locate,
and not elsew ere. Nothing herein shall be construed to exempt the real property
of associations from either State, county or municipal taxes, to the same extent,
according to its value, as other real property is taxed."
13 Except for the provisions in the 1926 amendment relating to the fourth tax
alternative, the 1926 and 1923 amendments are practically the same in substance.
See infra n. 14.
14 The 1926 Amendment of Section 5219 reads as follows: "The legislature of
each State may determine and direct, subject to the provisions of this section, the
manner and place of taxing all the shares of national banking associations located
within its lim Zhe several States may (1) fax said shares, or (2) include dividends derived therefrom in the taxable income ofan owner or holder thereof, or
(3) tax such associatinns on their net income, or (4) according to or measured
by their net income, rovided the following conditions are complied with:
"1. (a) The imposition by any State of any one of the above four forms of
taxation shall be in lieu of the others, except as hereinafter provided in subdivision (c) of this clause.
"(b) In the case of a tax on said shares the tax imposed shall not be at a
greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such State coming into competition with the business of national
banks: Provided, That bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness in the
hands of individual citizens not employed or engaged in the banking or investment business and representing merely personal investments not made in competition with such business, shall not be deemed moneyed capital within the meaning
of this section.
"(c) In case of a tax on or according to or measured by the net income of an
association, the taxing State may, except in case of a tax on net income, include
the entire net income received from all sources, but the rate shall not be higher
than the rate assessed upon other financial corporations nor higher than the highest
of the rates assessed by the taxiif State upon mercantile, manufacturing, and
business corporations doing business within its limits: Provided, however, That a
State which imposes a tax on or according to or measured by the net income of,
or a franchise or excise tax on, financial, mercantile, manufacturing, and business
corporations organized under its own laws or laws of other States and also imposes
a tax upon the income of individuals, may include in such individual income dividends from national banking associations located within the State on condition
that it also includes dividends from domestic corporations and may likewise include
dividends from national banking associations located without the State on condition
that it also includes dividends from foreign corporations, but at no higher rate
than is imposed on dividends from such other corporations.
"(d) In case the dividends derived from the said shares are taxed, the tax shall
not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon the net income from other moneyed
capital.
'k
"2. The shares of any national banking association owned by nonresidents of
any State, shall be taxed by the taxing district or by the State where the association is located and not elsewhere; and such association shall make return of
such shares and pay the tax thereon as agent of such nonresident shareholders.
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to certain conditions, to (1) tax the shares of national banks to their
owners; or (2) include the dividends therefrom in the taxable income
of the owners or holders thereof; or (3) tax the banks on their net
income; or (4) tax the banks according to, or measured by, their net
income.
What is the constitutional basis of these statutes? What right have
the states to take advantage of the consent given by Congress to state
taxation of a federal instrumentality? We have the court flatly declaring in McCulloch v. Maryland that the states cannot tax the operations
of national banks but can tax the real property thereof and also the
interests of shareholders therein. We have the later cases flatly declaring
that the states cannot tax even the interests of shareholders without
express consent of Congress. If, however, McCulloch v. Maryland be
read in the light of the facts of the case and the principles involved be
kept in mind, it is believed that there is no inconsistency between the
cases, and that the present state of the law is fairly clear.
If the states do not have the power to tax national banks beyond
the extent to which Congress may have consented, they lack the power,
not simply because Congress has not given it to them, but because
Congress by not consenting to the exercise of the power has implied an
affirmative intent to prohibit it. It is apparent that the theory that the
states derive their power to tax national banks from a grant by Congress
cannot be sustained if it means that Congress has granted a power which
is by the Constitution delegated exclusively to the federal government
or prohibited to the states by that instrument.15 But there is another
"3. Nothing herein shall be construed to exempt the real property of associations from taxation in any State or in any subdivision thereof, to the same extent,
according to its value, as other real property is taxed.
"4. The provisions of section 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the United States
as heretofore in force shall not prevent the legalizing, ratifying, or confirming by
the States of any tax heretofore paid, levied, or assessed upon the shares of
national banks, or the collecting thereof, to the extent that such tax would be valid
under said section." 44 STAT. 223 (1926).
15In view of the fact that the division of power between the federal government and the states is fixed by the Constitution, it is difficult to explain how that
division can constitutionally be altered simply by action or inaction of the federal
or state governments. So far as the federal Constitution is concerned, the states
may pass any law whatever that is not expressly or impliedly prohibited by that
instrument. If that be true, how can any power be given to the states by Congressional action or inaction without amending the Constitution? It has been
suggested that although Congress cannot delegate powers to the state, yet, inasmuch as the bank is the creature of Congress and has only such powers and
privileges as Congress chooses to endow it with, and since Congress can therefore
create banks with or without any particular power or privilege, it must follow
that Congress can confer any such power or privilege subject to limitations, conditions or burdens such as susceptibility to state taxation. Submission to taxation
by the states in the manner set forth in the statute might therefore be considered
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explanation of the theory. The Constitution delegates certain powers
to the federal government and gives Congress power to pass all laws
necessary and proper to carry those powers into effect, including power
a condition precedent to the right to exercise the powers and privileges of a national
bank: "Were we to admit, for the sake of the argument, this to be a tax of the
bonds or capital stock of the bank, it is but a tax upon the new uses and new
privileges conferred by the charter of the association; it is but a condition annexed
to the enjoyment of this new use and new application of the bonds; and if Congress possessed the power to grant these new rights and new privileges, which none
of the learned counsel has denied, and which the whole argument assumes, then
we do not see but the power to annex the conditions is equally clear and indisputable. . . . The tax is the condition for the new rights and privileges conferred
upon these associations." Mr. Justice Nelson in Van Allen v. Assessors (1865)
70 U. S. (3 Wall.)-573, 583. This argument, however, would be unsound if it
meant that Congress may in this manner confer a power upon the states which the
Constitution prohibits to the states or grants exclusively to the federal government.
Suppose the incorporators of the bank agree to the condition and the charter is
granted. Suppose further that a state levies a tax according to the terms of the
condition. If the bank or taxpayer refuses to pay the tax because of a lack of
power in the state to levy the tax, what right has the state to set up the condition
as a justification for an exercise of power impliedly prohibited to it by the Constitution? If the Constitution prohibits the power to the state, it makes no difference whether Congress also prohibits it or expressly refuses to prohibit it. It is
true that according to the condition on which the bank was chartered it agreed to
submit to certain state taxes, but is not the state without authority to pass the
laws necessary to enable it to take advantage of the condition? It might be argued
that although the state has no authority to pass the law, the bank is estopped
by the condition to deny the state's authority. Such an argument seems tantamount
to saying that if the bank wants a charter it must consent to an unconstitutional
condition and would seem to be met by a line of reasoning similar to that of
recent cases which deny the states power to impose unconstitutional conditions
upon foreign corporations desiring to do an intra-state business within their limits.
Terral v. Burke Construction Co. (1922) 257 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 188. See also
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas (1910) 216 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 190;
Michigan Public Utilities Commission et al. v. Duke (1925) 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup.
Ct. 191; Frost v. R. R. Commission (1926) 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605. And
if inaction or submissiveness of the federal government itself cannot constitutionally give the states power, how can inaction or submissiveness of a federal agency
or instrumentality constitutionally confer power upon the states?
Mr. Justice Nelson, however, in the Van Allen case, recognized an original right
in the states to tax national bank shares. The power is, according to his opinion,
one that both Congress and the states have: a concurrent power, from the exercise
of which Congress may, by reason of its paramount authority, exclude the states,
or in the exercise of which, Congress for the same reason my restrict the states:
"It is said that Congress possesses no power to confer upon a State authority to
be exercised which has been exclusively delegated to that body by the Constitution, and, consequently, that it cannot confer upon a State the sovereign right of
taxation; nor is a State competent to receive a grant of any such power from
Congress. We agree to this. But as it respects a subject-matter over which Congress
and the States may exercise a concurrent power, but from the exercise of which
Congress, by reason of 'its paramount authority may exclude the States, there s
no doubt Congress may withhold the exercise of that authority and leave the
States free to act. An example of this relation existing between the Federal and
State governments is found in the pilot laws of the States, and the health and

',~-
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to create and maintain instrumentalities designed to carry those powers
into effect. It makes such laws the supreme law of the land. National
banks are such instrumentalities. McCulloch v. Maryland laid down
an unquestionable principle when it said that if the states had power
whether by taxation or otherwise, to destroy or hamper the effectiveness of such federal instrumentalities, the provisions of the Constitution
paraphrased above would be idle and meaningless. On the basis of that
principle it held void a tax levied by a state upon the operations of a
federal instrumentality, because such a tax would hamper the function
quarantine laws. The power of taxation under the Constitution as a general rule,
and as has been repeatedly recognized in adjudged cases in this court, is a concurrent power. The qualifications of the rule are the exclusion of the States from
the taxation of the means and instruments employed in the exercise of the functions of the Federal Government." 70 U. S. (3 Wall.) 573, 585. But if the concurrent theory of the Van Allen case were adopted, the taxing powers of the
states could be utterly destroyed, inasmuch as the taxing powers of Congress are
practically unlimited. "That the authority conferred upon Congress by § 8 of
Article I 'to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises' is exhaustive and
embraces every conceivable power of taxation has never been questioned, or, if it
has, has been so often authoritatively declared as to render it necessary only to
state the doctrine." Chief Justice White in Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co.
(1916) 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, 239. A mere statement of the limitations upon
the federal taxing power is sufficient to show that they alone would be insufficient,
if the "concurrent" theory of the Van Allen case were followed, to prevent virtual extinction by Congress of the taxing power of the states. The limitations on
the federal taxing power are as follows: "all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States." U. S. CoNST., Art. I, § 8. "No Capitation,
or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration
herein before directed to be taken." U. S. CONST., Art. I, § 9. Instrumentalities of
the states cannot be taxed. Collector v. Day (1870) 78 U. S. (11 Wall.) 113, 127.
The salaries of the president (U. S. CoNsT., Art. II, § 1 (7)) and federal judges
(U. S. CoNsT., Art. III, § 1; Evans v. Gore (1920) 253 U. S. 245, 40 Sup. Ct. 550;
Miles v. Graham (1925) 268 U. S. 501, 45 Sup. Ct. 601) are not taxable. Other
cases, moreover, seem to be directly opposed to the concurrent theory of the Van
Allen case. The well-settled law seems to be that the power of the states and the
nation to tax for the support of their own governments is co-extensive rather than
concurrent. This power may be exercised at the same time and upon the same
subjects by the United States and by the states "with ut any inconsistency or
repugnancy." Ward v. Maryland (1870) 79 U. S. (12 Wall.) 418, 428. See also
Passenger Cases (1849) 48 U. S. (7 How.) 283, 298-299 and Lane County v.
Oregon (1859) 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76-78. The meaning of "concurrent" as
regards taxation is clearly and forcefully set forth in Marshall's opinion in Gibbons
v. Ogden (1824) 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199, where it is said: "Congress is authorized to lay and collect taxes, etc., to pay the debts, and provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States. This does not interfere with the
power of the states to tax for the support of their own governments; nor is the
exercise of that power by the states, an exercise of any portion of the power that
is granted to the United States. In imposing taxes for state purposes, they are not
doing what Congress is empowered to do. Congress is not empowered to tax for
those purposes which are within the exclusive province of the states. When, then,
each government exercises the power of taxation, neither is exercising the power
of the other."

4
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of that instrumentality, such, indeed, being the very purpose of the tax.
The rest of the opinion dealing with this branch of the case, whatever
its merit, is dictum. We start, then, with the proposition that Congress
can create instrumentalities in aid of the exercise of its powers, and the
states cannot interfere with the functioning of those instrumentalities.
The bar to the operation of the states' taxing power is thus, not an
express prohibition in the Constitution, but an implied limitation due
to the potentiality of conflict with the exercise of federal power over the
same subject.1 6 The only limitation upon the power of Congress to
create instrumentalities is that they promote in some degree the fulfillment of the purpose of Congress in exercising its powers.' 7 If a tax
free instrument is, in the opinion of Congress, necessary to carry out
those purposes, Congress may so declare; if it believes those purposes
may be carried out by an instrument subject to state taxation it may
likewise so declare. If Congress has created an instrument and expressly
withheld from that instrument an immunity from state taxation, there
is no conflict with an exercise of federal power, and the states' general
tax laws of course take effect.'s Section 5219 should, therefore, be con16 Railroad Company v. Peniston (1873) 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 5, 36: "It is,
therefore, manifest that exemption of Federal agencies from State taxation is
dependent, not upon the nature of the agents, or upon the mode of their constitution, or upon the fact that they are agents, but upon the effect of the tax; that
is, upon the question whether the tax does in truth deprive them of power to serve
the government as they were intended to serve it, or does hinder the efficient exercise of their power."
17McCulloch v. Maryland, supra n. 6; Osborne v. Bank of United States
(1824) 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 738; First National Bank v. Fellows (1917) 244 U. S.
416, 37 Sup. Ct. 734; Missouri ex rel. Burnes Nat. Bank v. Duncan (1924) 265
U. S. 17, 44 Sup. Ct. 427.
18 That the states may regulate national banks so far as such regulation does
not conflict with express provisions of Congressional legislation or with the purposes thereof has been definitely established by numerous decisions of the Supreme
Court. It is submitted that there is no real distinction between the principle of
these cases and the principle underlying state taxation of national banks. For
cases in which state regulation has been upheld in absence of conflicting federal
legislation, see McClellan v. Chipman (1896) 164 U. S. 347, 17 Sup. Ct. 85 (state
statute invalidating assignments in fraud of creditors upheld as to preferences given
national banks); Waite v. Dowley (1877) 94 U. S. 527 (state statute upheld requiring cashiers of national banks within the state to transmit to clerks of the
several towns in the state a list of the names of its shareholders with the number
of their shares); First National Bank in St. Louis v. Stat of Missouri (1924)
263 U. S. 640, 44 Sup. Ct. 213 (upheld right of Missouri to enforce as against
national banks a state statute prohibiting the establishment of branch banks).
In this case, Mr. Justice Sutherland, delivering the opinion of the court, declared,
"Having determined that the power sought to be exercised by the bank finds no
justification in any law or authority of the United States, the way is open for
the enforcement of the state statute. In other words, the national statutes are
interrogated for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether anything they contain
constitutes an impediment to the enforcement of the state statute, and the answer
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sidered an express declaration by Congress that certain types of state
taxation will not be deemed an interference with the purpose of Congress in creating national banks, and an implied'9 declaration that all
being in the negative, they may be laid aside as of no further concern." 263 U. S.
at 660, 44 Sup. Ct. at 216.
For cases in which state laws have been held inoperative as regards national
banks because in conflict with the provisions or purposes of federal legislation, see
Mechanics' National Bank v. Dearing (1875) 91 U. S. 29 (state statute providing'
that obligations carrying a usurious interest rate should be wholly void held inapplicable to national banks because National Banking Act provided that in such
cases only the interest should be forfeited). The power of the state to regulate
contracts made by national banks was recognized but, in the words of the court,
"whenever the will of the nation intervenes exclusively in this class of cases, the
authority of the State retires and lies in abeyance until a proper occasion for its
exercise shall recur." Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank (1896) 161 U. S. 275, 16 Sup.
Ct. 502 (New York statute providing that deposits of savings bank in any bank
which should become insolvent should constitute a preferred claim held invalid as
to deposits of savings banks in national banks because National Banking Act required the assets of an insolvent national bank to be distributed ratably among
the creditors); First National Bank of San Jose v. California (1923) 262 U. S.
366, 1030, 43 Sup. Ct. 602 (California statute providing for escheat to state of
bank deposits remaining totally inactive for twenty years or more held invalid as
regards national banks as an interference by the state in the relations of the banks
with their depositors and impairing efficiency of the banks).
19 See also Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corporation (1928) 276 U. S. 575,
48 Sup. Ct. 333. In this case an Oklahoma tax on the production of oil was held
valid as applied to oil from land bought by a Creek Indian under supervision of
the Secretary of the Interior, although the Secretary had, apparently, attempted
to exempt it from state taxation. Mr. Justice Stone, delivering the opinion of the
court, declared:
"the lands now in question, and hence the interest of the lessee in them, are not
such instrumentalities of the government as will be declared immune from taxation in the absence of an express exemption by Congress and that the mere act of
the Secretary in imposing the restriction is not the exercise of any power which
may reside in Congress to exempt them from taxation.
"What governmental instrumentalities will be held free from state taxation,
though Congress has not expressly so provided, cannot be determined apart from
the purpose and character of the legislation creating them.; Metcalf & Eddy v.
Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514. The end sought and the mode of attaining it adopted by
Congress in the legislation providing for the welfare of the Indians by setting
apart, by allotment or otherwise, tribal lands or the public domain, restricted for
their benefit, led to the conclusion that those lands and the use of them were so
intimately connected with the performance of governmental functions as clearly to
require independence of all state control so complete that nothing short of an
express declaration by Congress would have subjected them to state taxation.
"Governmental agencies similarly held to be exempt are national banks, First
National Bank of Hartford v. Hartford, 273 U. S. 548; bonds of the national government, Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 467. . . . There are some
instrumentalities which, though Congress may protect them from state taxation,
will nevertheless be subject to that taxation unless Congress speaks. See Goudy v.
Meath, 203 U. S. 146, 149; Gromer v. Standard Dredging Co., 224 U. S. 362, 371;
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Pennsylvania, 240 U. S. 319, 323; Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5; Choctaw 0. & G. R. R. v. Mackey, 256 U. S. 531, 537; Central
Pac. R. R. v. California, 162 U. S. 91, 126. These lands we take to be of that
character."
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other kinds and degrees of taxation will be deemed an interference with
that purpose.
It is worthy of note that the solution found by Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland does not decide the vital question
dealt with in the theory above stated, and it is submitted, necessarily
decided by the cases which recognize and give effect to Section 5219.
Marshall first enlarged upon the constitutional necessity of operations
of federal instruments being immune from state interference. He then
stated the argument of the state that the power of the state to tax all
things within its borders was a sovereign and unsurrendered power.
Marshall solved the apparently irreconcilable conflict, not by denying
the contention of the state, but by denying the conflict. He assumed
and indeed admitted by implication the unrestrainable quality of the
state's power to tax. But, said he, the state's power extends, not to
everything within its borders, but to everything within its "sovereignty,"
and he held that instruments and operations of instruments placed
within the borders of the state by the federal government exercising
its supreme powers were not thereby placed within the "sovereignty"
of the state. With this reasoning it was unnecessary to decide what
would happen when those powers do in fact come into conflict. This is
the question raised and dealt with above, and in the cases enforcing the
provisions of Section 5219. Marshall assumed, no doubt correctly,20
that the property of individuals in shares in a national bank was subject to the state's sovereign power of taxation. Section 5219 is undoubtedly an interference with that power, and the court enforces it. It seems
therefore unquestionable that under the law as it now exists Congress
may, within limits not yet defined, 2 ' for the purpose of protecting and
20

See supra n. 15.

In National Bank v. Commonwealth (1869) 76 U. S. (9 Wall.) 353, the
Supreme Court, per Miller, J., in holding valid a state statute taxing shares of
national banks, declared, "The principle . . . [of McCulloch v. Maryland] has its
limitation, a limitation growing out of the necessity on which the principle itself
is founded. That limitation is, that the agencies of the Federal government are only
exempted from State legislation, so far as that legislation may interfere with, or
impair their efficiency in performing the functions by which they are designed to
serve that government. Any other rule would convert a principle founded alone in
the necessity of securing to the government of the United States the means of
exercising its legitimate powers, into an unauthorized and unjustifiable invasion
of the rights of the States." And somewhat further on in the opinion it is stated:
"They [national banks] are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in
their daily course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation.
All their contracts are governed and construed by State laws. Their acquisition
and transfer of property, their right to collect their debts, and their liability to
be sued for debts, are all based on State law. It is only when the State law incapacitates the banks from discharging their duties to the government that it
becomes unconstitutional. We do not see the remotest probability of this, in their
being required to pay the tax which their stockholders owe to the State for the
shares of their capital stock, when the law of the Federal government authorizes
the tax."
21
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fostering its lawful instruments, restrict the exercise of some of the
sovereign powers of the states, among them the taxing power. The
states may exercise their taxing powers until such exercise impinges
upon and interferes with a use by Congress, for its lawful purposes, of
the object taxed, when, because of the supremacy clause of the Constitution, the states must give way.
With respect to the point which Marshall actually decided, namely,
that a state tax upon the operations of a federal instrument was void,
it was unnecessary for him to decide whether such a tax was absolutely
void: whether it would be void even though Congress consented. The
exuberance of his rhetoric suggests that his condemnation of such a
tax was unqualified, but it is submitted that the Constitution does not
justify such a result. The tax is inoperative simply because the court
implies from Congressional silence that Congress deems a tax free instrument necessary to carry out the purposes of Congress in creating
that instrument. If the view of the nature of federal instruments set
out above be correct, then it is difficult to see how any kind or degree
of subjection of such instruments to state taxation could be unconstitutional per se. One may possibly imagine an instrument so hampered
and emasculated by state taxation, to which Congress had rendered it
vulnerable, that it would be completely incapable of performing any
lawful purpose. But even in this remote contingency the statute creating the instrument or authorizing the taxes, if it was void, would be so,
not because Congress had delegated any of its power to the states, but
because Congress had as a matter of fact created an instrument which
was worthless and therefore not an instrument authorized by the Constitution. In other words, it seems clear that no kind or degree of consent to taxation of a federal instrument could be anything more than a
limitation of the powers of the instrument. It could never be a delegation of federal powers. A grant of power to tax and therefore interfere
with an instrument created to subserve a federal power is not power to
interfere with the power subserved and could not possibly be considered
a grant of it.
In view of the foregoing discussion it is submitted that it makes no
difference to the validity or effect of Section 5219 that some of its
provisions may, or may be argued to, restrict the taxing power of the
states and that others may allow that power to operate directly upon
the instrument or its operations.
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II. WHAT IS "OTHER MONEYED CAPITAL IN THE HANDS OF
INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS"

A. "OTHER

MONEYED CAPITAL" Is NOT CONFINED TO CAPITAL
INVESTED IN BANKS

Section 5219 of the United States Revised Statutes has an extremely
interesting history. The statute, it will be recalled, provides, and has
always provided, that the taxation of national bank shares "shall not
be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the
hands of individual citizens . . . " The judicial history of this section
has been written around attempts of the courts to explain the key words,

"other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens." This phrase
has never ceased to puzzle legislators, judges, and taxpayers in spite of
the fact that the Supreme Court has several times attempted comprehensively to define its import. That capital invested in state banks is
"other moneyed capital" is obvious. 22 It has been strongly contended,
in fact, that the Congress which passed the measures that later became
Section 5219 intended the words to refer only to the stocks in state
banks and not to personal investments. 23 The United States Supreme
22

Mercantile Bank v. N. Y. (1887) 121 U. S. 138, 7 Sup. Ct. 826; City Bank
v. Paducah, (C. C. D. Ky. 1877) Fed. Cas. No. 2743.
23 The first (1864) restrictive act of Congress contained three express limitations on the state's power to tax national bank shares. See supra n. 11. Two of
these restrictions were as follows: (1) The rate imposed on national bank shares
must not be greater than that assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of
individual citizens; (2) The tax on national bank shares must not exceed that
imposed on state bank shares. The contention that Congress meant to refer to
state bank shares only would seem to render superfluous the first restriction. As a
matter of fact, however, the second restriction was actually considered superfluous, as it was omitted from the reehiactment of the statute in 1868. It might
be argued that the two limitations in the 1864 act were identical in meaning and
that one of them, it was a matter of indifference which one, was superfluous so
that no particular significance should be attached to omitting the second restriction rather than the first, inasmuch as either referred only to state bank shares.
This argument, however, seems unsound, for if Congress had in fact considered
the general and the specific restriction to be identical in meaning it would, it
seems safe to say, have omitted the former. The Supreme Court reached this conclusion in Boyer v. Boyer (1885) 113 U. S. 689, 691, 5 Sup. Ct. 706, 707:
"But the act of 1864 was so far modified by that of February 10, 1868, 15 Stat.
34, ch. 7, that the validity of such State taxation was thereafter to be determined
by the inquiry, whether it was a greater rate than was assessed upon other moneyed
capital in the hands of individual citizens, and not necessarily by a comparison with
the particular rate imposed upon shares in State banks. The effect, if not the
object, of the latter act was to preclude the possibility of any such interpretation
of the act of Congress as would justify States, while imposing the same taxation
upon national bank shares as upon shares in State banks, from discriminating
against national bank shares, in favor of moneyed capital not invested in State bank
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Court, however, when the matter has been presented to it, has not
hesitated to give the words a much broader meaning than capital invested in state banks.
The first case broadly to interpret the statute was People v.
Weaver.24 A New York statute, construed by the New York Court of
Appeals as not permitting holders of national bank shares to make the
same deductions for debts it allowed to those who had moneyed capital
otherwise invested, was held to conflict with Section 5219. National and
state bank shares were taxed equally, no deduction being allowed from
either, so the case clearly stands for the proposition that moneyed
capital within the meaning of the statute included capital other than
that invested in banks. In Evansville National Bank *v.Brittone5 the
court held invalid an Indiana statute which permitted deduction of
debts from "credits" but not from bank stock and other personal property. It was argued that the Indiana statute was to be distinguished
from the New York statute held invalid in People v. Weaver in that the
former allowed deduction of debts only from "credits," whereas the latter allowed the deduction from all personal property except bank stock.
The court was of the opinion, however, that the nature of the discrimination was just as important as the extent thereof and that of
all kinds of personal property, "credits" were, perhaps, most clearly
"other moneyed capital":
"The Act of Congress does not make the tax on personal property the
measure of the tax on bank shares in the State but the tax on moneyed
capital in the hands of the individual citizens. Credits, money loaned at
interest, and demands against persons or corporations are more purely
representative of moneyed capital than personal property, so far as they
can be said to differ." 26

The Weaver case was again followed and its principle extended in
Boyer v. Boyer,27 in which the court gi fte broadest interpretation
which has ever been given Section 5219. The case was as follows. A
Pennsylvania statute removed the burden of local taxation "from all
bonds or certificates of loan issued by any railroad company incorstock. At any rate, the acts of Congress do not now permit any such discrimination."
In spite of this decision the conclusion that Section 5219 applied only to state
banking associations was reached in 1919 by the Virginia court in Merchants National Bank v. Richmond (1919) 124 Va. 522, 98 S. E. 643. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the decision. Mr. Justice Pitney, delivering the opinion of
the court quoted from and adopted the reasoning of the Boyer case quoted above.
24 (1879) 100 U. S. 539.
25 (1882) 105 U. S. 322.
26 105 U. 5. 322, 324.
27 (1885) 113 U. 5. 689, 5 Sup. Ct. 706.
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porated by the State; from shares of stock in the hands of stockholders
of any institution or company of the State, which, in its corporate
capacity, is liable to pay a tax into the State treasury under the Act of
1859; from mortgages, judgments and recognizances of every kind;
from moneys due or owing upon articles of agreement for the sale of
real estate; from all loans however made by corporations which are
taxable for State purposes when such corporations pay into the State
treasury the required tax on such indebtedness." The case arose on an
injunction to restrain the levy of a county tax on shares of stock in a
national bank. The county demurred to the bill setting forth the exemptions allowed by the state laws above quoted, and contended that the
fact that a large amount of personal propqty other than bank shares
was exempt from taxation was immaterial in that such exemptions did
not include the shares of state banks and savings institutions. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sustained the demurrer, on the ground
that national bank shares were not taxed in any different manner nor
at a higher rate than other capital of a similar character. The United
States Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision, holding that the
state court had failed correctly to interpret the meaning of Section 5219.
The court declared that
"Capital invested in national bank shares was intended to be placed
upon the same footing of substantial equality in respect of taxation by
State authority as the State establishes for other moneyed capital in the
hands of individual citizens, however invested, whether in State bank
28
shares or otherwise!'"

The contention was made that public policy demanded that railroad
securities and the stocks and bonds of certain other corporations which
were liable to taxation for state purposes only should be exempt from
local taxation inasmuch as the principal revenues of the state were
derived from these sources. It is apparent from the answer of the court
to this contention that such capital was deemed to be within the meaning of Section 5219:
"It is quite sufficient in respect of such matters, to say that this court
has no function to deal with the considerations of public policy which
control that Commonwealth in the assessment of property for purposes of
revenue.... If the principle of substantial equality of taxation under State
authority, as between capital so invested and other moneyed capital in the
hands of individual citizens however invested, operates to disturb the
peculiar policy of some of the states in respect of revenue derived from
taxation, the remedy therefor is with another department of the govern29
ment, and does not belong to this court."
28 113 U. S. 689, 702. Italics added.
29 113 U. S. 689, 702.
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No limitation whatever seemed to be put upon the meaning of the
words "other moneyed capital." All capital, the value of which is measured in terms of money, was apparently included within the scope of
Section 5219. Although, as will presently appear, this holding was
somewhat modified in later decisions, the proposition that "other
moneyed capital" is confined to capital invested in banks has never
been sustained by the Supreme Court.

B.

"MONEYED

CAPITAL" AS USED IN SECTION 5219 MEANS ANY
THAT COMPETES WITH THE BUSINESS OF
NATIONAL BANKS

CAPITAL

The court very soon vrithdrew from the broad position taken in
Boyer v. Boyer. In Mercantile National Bank v. Mayor etc. of New
York, 30 a case of outstanding significance, the court very definitely
limited the rule of the Boyer case. The phrase "other moneyed capital"
was held to refer not to any kind of money capital but only to capital
in the hands of ihdividual citizens that competed with the business of
national banks. In other words, "moneyed capital" was deemed to be
capital employed in a manner similar to that in which banks employ
their money, i. e., where the object of the enterprise is to make a profit
by the use of the capital as money. "The moneyed capital thus employed is invested for that purpose in securities by way of loan, discount, or otherwise, which are from time to time according to the rules
of business, reduced again to money and reinvested." It was not the
intention of Congress to interfere with the states' taxing policies with
regard to business activities that did not compete with national banks.
As the court says in one of the most oft-quoted portions of its opinion,
"The main purpose ... of Congress, in fixing limits to state taxation
on investments in the shares of national banks, was to render it impossible for the state, in levying such a tax, to create and foster an unequal
and unfriendly competition, by favoring institutions or individuals
carrying on a similar business.dlperations and investmentsof a like
character. The language of the Act of Congress is to be read in the
light of this policy." 3 ' The apparently almost unlimited scope of the
phrase "other moneyed capital" as interpreted in the Boyer case is thus
unequivocally repudiated and in its place a purposive rather than a
merely literal connotation is adopted.
The court then examined the context of the phrase and found
therein further aid in determining its meaning:
30 (1887) 121 U. S. 138, 7 Sup. Ct. 826.
31 121 U. S. 138, 155.
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"Applying this rule of construction, we are led, in the first place, to
consider the meaning of the words 'other moneyed capital,' as used in the
statute. Of course it includes shares in national banks; the use of the word
'other' requires that. If bank shares were not moneyed capital, the word
'other' in this connection would be without significance."

In other words, when Congress says that national bank shares shall not
be taxed at a higher rate than "other moneyed capital" it necessarily
says that national bank shares are "moneyed capital," for if they were
not, then the other capital spoken of would not be "other" moneyed
capital but simply "moneyed capital." One might conclude, therefore,
that by "other" moneyed capital Congress must have meant only
capital, which like national bank shares, was "moneyed capital," but
which was not national bank shares (since it was "other") but shares in
banks not national, namely, state banks. This conclusion, however,
would be unquestionably wrong. By calling national bank shares
moneyed capital, Congress undoubtedly called shares in similar state
banks moneyed capital. But Congress could imply that all bank shares
are moneyed capital without implying that all moneyed capital is bank
shares. The court, quite properly, therefore, inquired further into the
scope of "other moneyed capital" on the basis of the purposive definition which it had formulated:
"But 'moneyed capital' does not mean all capital the value of which is
measured in terms of money. In this sense, all kinds of real and personal
property would be embraced by it, for they all have an estimated value as
the subjects of sale. Neither does it necessarily include all forms of investment in which the interest of the owner is expressed in money. Shares
of stock in railroad companies, mining companies, manufacturing companies, and other corporations, are represented by certificates showing that
the owner is entitled to an interest, expressed in money value, in the entire
capital and property of the corporation, but the property of the corporation which constitutes its invested capital may consist mainly of real and
personal property, which, in the hands of individuals, no one would think
of calling moneyed capital, and its business may not consist in any kind of
dealing in money, or commercial representatives of money." 32
32

1bid. So far as concerns the policy of the national government with reference
to national banks it is a matter of indifference, the court declared, how the corporations just mentioned, or the interests of individuals in them, are taxed. Whether
such interests are taxed has no effect in the contemplation of the law upon the
success of the national banks. The court has definitely held that corporations engaged in the following business enterprises are not considered in competition with
national banks and hence such corporations or shares of stock therein may be
exempt in whole or in part from taxation, as far as Section 5219 is concerned:
Mining Companies. Talbott v. Silver Bow County Commissioners (1890) 139
U. S. 438, 11 Sup. Ct. 594.
Gas Companies. First National Bank of Aberdeen v. County of Chehalis (1897)
166 U. S. 440, 17 Sup. Ct. 629.
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In other words, the test is not whether the thing specially favored
by the state's taxing laws is or is not capital in the form
money,
or measured in terms of money, but whether it is capital em loyed in
Telephone Companies. Bank of Redemption v. Boston (1887) 125 U. S. 60,
8 Sup. Ct. 772.
Building and Loan Associations. Davenport Bank v. Davenport Boar -of Equalization (1887) 123 U. S. 83, 8 Sup. Ct. 73; National Bank of Redemption v. Boston
(1887) 125 U. S. 60, 8 Sup. Ct. 772; Mercantile National Bank of Cleveland v.
Hubbard (1899) 98 Fed. 465.
I
ance Companies. People v. Commissioners (1866) 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 244;
B
of Redemption v. Boston (1887) 125 U. S. 60, 8 Sup. Ct. 772.
Savings bank deposits have been held not to come within the application of
Section 5219 because public policy favors the encouragement of savings banks and
because they do not compete with the distinctively commercial operations of
national banks. Mercantile National Bank v. New York, supra n. 22; Bank v.
Board of Equalization (1887) 123 U. S. 83, 8 Sup. Ct. 73; Bank of Redemption v.
Boston (1887) 125 U. S. 60, 8 Sup. Ct. 772; Mercantile National Bank v. Hubbard (N. D. Ohio, 1889) 98 Fed. 465.
Trust Companies. In the Mercantile Bank case, supra n. 22, the court declared
that under the laws of New York at that time trust companies were not banks in
the "commercial sense of that word and do not perform the functions of banks in
carrying on the exchanges of commerce. They receive money on deposit, it is true,
and invest it in loans, and so deal, therefore, in money and securities for money in
such a way as properly to bring the shares of stock held by individuals therein
within the definition of moneyed capital in the hands of individuals as used in the
Act of Congress. But we fail to find in the record any sufficient ground to believe
that the rate of taxation, which in fact falls upon this form of investment of
moneyed capital, is less than that imposed upon shares of stock in national banks."
12 U. S. 138.
In Jenkins v. Neff (1902) 186 U. S. 230, 22 Sup. Ct. 905, it was claimed that,
although the laws of New York did not permit trust companies to engage in the
banking business, they were in fact doing such business. The court held that, even
admitting that trust companies were in fact doing a banking business, it would not
presume that the state would show bad faith by permitting them to continue such
operations, and that investments in trust companies were not competitive with
national banking capital, even though such companies did temporarily compete
because of their illegal acts. This holding was expressly repudiated by the court in
First National Bank v. Hartford (1927) 273 U. S. 548, 552, 47 Sup. Ct. 462: "The
4 uestion [of competition within the meaning of Sectiqp 5219] is thus a mixed one
of law and fact, and in dealing with it we may review the facts in order correctly
to apply the law. The opposite view expressed in Jenkins v. Neff, 186 U. S. 230,
must be considered discarded by the later cases." By dictum in Amoskeag Savings
Bank v. Purdy (1913) 231 U. S. 373, 34 Sup. Ct. 114, trust companies were
assumed to be competing with national banks. From these dicts it seems safe to
assume that investments in trust companiks exercising the powers admittedly exercised by the companies in enkihs v. Neff would now be considered 'other moneyed
capita" aid Within the r
of Section 5219.
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trust business, subject to certain statutory limitations. FEDERAL RESERVE Act, 38
STAT. 251, 262 (1913), 12 U. S. C. § 248 (1926). The Supreme Court in upholding
this statute gave as one of the reasons for its decision the fact that trust companies
actually copt
ihthe business of national banks. First National Bank of Bay
City v. Fellows (1917) 244 U. S. 416, 425, 37 Sup. Ct. 734. See also IVissouri ex rel.
Burnes Nat. Bank v. Duncan, supra n. 17.
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the same kind of transactions in which national banks engage. The
question naturally arises at this point, what are the transactions in
which national banks engage? The court's answer to this question is one
of the most important parts of its opinion, for individuals or institutions
awhich perform any of these operations cannot with regard thereto be
givds advantages in the matter of taxation that are not extended to
owners of national bank shares:
"The business of banking as defined by law and custom, consists in the
issue of notes payable on demand, intended to circulate as money where
the banks are banks of issue; in receiving deposits payable on demand; in
discounting commercial paper; making
; buying and selling bills of exchange; negotiating loans, andd
1
mng in
mn
t
ilonm
municipal and other gnrLrtons. These are the operations in which
the capital invested in national banks is employed, and it is the nature of
that employment which constitutes it in the eye of this statute 'moneyed
capital."' 3

V

Regardless of the clear and definite holding of People v. Weaver and
Boyer-V. Boyer and the detailed opinion of the court in Mercantile
National Bank v.New York to the effect that "other moneyed capital"
as used in Section 5219 was not c nfined to capital invested in banks,
the states failed to provide in their Tax statutes for equality of taxation
of individually owned "'moneyed capital" and capital invested in banks.
Some states, including California, authorized a separate classification of
all intangible property except bank shares for low rate taxation. In
view of the cases mentioned it is surprising that it was not until 1921
that the Supreme Court was called upon to hold invalid such favored
treatient of intangibles. In that year in Merchants National Bank v.
RicktMond," the most important case on this subject since the Mercantile Bank case, the Supreme Court held invalid a state law and municipal ordihance taxing national bank shares, on the ground that bonds,
notes ad other evidences of indebtedness in the hands of individual
citizens were taxed at a lower rate t,an were bank shares. The State
of Virginia and the City of Richmond, by statute and ordinance, imposed a tax for state purposes at the rate of 35 cents and a tax for city
purposes at the rate of $1.40-a total of $1.75 upon the $100 of
vainato i-upon shares of stocks in state and national banks. Upon
t ngeneral, including bonds, notes and other evithe state rate was 6\5 cents and the city rate 30
ene
of 95 cents upon each $100 of valuation. The $1.75
sed upon national bank stocks to the aggregate value of
*l21(..13,56
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more than $8,000,000, and upon the stocks of state banks and trust
companies to the value of $6,000,000 and upwards, while the lower
rate was imposed upon bonds, notes and other evidences of indebtedness aggregating $6,250,000. The court asserted that it was shown by
evidence without dispute that moneyed capital in the hands of individuals invested in bonds, notes and other evidences of indebtedness
comes into competition with the national banks in the loan market.
It was the opinion of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals that the
purpose of Section 5219 was confined to the prevention of discrimination by the state in favor of state banking associations against national
banking associations and that therefore there was no repugnance of the
Virginia taxes to that section. The United States Supreme Court reiterated and elaborated upon its earlier holdings that this is too narrow a
view of the meaning of Section 5219, stating:
"By repeated decisions of this court, dealing with the restriction here
imposed, it has become established that, while the words 'moneyed capital
in the hands of individual citizens' do not include shares of stock in corporations that do not enter into competition with the national banks, they
do include something besides shares in banking corporations and others
that enter into direct competition with those banks. They include not only
moneys invested in private banking, properly so called, but investments of
individuals in securities that represent money at interest and other evidences of indebtedness such as normally enter into the business of banking."35

Immediately following the decision in the Richmond case, banks
in all parts of the country brought suits to test the validity of state tax
laws according special privileges to intangible property. The Richmond
decision also led to the amendment of Section 5219 in 1923. The section was reinacted and after the words, "other moneyed capital in the
hands of individual citizens," the following proviso was added:
"Provided that bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness in the
hands of individual citizens not engaged or employed in the banking business and representing merely personal investments not made in competition
with such business, shall not be deemed moneyed capital within the mean36
ing of this section."

It seems clear that the amendment was intended to be a proviso in
the proper sense of the word, i. e., was intended to except the types of
capital enumerated from the operation of the section. That purpose
might have been accomplished had the words "not made in competition
with such business" been omitted. But when the section as reeanacted
35 256 U. S. 635, 639. Italics added.
36 42 STAT. 1499.
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came before the Supreme Court in National Bank v. Anderson 7 the
court interpreted the amendment as follows:
"The defendants say that this renactment was intended as a legislative
interpretation of the prior restriction, and that the proceedings resulting in
its adoption so show. But, assuming that this is true, the situation is not
changed; for the reenactment did no more than to put into express words
that which, according to repeated decisions of this court, was implied
before. In Mercantile Nat. Bank v. New York, supra, where the terms and
purpose of the restriction were much considered, it was distinctly held that
the words 'other moneyed capital' must be taken as impliedly limited to
capital employed in substantial competition with the business of national
banks. In later cases that definition was accepted and given effect as if
written into the restriction . . . Thus in legal contemplation and practical
38
effect the restriction was the same before the rednactment as after."

The court thus held that the amendment was without any effect whatever. In general, interpretations of statutes which render the meaningless are not favored, and although the provi
is wit out doubt poorly
worded, it is at least arguable that the court's interpretation is not

justified.39
The Supreme Court has had occasion in several recent cases to
reaffirm the position taken in the Richmond case. In view of these
cases there can be no doubt whatever that individuals are competing
37

Supra n. 1.
38 269 U. S. 341, 350.

39 If the statute be read in the light of the fact that the amendment followed
upon the heels of the Richmond case, in which the very variety of investments
dealt with in the amendment were held to be within the restrictions of the statute,
it seems unreasonable to question the proposition that the amendment was designed
to change the rule of that case. See 64 CONG. REc. 4802-4803, 4959 (1923). It seems
that the only justification for the decision nullifying the proviso would be that the
language of the statute compelled the court to ignore the unquestionable intention
of Congress in enacting it. It is well settled, of course, that statutes are thus interpreted only when no other interpretation is possible. Other interpretations were
possible in this case. For example, it would seem quite possible to say that the
words "not made in competition with such business" were intended to be parenthetical or argumentative rather than a genuine qualification of the types of
investment enumerated.
The court held that the statute was merely declaratory. But if Congress was
simply declaring the existing rule, its attempt to do so was indeed a very imperfect
and misleading statement of the rule: a legislative attempt to enumerate all forms
of capital falling under this rule would be futile, impossible and dangerous dangerous because it would exclude all other forms of capital. It cannot be said
that Congress intended in fact that its list be exhaustive, for it did not include the
most obvious item, i. e., shares in state banks. Unless, therefore, the proviso be
treated as a meaningless jumble of words it must be said that Congress meant
either to exclude from the operation of the statute the forms of capital enumerated
or it meant to exclude all other forms. Since state bank shares were not listed, the
latter alternative is untenable.
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with national banks even though they make purely personal investments
in bonds, notes and other forms of indebtedness.
In First National Bank of Hartford v. Hartford,40 a rather belated
attempt was made to confine the phrase "other moneyed capital" as
used in Section 5219, to capital invested in banks. Under the laws of
Wisconsin an ad valorem tax was imposed upon the shares of all banks
as personal property within the assessment district in which the bank
was located. All debts due to any person and all stocks and bonds were
exempt from the ad valorem tax, but the income therefrom was taxed
under a general income tax, which was assumed by the state court, and
not questioned by the United States Supreme Court, as not to be the
equivalent or substitute for the ad valorem tax levied upon bank shares.
All persons doing a "banking business" in Wisconsin are required by
statute to incorporate as banks, and their shares are taxed in the same
way and at the same rate as shares in national banks, but the statute
expressly limited its application to those engaged in "soliciting, receiving, or accepting of money or its equivalent on deposit as a regular
business." There were individuals, firms and corporations in Wisconsin,
not required by its laws to be incorporated as banks, engaged in an
extensive business41 of loaning money on the security of notes, bonds
and mortgages and selling securities "all involving investment and reinvestment by them and their customers." The state supreme court
sustained the tax, holding that there was no capital in the hands of
individual citizens which was invested or used in substantial competition with the capital invested in national banks shares, inasmuch as all
persons doing a banking business were required to incorporate and were
taxed on their shares in the same manner and at the same rates as
national banks. The state court was thus apparently of the opinion that
Section 5219 was not violated unless the tax favored persons engaged
in "soliciting, receiving or accepting money or its equivalent on deposit
as a regular business." But this activity constitutes only a part of the
business of national banks. The United States Supreme Court refused
to approve the narrow interpretation of Section 5219 by the Wisconsin
court:
"The requirement of approximate equality in taxation is not limited to
investment of money capital in shares of state banks or to competing
capital employed in private banking. The restriction applies as well where
the competition exists only with respect to particular features of the business of national banks or where moneyed capital 'is employed, substantially
as in the loan and investment features of banking, in making investments
40

Supra n. 1.

41 For discussion of burden of proving discrimination see infra p. 108 et seq.
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by way of loan, discount or otherwise, in notes, bonds or other securities,
with a view to sale or repayment and reinvestment'."
"Competition may exist between other moneyed capital and capital invested in national banks, serious in character and therefore well within the
pupose of Section 5219, even though the competition be with some but not
all phases of the business of national banks. Section 5219 is not directed
merely at discriminatory taxation which favors a competing banking business. Competition in the sense intended arises not from the character of
the business of those who compete but from the manner of the employment of the capital at their command." 42

In First National Bank of Guthrie Center v. Anderson, 3 plaintiff
national bank brought suit on behalf of its shareholders to restrain
the collection of a tax against the latter on their shares. The complaint
of the bank stated that in the town of Guthrie Center the total levy for
local, county and state tax purposes on national bank shares was 143.5
mills on the dollar, whereas only 5 mills on the dollar was imposed
upon "notes, mortgages and other evidences of debt, and investments
of individuals in securities, which represent money at interest, and other
evidence of indebtedness such as normally enter into the business of
banking. . . . That the amount of notes, mortgages and other evidences
of money loaned and put out at interest . . . was a very large sum,

which amount plaintiff is unable to state; but upon information and
belief plaintiff charges said amount to be more than $5,000,000 . . .
while the total of all bank stock, including state and national in Guthrie
County, Iowa, does not exceed the sum of $316,852." The defendant
county officers charged with the duty of collecting the taxes interposed
a general demurrer to the petition. The demurrer, sustained by the state
court, was overruled by the United States Supreme Court on the
ground that the discrimination charged in the petition on the authority
of settled decisions, was in conflict with the restrictions of the federal
statute. The state supreme court regarded the petition as alleging simply that notes and other evidences of moneyed loans, payment of which
is secured upon farm lands, were taxed at a lower rate than bank
shares. Moneyed capital loaned on farm mortgages, it was argued,
was not to be regarded as loaned or invested in competition with
national banks, inasmuch as state and national banks were the instrumentalities through which much the larger portion of farm loans were
made, which were thus a source of profit to the bank: "Surely moneyed
capital loaned and invested by banks, as the agents of their customers,
cannot be said to be loaned in competition therewith. Competition means
rivalry, and the loaning of money by national and other banks for
42 273 U. S. 548, 556, 557.
43
Supra n. 1.

17-z.

106

17 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW .

individuals at a profit, or for the convenience of such owners is lacking
in all the essentials of competition." The United States Supreme Court
answered this contention as follows:
"We find . . . [in the allegations in the petition] no specific mention of

farm mortgages, nor anything indicating that they refer only to such
mortgages. No doubt they are broad enough to include farm mortgages;
but this does not weaken the allegation of competition, for while national
banks were formerly prohibited from making loans on real estate, Rev.
Stat. §§ 5136, 5137; Union National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621, 625;
National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S. 99, the prohibition was partly withdrawn and much of that field was opened to such banks by the Acts of
December 22, 1913, c. 6, § 24, 38 Stat. 273, and September 7, 1916, c. 461,
39 Stat. 754."44

This case apparently stands for the proposition that the extension of
the power of national banks effects a corresponding extension of the
field of business activities that compete with the business of national
banks.
The court's concise summary of the restrictions upon state taxation
of national banks forcibly and definitely sets out its present interpretation of Section 5219:
"1. The purpose of the restriction is to render it impossible for any
state, in taxing the shares, to create and foster an unequal and unfriendly
competition with national banks, by favoring shareholders in state banks
or individuals interested in private banking or engaged in operations and
investments normally common to the business of banking. Mercantile
National Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138, 155; Des Moines National
Bank v. Fairweather,supra.
"2. The term 'other moneyed capital' in the restriction is not intended to
include all moneyed capital not invested in national bank shares, but only
that which is employed in such way as to bring it into substantial competition with the business of national banks. Mercantile National Bank v.
New York, supra; Aberdeen Bank v. Chehalis County, 166 U. S. 440, 461.
"3. Moneyed capital is brought into such competition where it is invested in shares of state banks or in private banking; and also where it
is employed, substantially as in the loan and investment features of banking, in making investments, by way of loan, discount or otherwise, in
notes, bonds or other securities with a view to sale or repayment and re44 The court dismissed the contention that the banks were really benefited by the
system of farm loans as follows: "As the case now stands, we think no effect can
be given to what the state court assumes is the practice of banks in rural portions
of Iowa in making farm loans as agents for their customers or others. If there be
such a practice, it is not a matter which may be noticed and given effect without
pleading or proof. If followed by some banks it may not be followed by others.
The state court does not speak of it as universal, but only as followed by 'many
banks.' Certainly the record gives no ground for holding that the plaintiff follows
it. In this situation the allegation of competition stands unaffected by the assumed
practice." 269 U. S. at 354.
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investment. Mercantile National Bank v. New York, supra; Palmer v.
McMahon, 133 U. S. 660, 667, 668; Talbott v. Silver Bow County, 139
U. S. 438, 447.
"4. The restriction is not intended to exact mathematical equality in the
taxing of national bank shares and such other moneyed capital, nor to
do more than require such practical equality as is reasonably attainable
in view of the differing situations of such properties. But every clear discrinination against national bank shares and in favor of a relatively
material part of other moneyed capital employed in substantial competition with national banks is a violation of both the letter and spirit of
the restriction. People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539; Boyer v. Boyer, 113
U. S. 689; National Bank of Wellington v. Chapman, 173 U. S. 205,
216."145

III. WHAT IS A GREATER RATE?
If a state taxes national bank shares, "the tax shall not be at a
greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital

. . .

" The

court has interpreted the words "at a greater rate" to be applicable not
only to rates but to any discriminatory state taxation. The discriminatory character of a state tax is usually confined, however, to either the
rates or the basis of assessment. If the valuation of national bank
shares in proportion to their real value is higher than that of other
moneyed capital the tax is as vicious as if the rates themselves had
been discriminatory. Few cases simply involving unequal rates have
reached the United States Supreme Court. Most of the cases have been
brought before that court because of an alleged discrimination in the
valuation of national bank shares. The following general situations presenting the problem of discrimination in the basis of assessment have
arisen: (1) National bank shares have been taxed by entirely different
methods of assessment from those used in taxing state banks and other
moneyed capital; (2) taxpayers have been allowed by state law to
deduct debts from credits but not from the valuation of national bank
shares; (3) holders of "other moneyed capital" such as state bank
shares have been allowed to deduct the value of federal tax exempt
securities held by the state bank from the taxable value of the shares
where owners of national bank shares were not allowed to do so;
(4) holders of shares in a national bank have not been permitted to
deduct taxes paid by the bank as a shareholder in another national
bank, resulting in double taxation. A brief survey of the cases will
show how the Supreme Court has met and solved the problems presented to it in each of the above situations.
Section 5219 does not require absolute equality of treatment of national bank shares and other moneyed capital in the hands of individual
45 269 U. S. 341, 347-348.
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citizens. Nor is any uniform rule prescribed as to the manner or mode
of taxing national bank shares. If the actual tax burden on national
bank shares is not in excess of the burden upon "other moneyed capital"
the state may exercise its own independent judgment regarding its tax
methods without fear of violating Section 5219.48
A national bank shareholder wishing to escape state taxation of his
shares has the burden of proving discrimination in favor of "other
moneyed capital." He must establish that a substantial amount 47 of
capital favored by the state tax laws is employed in actual competition
with the business of national banks. The rule as to proof of discrimination is emphatically set forth by the court in its opinion in First National Bank of Garnett v. Ayers:48
"In order to come to a decision in favor of the plaintiff in error, it
would be necessary for this court to take . . . judicial notice of what is

claimed to be a fact, viz., that the amount of moneyed capital in the State
of Kansas from which debts may be deducted, as compared with the
moneyed capital invested in shares of national banks, was so large and
substantial as to amount to an illegal discrimination against national bank
shareholders. This we cannot do. . . . The relative proportions in which
the moneyed capital of the State of Kansas is invested in the various kinds
of securities to be therein found, this court cannot judicially know. When
proof shall be made regarding this matter, it may then be determined
intelligently whether . . . there has been a real discrimination against the
holders of national bank shares."

However, in order to prove substantial competition it is not necessary to show that national banks and competing investors solicit the
same customers for the same loans or investments. "It is enough
if both engage in seeking and securing in the same locality capital investments of the class now under consideration which are substantial in
amount." 49
46

See opinion of Brewer, J., dissenting in San Francisco National Bank v.
Dodge (1905) 197 U. S. 70, 25 Sup. Ct. 384.
47 In Lionberger v. Rouse (1870) 76 U. S. (9 Wall.) 468, discrimination in
favor of a "substantial" amount of other moneyed capital was not proved by
showing that two state banks by contract contained in their charter could be taxed
only one per cent on their capital stock, which was less than the rate on national
bank stock. In sustaining the tax the court said, "It is not denied that these two banks
hold a very inconsiderable portion of the banking capital of the State, and that the
shares of all other associations in the State (there being many), with all the privileges of banking . . . are taxed like the shares in National Banks." 76 U. S. (9
Wall.) 468, 474.
48 (1896) 160 U. S. 660, 667, 16 Sup. Ct. 412. See also Bank of Commerce v.
Seattle (1897) 166 U. S. 463, 464, 17 Sup. Ct. 996, which was quoted with approval
by Pitney, J., who delivered the opinion of the court in National Bank v. Richmond (1921) 256 U. S. 635, 641, 41 Sup. Ct. 619.
49 First National Bank v. Hartford (1927) 273 U. 5. 548, 559, 47 Sup. Ct. 462.
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Georgetowm National Bank v. McFarland5 o is the latest case in
which the Supreme Court refused to invalidate a state tax upon national
bank shares because of lack of proof that a substantial amount of
capital favored by state tax laws was employed in actual competition
with the business of national banks. The state taxed money, notes,
bonds and other credits for state purposes at a rate of 40c per $100.
National and state bank shares were subject to this tax and, in addition,
to local taxation as well. There was thus a clear case of discrimination
on the face of the law and it was contended by plaintiff bank that
where all moneyed capital is exempt from local taxation except bank
shares the law is void on its face without proof. The court rejected this
contention and refused to invalidate it on the ground that "the evidence with respect to capital invested by individuals, taken as a whole,
falls short of establishing that the capital thus used is employed substantially as in the loan and investment features of banking in making
investments by way of loan or discount, or in notes, bonds, and other
securities, with a view to sale or repayment and reinvestment." 51
The shareholder has a more difficult task in establishing discrimination, when the state has one method for taxing national bank shares and
different methods for taxing state banks and "other moneyed capital,"
than when the same method is used in taxing both. In Davenport National Bank v. Board of Equalization,52 national bank shares were
directly taxed, shares in state savings banks were not taxed but the
capital of the savings banks was taxed directly at the same rate imposed
on national bank shares. The court upheld the tax on the ground that it
50 (1927) 273 U. S. 568, 47 Sup. Ct. 467.
51 273 U. S. 568, 570. Mr. Justice Stone, who delivered the opinion of the court
in this case, although affirming the decision of the state court, criticized its opinion
for paying "more attention than we think justified to the difference between shorttime and long-time loans and to the readiness with which the banks obtain loans,
notwithstanding the competition alleged." This criticism is very interesting in view
of the following and rather convincing argument of the state court: "It is shown
by all the testimony that the banks made short-time loans, and that they decline
to make loans on long time. It is also shown that the banks are lending to the
limit and are rediscounting their paper in order to accommodate customers for a
large part of the year. The moneyed capital of individuals is invested in notes given
for the purchase-money of land or secured by mortgage on land running for a
longer time than banks are willing to lend money for. It is not shown by anybody
that any appreciable amount of money held by individuals is used in short-time
loans, such as the banks made, and, this being true the capital invested in land
notes and the like does not come into competition with the national banks, for
they do not handle this character of paper." McFarland v. Georgetown National
Bank (1925) 208 Ky. 7, 12, 270 S. W. 995, 997. Quoted by Lutz, 13 BULLETIN OF
NATIONAL TAx AssocIATIoN (1928) No. 9, p. 265.
52 (1887) 123 U. S. 83, 8 Sup. Ct. 73.
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"did not satisfactorily appear from anything found in the record that
this tax upon the moneyed capital of the savings banks is not as great
as that upon the shares of stock in the national banks. It is not a necessary nor a probable inference from anything in this system of taxation
that it should be so, and it is not shown by any actual facts in the record
that it is so. If then, neither the necessary, usual or probable effect of
the system of assessment discriminates in favor of the savings banks
against the national banks upon the face of the statute, por any evidence
is given of the intention of the legislature to make such a discrimination,
nor any proof that it works an actual and material discrimination, it is
53
not a case for this court to hold the statute unconstitutional."

In San Francisco National Bank v. Dodge54 it was contended that
a California law imposing a tax upon national bank shares but not
upon the shares of state banks or other moneyed corporations was void
on its face. State banks and corporations were taxed upon their property. The court held that no conflict necessarily arises between the
act of Congress and the state law solely because the latter provides one
method for taxation of state banks and other moneyed corporations
and other methods for national banks. The court found the tax invalid,
however, since national bank shares were taxed upon their full value
which included the elements of value contributed by "good will, dividend earning power, the ability with which the corporate affairs were
managed, the confidence reposed in the capacity and permanence of
tenure of the officers, and all those other indirect and intangible elements
of value which enter into the estimate of the worth of the stock and
help to fix the market value or selling price of the shares," whereas the
taxation of state banks on their property only did not include these
intangible elements of value.55
53 The court then cites the opinion in Mercantile Bank v. New York, supra n. 22,
that capital in savings banks was not in competition with national banking capital
but finds it "unnecessary to inquire whether the savings banks of Iowa are based
upon principles similar to those of New York which were the subject of the opinion
in Mercantile Bank v. New York, for while in that case the savings banks were
exempt from taxation, the Iowa statute imposes a tak upon them equal to that
imposed upon the shares of national banks." 123 U. S. 83, 86.
54
Supra n. 46.
55 It is interesting to observe in the cases just discussed that in determining
whether or not the state tax is discriminatory as to national bank shares the court
does not compare the tax imposed on national bank shareholders with the tax
burden on the state bank shareholders but with the tax on the state banks themselves. In other words, the states are allowed to set off the tax burden imposed on
the state banks directly against the tax burden imposed on national bank shares.
The states are thus allowed what seems a quite proper and harmless freedom in
the method of taxing state banks. If the court were absolutely consistent and gave
full force to the italicised portion of the phrase, "other moneyed capital in the
hands of individual citizens," it would not translate a tax burden upon the state
banks into a tax burden upon the interests of individual citizens in those banks.
The court wil not permit a direct tax upon a national bank to be translated into
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An interesting problem of discrimination arising from difference in
tax methods is presented by the New York case of People ex rel. Hanover National Bank v. Goldfogle56 which involved the comparison of an
ad valorem tax on national bank shares with an income tax on other
moneyed capital. Bank shares, national and state, were taxed at one
per cent of their book value. Individuals were taxed upon their gross
income subject to certain exemptions at a rate of from one to three per
cent. Dividends from bank stock were not included in the list of exemptions and the New York laws were therefore construed as taxing bank
shares, both directly by the ad valorem tax and indirectly by the income
tax levied on dividends received from the shares. As competing capital
was taxed on income only there was a clear case of discrimination on
the face of the statute. It is not clear from the opinion whether substantial discrimination was actually proved or whether the court took
judicial notice of the fact that the amount of competing moneyed
capital "was not inconsiderable" and "in the city of New York in the
year 1921 .

.

. nearly twice the total capital of the state and national

banks." The court
fact that national
ad valorem tax on
"in no event would

went on to hold, however, that even aside from the
bank stock was exempted from the income tax the
national bank shares was invalid on the ground that
equality exist unless the income on competing capital

a tax upon the bank's shareholders; should it do so when state banks are taxed?
In Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro (1899) 173 U. S. 664, 19 Sup. Ct. 537,
it was urged that a tax upon the franchise of property of the plaintiff national
bank was equivalent to a tax on the shares of stock in the names of the shareholders. The court, standing fast by the distinct entity theory, rejected this contention and held that the tax, being admittedly levied on the bank directly, was
not within the purview of the authority conferred by Section 5219 and was therefore illegal. In the course of the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice White, it is
said: "It cannot be doubted that, as a general principle, it is settled that the taxation of the property, franchises and rights of a corporation is one thing, and the
taxation of the shares of stock in the names of the shareholder is another and
different one. . . . It is unnecessary to multiply citations on this subject, as the
question has been in recent cases reviewed and restated fully by the court." 173
U. S. 664, 681. If national banks and their shareholders are separate and distinct
entities it would seem that state banks and their shareholders are equally separate
and distinct. See Henry Rottschaefer, State Taxation of National Bank Shares
(1923) 7 MINNESOTA L. REv. 357, 366.

As to the collection of any valid tax on shares of national banks, the banks
may be required to pay the entire tax levied upon the shareholders, without
invalidating the tax as one upon the banks, upon the theory that the bank is acting
as the agent of the shareholders with alien upon the shares and dividends as
security for repayment of the tax. First National Bank v. County of Chehalis,
supra n. 32; National Bank v. Ky. (1869) 76 U. S. (9 Wall.) 353; Merchants and
Manufacturers Nat. Bank v. Penn. (1897) 167 U. S. 461, 17 Sup. Ct. 829; Home
Savings Bank v. Des Moines (1907) 205 U. S. 503, 27 Sup. Ct. 571.
56 (1922) 234 N. Y. 345, 137 N. E. 611. Petition for writ of certiorari denied by
United States Supreme Court (1923) 261 U. S. 620, 43 Sup. Ct. 432. For comment
on this case see Note (1923) 8 CORNELL L. Q. 279.
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were large beyond the dreams of avarice and the usual returns on
investments."
"How can equality be established or presumed as the necessary result
of the taxing statutes? In a very considerable number of cases the valuation tax must inevitably be the heavier burden. It is fixed and certain. The
income tax is variable and dependent on income and amount of income.
It is conceivable that when returns on such capital are low, the bank
stock would be taxed and the competing capital would be exempt." 57

The inequality arising from the New York laws is easily demonstrated. A 1% tax on a share of national bank stock of a book value
of $1000 is $10. One thousand dollars of competing moneyed capital
would have to bring in an income of $333.33, or a return of 33/% on
the investment to entitle the state to a $10 tax at 3%, the highest rate
imposed by the income tax law.58
One of the earliest forms of discrimination against national bank
shares lay in the practice of permitting personal debts to be deducted
from credits but not from the value of national bank shares. The court
in People v. Weaver,59 it will be recalled, held invalid as regards national bank shares a New York statute allowing debts to be set off
against all forms of personal property except national and state bank
shares. However, a shareholder cannot attack the statute unless he has
debts to deduct." Furthermore, if the state has different methods of
taxing national bank shares from other moneyed capital it may allow
deduction of debts from other moneyed capital and not from the value
of bank shares if an actual discrimination is not proved.
In Amoskeag Savings Bank v. Purdy6 1 the court was called upon to
determine the validity of a New York statute which taxed national
bank shares at a rate of one per cent on their book value (capital, surplus and undivided profits of the bank divided by the number of out57 234 N. Y. 345, 354, 137 N. E. 611, 614.
It is important to note that Section 5219 now permits the taxation of bank
dividends under a personal income tax as well as the taxation of the income of
the bank itself under a corporate income tax: "A state which imposes a tax on or
according to or measured by the net income of, or a franchise or excise tax on,
financial, mercantile, manufacturing, and business corporations organized under
its own laws or laws of other states and also imposes a tax upon the income of
individuals, may include in such individual income dividends from national banking associations located within the state on condition that it also includes dividends from domestic corporations and may likewise include dividends from
national banking associations located without the state on condition that it also
includes dividends from foreign corporations, but at no higher rate than is imposed on dividends from such other corporations."
58
5See Note (1923) 8 CORNELL L. Q. 279.
59
Supra n. 24.
6
o Supervisors of Albany County v. Stanley (1882) 105 U. S. 305.
61 (1913) 231 U. 5. 373, 34 Sup. Ct. 114.
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standing shares) and which left out of consideration other elements
such as good will and the like which enter into the determination of the
actual market value of such shares. Other personal property, including
capital of individual bankers, was taxed directly upon its full value,
which presumably meant market value, at a higher rate than that
imposed upon national bank shares. From this value, however, the taxpayer was permitted to deduct personal debts. These deductions were
not allowed owners of national bank shares, and it was therefore contended, upon the authority of People v. Weaver, that national bank
shares were discriminated against in violation of Section 5219. The
court pointed out the difference in method of taxing bank shares and
other personal property as a basis of distinguishing the law in question
from the one in the Weaver case. In view of the different basis
of taxation it was held that allowing deduction of debts from the value
of other property was unlikely to discriminate against national bank
shares 62 but "as against the owner of bank shares, who, by alleging
discrimination assumes the burden of proving it, and who fails to show
that the method of valuation is unfavorable to him, it may be assumed
to be advantageous." It was further held that Section 5219 deals with
shareholders as a class and not as individuals so that if the tax is fair
to the class the fact that an owner of national bank stock, who is
indebted, may sustain a heavier tax than another, likewise indebted,
who has invested his money otherwise, will not render the tax invalid.
The language of Section 5219 "clearly prohibits discrimination against
shareholders in national banks and in favor of the shareholders of competing institutions, but it does not require that the scheme of taxation
shall be so arranged that the burden shall fall upon each and every
shareholder alike, without distinction arising from circumstances personal to the individual."
Although the state requires the valuation at its true cash value of
all moneyed capital, including shares of national banks, the systematic
and intentional under-valuation of all other moneyed capital, by the
taxing officers, far below its true value while national banks are assessed
at full value, is a violation of Section 5219. In Pelton v. Commercial
National Bank of Cleveland,13 the county auditor, a member of the
62 "With respect to individual bankers, there is a difference, they being apparently
subject to the local rate of taxation and entitled to the privilege of deduction for
personal debts; but as they are taxable upon the amount of the capital invested
in the banking business which is normally only such as remains after the deduction
of debts, it is not plain that they possess any valuable privilege of reducing the
tax assessment by deducting debts." 231 U. S. 373, 392, 34 Sup. Ct. 114, 121.
63 (1880) 101 U. S. 143. See also Cummings v. Merchants Nat. Bank of Toledo
(1880) 101 U. S. 153; Whitbeck v. Mercantile Nat. Bank (1888) 127 U. S. 193,

Avx,
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Board of County Equalization, testified that the valuation placed upon
the shares of national banks was higher in proportion than the valuation of other personal property, including banking capital. He stated
that the matter was talked over in the board and that it was their aim
to make it higher and that the value placed by them on national bank
shares was intentionally higher than the assessed value returned by
private banks. The court held void the discriminatory excess by the
board as "this discrimination was neither an accident nor a mistake nor
a rule applied only to this Bank . . . it was a principle deliberately

adopted to govern their action in the valuation of all the shares of
national banks and applied to them all without exception."
First National Bank v. County of Chehalis" is the most liberal
of all the court's decisions sustaining a state's tax upon national bank
shares. The bank sought to enjoin the collection of a county tax upon
the shares of its capital stock, alleging that the tax violated Section
5219 for the following reasons: (1) there was exempt in the county,
loans and securities due to residents of the county from residents of the
county "of vast amount, to wit, exceeding the sum of two hundred and
thirty-seven thousand four hundred dollars"; (2) there was exempt in
the state outside of the county, $14,000,000 in loans and securities due
from residents to residents; (3) at least $26,000,000 of stocks and
bonds of insurance, wharf and gas companies were exempt, while the
total capitalization of all national banks in the state was only $7,000,000.
These allegations were admitted by demurrer to the bill which was sustained by the court on the ground that the capital in question was not
proved to be of a kind that comes into competition with national banks.
With regard to the second and third allegations, the court has ample
authority to support it but it seems that the first allegation made a
prima facie case of illegation discrimination clearly within the reasoning of the Mercantile Bank case, and that a demurrer to such an allegation would not be sustained today.65
Owners of national bank shares have complained that state taxing
laws discriminate against their shares when no provision is made for
deducting investments of the bank in United States securities in arriving at the value of the shares, although such deductions are made in
determining the value of assets of private bankers and individual citizens for taxation purposes. In the recent case of Des Moines National
66
Bank v. Fairweather,
the United States Supreme Court upheld a
8 Sup. Ct. 1121; Covington v. First Nat. Bank of Covington (1905) 198 U. S.
100, 25 Sup. Ct. 562.
64 (1897) 166 U. S. 440, 17 Sup. Ct.. 629.
5 See First Nat. Bank v. Richmond, supra n. 1; First Nat. Bank v. Anderso.,
supra n. 1.
66 (1923) 263 U. 5. 103, 44 Sup. Ct. 23.
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Iowa tax upon national bank shares, although no deduction was made
of the value of national securities from the taxable value of the shares.
Shares of stock in national and state banks were taxed in the same
manner but a deduction of the value of federal securities was made from
the value of the assets of private bankers who were taxed upon their
banking capital. Plaintiff bank contended that the tax was void (1) as
a tax upon exempt securities; and (2) because the failure to make
provision for deduction of national securities discriminated against
national banks. The court held, however, that the tax upon the bank
stock was not a tax upon tax exempt securities, even though the value
of the stock was largely dependent upon the value of the securities.
The decision on this point was placed upon the theory that the bank
and the shareholders were separate and distinct entities, the securities
being strictly the property of the bank and in no sense that of the
shareholders.67 The court has repeatedly held that as the tax is simply
on the shares it makes no difference how the bank's capital is invested.68
For example, the state is not required to make deductions from the
value of the shares because of real estate owned by the bank outside of
the taxing state;69 and although the bank's real property in the state
may be taxed by express permission of Section 5219, its value need
not be deducted from the assessed value of the shares when they are
taxed.70 The court in the Fairweather case answered the plaintiff's contention that national bank shares were being taxed at a greater rate
than other moneyed capital by stating that the exemption allowed
private bankers was merely in recognition of, and obedience to, another
law of the federal government that United States securities in the hands
of individuals cannot be taxed by the states. The discrimination was
67 For the same reason tax exempt securities need not be deducted from the
value of state bank shares when they are taxed. People v. Commissioners (1866)
A
71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 244, 258.
68 Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander (1902) 184 U. S. 111, 22 Sup. Ct. 394; Home
Savings Bank v. Des Moines (1907) 205 U. S. 503, 27 Sup. Ct. 571. In Home
Savings Bank v. Des Moines, the court declared that Vah Allen v. Assessors has
"settled the law that a tax upon the owners of shares of stock . . . is not a tax
upon United States securities which the corporation owns." It was also asserted
in the same case, "But the distinction between a tax upon shareholders and one
on the corporate property, although established over dissent, has come to be inextricably mingled with all taxing systems and cannot be disregarded without bringing
them into confusion which would be little short of chaos." 205 U. S. 503, 518.
See also: National Bank v. Kentucky, supra n. 55; Palmer v. McMahon (1890)'
133 U. S. 660, 666, 10 Sup. Ct. 324; Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee (1896) 161
U. S. 134, 146, 16 Sup. Ct. 456; New Orleans v. Citizens Bank. (1897) 167 U. S.
371, 402, 17 Sup. Ct. 905; First Nat. Bank v. Hannan (1924) 266 U. S. 638, 45

Sup. Ct. 9.

.Chambers (1901) 182 U. S. 556, 561, 21 Sup. Ct. 863.
Savings Bank v. Purdy, supra n. 61; People's Nat. Bank v. Mayre
C. C. E. D. Va. 1901) 107 Fed. 570, 579.
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really imposed by the federal law. It must be admitted, however, that
although the result reached is perhaps a necessary consequence of the
court's adherence to the entity theory, there nevertheless was actual
discrimination against national bank shareholders. Whether the corporation or the shares is the subject taxed the burden is ultimately
borne by the shareholder. If private bankers can deduct the value of
investments in United States securities and national bank shareholders
cannot, private banking capital obviously is operating under relatively
lighter burdens than competing national banking capital.
In Montana National Bank of Billings v. Yellowestone Count y, 71
the court, no doubt properly, refused to carry the reasoning of the
Fairweather case to its logical conclusion. National bank shares were
taxed to their full value, including the value contributed by liberty
bonds and other non-taxable securities. State bank shares were not
taxed. State banks, however, were directly taxed upon the value of
their assets, necessarily excluding therefrom the value of tax exempt
securities. It was contended on the authority of the Fairweather case,
that since the exemption from taxation of the federal securities in the
hands of the state banks was created by federal statute, the discrimination was one which the state could not avoid. The court, Mr. Justice
Sutherland writing the opinion, in holding that the tax imposed an
invalid discrimination against national bank shares, considered the
state's view of the Fairweather case "entirely erroneous." The cases
were distinguished as follows:
"The statutes of Iowa . . . [involved in the Fairweather case] . . .
expressly provide that shares of stock in national banks and . . . trust

companies located in the state shall be assessed to the individual stockholders; and shares of national banks and those of competing state corporations are put, for purposes of taxation, upon terms of exact equality.
The provisions of the Iowa statute which was assailed related to the
assessment of capital employed by individual bankers (p. 105); and this
Court held that the restriction of § 5219 was not violated because the
state, perforce, allowed a deduction of federal securities in assessing the
capital of such individual bankers; that the federal law made such securities exempt and the state merely respected the exemption. P. 117. The
decision in no way affects the rule (Van Allen v. Assessors and other
cases, supra) that in respect of the taxation of state corporate banks, the
shares must be taxed as they are in the case of national banks, so far as
necessary to prevent discrimination, and that, in neither case, does the
72
exemption of federal securities apply in the taxation of such shares."

Where the state taxes national bank shares and does not tax state
bank shares but taxes state bank capital, the court in effect translates
71 (1928) 276 U. S. 499, 48 Sup. Ct. 331.
72 276 U. S. 499, 503.
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a tax on the state bank capital into a tax upon the state bank shares.7 3
But the condition on which the states are allowed to tax other moneyed
capital by different methods from those used in taxing national bank
shares is that the actuM tax burden on national bank shares must not
be in excess of the burden resting ultimately upon other moneyed
capital. The tax in the Billings case did not meet this condition and
was therefore invalid. Whether the court's attempt to distinguish the
Fairweather case was successful or not, the result reached seems to be
unquestionably correct, because factual discrimination was admitted.
The Fairweather case seems to weaken the sufficiency of mere factual
discrimination in this situation as a ground for invalidating a tax; but
it does not for the following reasons: So far as the logic of the distinction between the cases is concerned the court's adherence to the entity
theory cannot be questioned, whatever be its merits when separately
considered, and once the entity theory is accepted as a premise, the
cases are clearly distinguishable. Under the express provisions of Section 5219 a state can tax national bank shares and cannot tax national
bank capital. And the entity theory seems to compel the conclusion
that a tax on the shares is properly measured by their value regardless
of the basis of that value. A tax on private bankers, on the other hand,
is perforce a tax on their capital and includes perforce, an exemption
of that part of the value represented by federal securities. The result is
that the statute exempting federal securities plus the court's adherence
to the entity theory justified, if it did not indeed compel, the discrimination by the state involved in the Fairweathercase. When we come to
the Billings case, however, the virtual unavoidableness of the discrimination involved in the Fairweather case is not present, for the state
has at its command, in the situation there presented, an alternative
method of taxation, i. e., the state may tax both national and state
banking corporations by taxing their shares, and thus avoid this discrimination completely. The reasoning of the distinction is not impeccable because the discrimination in the Fairweathercase was not in fact
absolutely unavoidable. Thus the court might, it seems, have required
the state to remove the discrimination by providing that in assessing
national bank shares the part of the value thereof attributable to tax
exempt securities held by the bank should be deducted. This would
perhaps have been impracticable; and at any rate it is clear that any
flaw in the distinction between the two cases arises out of the possible
incorrectness of the Fairweather decision, and does not affect the
decision of the Billings case, which seems to be unimpeachable. If then,
as seems to be the case, the decision of the Billings case is good law,
78Supra n. 55.
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certain consequences follow which are of a serious and far-reaching
nature. The case requires the conclusion that in any state having state
banks holding any considerable amount of federal securities, a tax upon
the state banks cannot, if national bank shares are taxed at full value,
be a tax directly upon the banks but must be upon their shares.
It has long been held that a national bank may be taxed on shares
it owns in another national bank because the permission of Section 5219
to tax national bank shares is unqualified.7 But a national bank cannot
be taxed on shares it owns in a state bank, as that is not sanctioned by
the statute and is therefore impliedly prohibited. 5 It was not until
1919 that the question was raised whether individual shareholders of
a national bank, taxed on its shares in another national bank, were
entitled to deduct from the assessed value of their shares that part
thereof contributed by the national bank shares on which the bank of
which they were members had already paid a tax. In Bank of California National Association v. Richardson,7 6 it appeared that the Bank
of California owned stock in the Mills National Bank and was taxed
as a shareholder therein. The state also taxed the shareholders of the
Bank of California but did not deduct from the value of the shares the
value of the shares already taxed. The court held that the assessment of
the shareholders of the Bank of California, on the amount already taxed
the bank as a shareholder in the Mills Bank, was invalid. The reason
for the decision given by the court was that in Section 5219 Congress
impliedly provided that the economic interests involved could only be
taxed once. In the words of Chief Justice White,
"It is undoubted that the statute from the purely legal point of view,
with the object of protecting the federal corporate agencies which it
created from state burdens and securing the continued existence of such
74 Bank of Redemption v. Boston (1888) 125 U. S. 60, 8 Sup. Ct. 772.
75
1t was contended in Bank of California National Association v. Richardson,
infra n. 76, which also involved the validity of a tai upon the plaintiff national
bank as a shareholder in a state bank, that Section 5219 requires that if all national
bank shares are taxed, all state bank shares must also be taxed. If shares in a state
bank held by a national bank are not taxed, although shares in a national bank are
taxed, there is a discrimination against national bank shares. The court held, however, that the statute and the ruling of the court in Bank of Redemption v. Boston,
supra n. 74, both in letter and spirit apply only to stock ownership by a national
bank in another national bank and that therefore taxation of the bank as a shareholder in a state bank was without the scope of the statute and therefore beyond
the power which it conferred. The law is well put in the words of Mr. Justice Pitney, who dissented in the Richardson case on another point, "The non-taxability of
state bank shares in the hands of a national bank is attributable to the character
of the national bank as a taxpayer, not to the quality of the state bank shares as
an object of taxation." See also First Nat. Bank v. Allbright (1908) 208 U. S. 548,
28 Sup. Ct. 349.
78 (1919) 248 U. S. 476, 39 Sup. Ct. 165.
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agencies despite the changing incidents of stock ownership, treated the
banking corporations and their stockholders as different. But it is also
undoubted that the statute for the purpose of preserving the state power
of taxation, considering the subject from the point of view of ultimate
beneficial interest, treated the stock interest, that is, the stockholder, and
the bank as one and subject to one taxation by the methods which it
provided." 77

Mr. Justice Pitney, who wrote a dissenting opinion in the Richardson
case, and with whom concurred Justices Brandeis and Clarke, insisted
that the legal distinction between the shareholder and the corporation,
as recognized by numerous decisions of the court, should control. The
dissenting opinion seems to be more in accord with the traditional law
on the subject.78 A shareholder who cannot deduct from his assessment
the value of federal securities owned by the corporation nor deduct real
estate taxes imposed upon the bank has no more right to the deduction
of the value of bank shares similarly owned by the bank. In these instances it is true that, if n6 deduction is permitted, the economic interest
of the shares will be taxed twice, but the obligationtf coipeting debtors
are also so taxed. As long as the burden on national bank shares is not
discriminatory, why should bank shares be given preferential treatment
not enjoyed by competing capital?7 9 Inasmuch as Section 5219 expressly
authorizes the taxation of bank shares to the holders thereof, subject to
certain definite restrictions, it would seem that the enumeration of the
restrictions by Congress should preclude the court from implying others.

77 248 U. S. 476, 485, 39 Sup. Ct. 165, 167. For another instance of an apparent
departure from the distinct entity theory, see Miller v. Milwaukee (1927) 272
U. S. 713, 47 Sup. Ct. 280, where the court held invalid an income tax exempting
shareholders from taxation on dividends on which the corporation had already
paid a tax. Inasmuch as the most conspicuous instance of exemption from the
corporate income tax was interest from United States bonds, the income tak on
the shareholder reached little else but the income from those bonds. See also
Iowa Loan and Trust Co. v. Fairweather (S. D. Iowa, 1918) 252 Fed. 605, 608,
in which the court gives the shareholders as well as the corporation the benefit of
the exemption allowed owners of Liberty Loan Bonds. Note (1919) 3 MINNESOTA
L. REv. 257.
78
Bank of Commerce v. New York (1862) 67 U. S. (2 Black) 620; Van Allen
v. Assessors (1865) 70 U. S. (3 Wall.) 573; People v. Commissioners (1866) 71
U. S. (4 Wall.) 244; National Bank v. Commonwealth (1869) 76 U. S. (9 Wall.)
353; Farrington v. Tennessee (1877) 95 U. S. 679; Tennessee v. Whitworth (1886)
117 U. S. 129, 6 Sup. Ct. 645; Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee (1896) 161 U. S.
134, 16 Sup. Ct. 456; New Orleans v. Citizens Bank (1897) 167 U. S. 371, 17 Sup.
Ct. 905.
79 See Thomas Reed Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by
the Taxing Powers of the State (1919) 32 HARVMD L. REv. 902, 916.

IV. STATE TAXATION OF NATIONAL BANKS "ACCORDING
TO OR MEASURED BY" THEIR NET INCOME
of the
1926 amendment to Section 5219
authorizes, subject to certain limitations to be discussed later, state taxation of national banks (1) "on"
their net income, or (2) "according to or measured by" their net income.
These two methods apparently offer the only means under the existing
law of according preferential treatment to bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness, without invalidating the bank taxes. Taxes
levied under these methods will be valid, so far as concerns Section
5219, even though intangibles are taxed at a low rate or not at all,
for the reason that under these methods the bank rate is compared
with that imposed on other corporations rather than with the rate on
other "moneyed capital."' The difference between the two new methods
lies in the fact that if the banks are taxed "on" their net income, the
income from tax exempt securities cannot be included in the base,
whereas Congressional consent to a tax on the banks "measured by"
their net income is designed to allow the inclusion within the tax
base of net income from tax exempt securities. 2 The purpose of the

A

the Statutes
MONG
Unitedother
Statesthings
Revised

I It will be observed that Section 5219, in effect now authorizes the state to
discriminate against national banks in favor of "other moneyed capital" not employed in corporate form or employed by individuals making investments in botnds,
notes and other forms of indebtedness. Even under the share method of bank taxation discrimination against national bank shares has been upheld in at least one
instance. See Des Moines National Bank v. Fairweather (1923) 263 U. S. 103,
44 Sup. Ct. 23, discussed in the first instalment of this paper (Jan. 1929) 17 CALiPoRNIA L. REv. 83, 114-118. For an answer to the argument that permission thus
given to discriminate against national banks by favoring &impeting capital is invalid, see the first section of the first instalment of this paper- (Jan. 1929) 17 CALiJORNIA L. REv. 83-94.
2See the report of the Committee on Banking and Currency, submitted to the
House of Representatives, March 11, 1926, in which it is stated:
"In the states which now apply the net income tax method to corporations generally and denominate it an excise or franchise tax, the practice is to include income
from all sources, including income from tax-exempt securities, in arriving at the
measure of the tax based on net income. Therefore, it is desirable, in order to establish complete taxing parity, to remove any question as to the inclusion of the income from tax-exempt securities as part of the measure of the tax based on net
income of national banking associations; so that the samebasis of measuring the
tax according to net income for corporations generally maf.be applied to national
banking associations by the taxing state.
"To this end the pending bill clearly distinguishes between taxing national banking associations (3) on their net income and (4) according to or measured by their
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discussion under this heading is to consider the validity of the consent
thus given.
The question immediately arises, why did not Congress specifically
authorize the inclusion of income from all sources when the banks were
taxed "on" their net income rather than attempt to accomplish the same
thing by sanctioning a tax "according to or measured by their net income"? The answer is perhaps twofold: (1) If valid, an authorization
to include income from tax exempt securities in the tax base of a tax
"on"2 net income, might have opened up to state taxation under personal
income taxes the income from federal securities and thus have materially injured the market for such securities; (2) Congress has expressly
set forth in several statutes 3 that income from federal securities shall
not be taxed, and a later declaration that such income may be taxed, if
not lacking in due process of law,4 would at least have been a breach of
net income. In the latter case the taxing state may 'include the entire net income
received from all sources.'
"In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (220 U. S. 108) the Supreme Court upheld an
excise tax on corporations where the measure of taxation was the income of the
corporation from all sources, and held that 'it is no valid objection that this measure includes, in part at least, property which as such could not be directly taxed.'
"Therefore the proposed amendments to section 5219 are designed to accomplish
the following:
"(a) The inclusion of income from tax-exempt securities as part of the measure
in taxing national banking associations, providing other corporations generally are
similarly treated by the taxing state . . . " 67 CONG. REc. 5760-5761, 5822, 60806089 (1926)
r ii fai
fthe exemption are not the same in all issues of United
States Bonds: In 12 STAT. 346, c. 33, § 2 (1862) it is provided:
"and all stocks, bonds and other securities of the United States held by individuals,
corporations or associations, within the United States shall be exempt from taxation by or under State authority."
The statute relating to the Panama Canal Bonds, 32 STAT. 484 (1902), 31 U. S. C.
§ 744 (1926) declares:
"and such bonds shall be exempt from all taxes or duties of the United States, as
well as from taxation in any form by or under State, municipal or local authority."
The statute relating to the First Liberty Loan bonds, 40 STAT. 35 (1917), 31 U. S.
C. § 746 (1926) declared the bonds to be:
"exempt, both as to principal and interest, from all taxation, except estate or inheritance taxes, imposed by authority of the United States, or its possessions, or
by any state or local taxing authority;

Ii,

. . .

For the provisions of the statute relating to the Second and subsequent Liberty
loans see 40 STAT. 291 (1917), 31 U. S. C. § 747 (1926). See also 31 U. S. C.
§§ 748, 749, 750, 751, 753 (1926) for other statutory tax exemptions of federal
securities. See also the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting in National Life
Insurance Co. v. United States (1928) 277 U. S. 508, 522, 48 Sup. Ct. 591, in
nces in tstatutes-arepeinted-out.
the.-dif
P w~
i4Itis to be observed that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit the
United States from impairing the obligation of contracts, see New York v. United
States (1922) 257 U. S. 591, 42 Sup. Ct. 239; but the question arises whether the
impairment of the obligation of contracts is prohibited the federal government
because it is a taking of property without due process of law. That it is, is sug-
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faith and a destruction of confidence in the national government of
purchasers of government securities. In short, Congress apparently
wanted to give a very limited consent to state taxation of federal securities; and to avoid unconstitutionality of the statute by bringing it within the class of statutes, which, like that involved in Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co., 5 to be discussed presently, have been upheld on the ground that

~f'A

gested in the following dictum quoted fron the court's opinion in the Sinking
Fund cases (1878) 99 U. S. 700, 718: "The United States cannot any more than
a State interfere with private rights, except for legitimate government purposes.
They are not included within the constitutional prohibitions which prevent States
from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, but equally with the
States they are prohibited from depriving persons or corporations of property
without due process of law. They cannot legislate back to themselves without
making compensation, the lands they have given this corporation to aid in the
construction of its railroad. Neither can they by legislation compel the corporation
to discharge its obligations in respect to the subsidy bonds otherwise than according
to the terms of the contract already made in that connection. The United States
are as much bound by their contracts as individuals. If they repudiate their obligations it is as much repudiation with all the wrong and reproach that term implies,
as it would be if the repudiator had been a State or a municipality or citizen."
It seems that when the impairment in question amounts to taking, it will come
under the due process clause of the fifth amendment as is evidenced by the opinion
of the court in United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. (1921) 256 U. S. 51, 41 Sup.
Ct. 439:
"The company accepted the proposal and at enormous cost constructed the road
and put the same in operation and the road was accepted by the President. Thus,
the proposal was converted into a contract as to which company by performing
its part became entitled to perform by the Government. Such rights are within
the protection of the due process clause of the Constitution. Giving effect to all
that bears upon the subject we are of the opinion that after the company earned
the right to receive what was intended by the grant it was not admissible for the
Government to reserve or appropriate to its own uses lands in the indemnity limits
required to supply losses in the place limits." It might be argued that the repudiation of the exemption from state taxes, as provided in Section 5219, is such a
direct and arbitrary taking of property as to violate the due process clause. To
reach this conclusion, one need only take at its face value the language of the majority opinion in National Life Insurance Co. v. United States, supra n. 3: "No
device or form of words can deprive him (holder of tax exempt bonds) of the
exemption for which he contracted." The case is discussed more fully later on.
A similar argument with respect to state securities, based squarely upon the
impairment of the obligation of contracts clause of the Constitution, might be
advanced to prevent the states from including within the tax base the value of
state securities which have been declared by statute to be tax free. The answer
to both contentions, if the court approves of the measurement theory, would
seem to be that the immunity statutes have no application to excise taxes, of the
kind discussed in the text, indirectly bearing upon tax-exempt securities, and would
fall within the well-settled rule that statutory provisions for tax exemption are to
be strictly construed. Tucker v. Ferguson (1874) 89 U. S. (22 Wall.) 527, 575;
Morgan v. Louisiana (1876) 93 U. S. 217; Chicago Ry. Co. v. Guffey (1887) 120
U. S. 569; Wilmington & W. R. po. v. Alsbrook (1892) 146 U. S. 279, 294, 13 Sup.
Ct. 72; Chicago Theological Seminary v. Illinois (1902) 188 U. S. 662, 674, 23 Sup.
Ct. 386; Jetton v. University of the South (1908) 208 U. S. 489, 499, 28 Sup. Ct.
375; Millsaps College v. Jackson (1927) 275 U. S. 129, 48 Sup. Ct. 94.
5(1911) 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, discussed more fully later on.
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the tax was not a tax "on" income from exempt securities at all but on
something else, namely, the doing of business, and that if the tax were
"measured by" net income which included some income which had come
from exempt securities, the burden thereon would be considered too
remote and incidental to render the tax invalid because of its effect.
If a state uses the "according to or measured by" method of taxing
national banks, it is important to determine what is the subject taxed.
Section 5219 reads: "The several states may . . . tax such associations
.. . according to or measured by their net income." The states have
always had authority to levy taxes on occupations and businesses carried on within their limits except businesses shielded by superior law,
and they have had this authority irrespective of whether the occupation
or business was carried on only by virtue of a license or franchise
granted by the state." These taxes are variously called excise, privilege or
occupation taxes. It seems, therefore, that it is no objection to the tax
that a national bank carries on business in a state independently of state
authority. The shield is now withdrawn from banking carried on under
the national bank act and these banks fall into the taxable class to the
extent permitted. Under the federal system of taxation, taxes on occupations have always been called excises. In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.7
the court upheld a federal excise tax on corporations "with respect to
the carrying on or doing business" by such corporations measured by
their total net income. The tax there upheld was upon the exercise of
privileges not granted by the federal government. If the federal government can levy an excise tax on the exercise of privileges it does not
grant, it is difficult to see why the state cannot levy excise taxes on the
exercise of privileges in the state which it does not grant. Such a tax
does not conflict with an exercise of federal power over the same subject because the congressional legislation in question prevents that conflict by consenting to the ax. The two situations are perfectly analogous
except for the source of the power in each instance, but it is submitted that this makes no difference, for the state's taxing power, being
applicable to this subject because not in conflict with congressional legislation, and being one of the inherent sovereign powers of the state is
at least as respectable and legitimate as Congress's power to levy excises
granted by the Constitution.
The condition attached to taxing national banks according to or
measured by their net income, is set forth in the statute as follows:

6 See 2 CooLEY ON TAXATION (3d ed. 1903) 1094-1102, 1104-1149, and cases
there cited.

7Supra n. 5.
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"In case of a tax on or according to or measured ty the net income
of an association, the taxing State may, except in case of a tax on net
income, include the entire net income received from all sources, but the
rate shall not be higher than the rate assessed upon other financial corporations nor higher than the highest of the rates assessed by the taxing
State upon mercantile, manufacturing, and business corporations doing
business within its limits. . . "8

The conditions herein set forth raise the question, can a state levy
a tax on other financial corporations and other mercantile, manufacturing and business corporations doing business within its limits measured
by their net income from all sources without deducting the income received from tax exempt securities? A negative answer to this question
might mean that the same required deductions would have to be allowed
national banks since the statute requires that the rate thereon must
not be "higher than the rate assessed upon other financial corporations
nor higher than the highest 9 of the rates upon mercantile, manufacturing and business, corporations doing business within its limits,"7.and
numerous cases, discussed in the last issue of this REIvmw, hold that
prohibition of a "higher rate" prohibits unequal allowance of deductions. 10 Unless implied, there is no congressional consent to state taxation of corporations other than national banks according to their total
net income, including income from federal securities," for Section 5219
844 STAT. 223 (1926).

9The limitation that the rate on national banks shall not be "higher than the
highest" of the rates on mercantile, manufacturing and business corporations doing
business within the limits of the state, rather than the limitation that such rate
shall not be "higher" than that imposed on such corporations, allows the state a
reasonable freedom in classifying corporations for purposes of taxation. Some
classes of corporations which the state may want to encourage may be taxed at a
lower rate than the bank rate without invalidating the bank tax, but national
banks cannot be taxed higher than the least favored class of mercantile, manufacturing and business corporations doing business within the limits of the state,
or in other words, national banks cannot be, as regards state taxation, the least
favored class of corporations doing business within the state.
10 (Jan. 1929) 17 CALIFORNIA L. REv. 83, 107 et sel.
11 The decisions under the share method of taxing national banks have permitted the taxation of national bank shares by different methods from those employed in the taxation of "other moneyed capital" as long as the ultimate burden
was not discriminatory as regards natiorAl bank shares. See (Jan. 1929) 17
CALIFORNIA L. REv. 83, 107 et seq. It would seem that if national banks are taxed
according to or measured by their total net income, the tax on the other corporations mentioned need not be in form an income tax as long as the ultimate
tax burden when translated into an income tax does not violate the conditions
above quoted. It is difficult, however, to see how there would be any way of
knowing in advance what the ultimate burden of a tax, not an income tax, would
be if translated into an income tax, and although the bupden of proving a violation of the conditions of Section 5219 is upon the tax payer, the state would find
its bank tax inoperative if actual discrimination were proved. The practical dif
culties seem almost insurmountable in devising any 6ther tax not an income tax
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does not purport to authorize state taxation of the other corporations
mentioned in the manner authorized for national banks. It would seem,
therefore, that if the court strictly interprets the restriction above quoted, a state can take full advantage of the authorization to levy a tax
measured by the total net income of national banks, only if, independently of Section 5219, it can levy a tax upon the other corporations
mentioned, measured by their total net income, including therein income
from federal securities.
But even though it be held that the states cannot measure excise
taxes on the other corporations mentioned according to total net income
without deducting income from exempt securities, it would still be possible for the court to uphold the tax on national banks measured by
total net income without requiring such deductions to be made, on the
authority of Des Moines National Bank v. Fairweather.12 As was pointed out in the last installment of this paper, there was one possible
criticism of, and therefore ground for doubting, the decision in the
Fairweather case. In that case, it will be recalled, the Supreme Court
upheld an Iowa tax upon national bank shares as against the objection
that it favored "other moneyed capital," although no deduction was
made of the value of federal securities owned by the bank from the taxable assets of the shares, whereas such deduction was made from the
value of assets of private bankers who were taxed upon their banking
capital. It was pointed out that the court might reasonably and quite
logically have held that since there was a substantial amount of competing moneyed capital, the measurement of a tax upon which could not
include exempt securities, the tax on national bank shares which did include exempt securities in its measurement was void, for even though
the state could not refuse the exemption to the competing capital, it
could have made the deduction from the value of the national bank
shares and therefore have avoided the discrimination. The court could,
therefore, quite properly have said that it considered the discrimination
sufficiently serious to compel the state thus to limit its taxation of
national banks. But in the instant situation, on the other hand, this
argument is not possible. Congress has expressly consented to a tax on
national banks measured by total net income. If the court holds that the
state cannot similarly tax foreign corporations doing business within the
that will uniformly result in the same burden as if an income tax were imposed.
If the state does not want to impose an income tax on the other corporations
specified in Section 5219 but wants to make sure that such a tax on national banks
will not be invalidated, it should impose taxes high enough on the other corporations that there will be no doubt that if translated into income taxes they would
of discrimination against national banks.
be free
2

1 Supra n. 1.

238

17 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

state, it cannot compel the state to grant a similar indulgence to national
banks without forbidding them to levy a tax which Congress has, in so
many words, consented to. The court could so hold only on the ground
that the consent was unconstitutional. And so to hold would be to contradict the fundamental proposition, discussed at length in the first installment of this article, and implied in every case that has upheld a tax
under Section 5219 since it was enacted, that a state tax upon a federal
instrumentality is void, if at all, only because it hampers and interferes
with that instrumentality, and that since the only limitation upon Congressional power to create instrumentalities is that they in some degree
subserve the lawful purposes of Congress, it is for Congress and not for
the courts to say whether an instrument subjected to this or that burden of state taxation will subserve the purposes of Congress in the manner it desires them to be subserved. It should be noted that under the
interpretation of the statutes which we are now considering the tax
which Congress has authorized is not only a burden upon, but a discrimination against, a federal instrumentality. It seems clear, in the
light of the above discussion, that the power of Congress to burden its
instrumentalities includes power to authorize discrimination against
them. This, be it noted, is a necessary premise to the decision in the
Fairweather case.
The foregoing discussion of the "measured by" method of taxing
national banks makes it apparent that two of the vital provisions thereof: (1) authorization of the inclusion of income from tax exempt securities in the measurement of the tax on national banks; and (2) the condition that the equivalent at least of such tax be imposed upon other
financial corporations and that the burden on national banks be no
greater than that on the least favored of the mercantile, manufacturing
and business corporations doing business within the state, apparently
depend for their validity or full operation upon the truth of the proposition that these taxes when "measured by" net income may include
income from exempt securities which could not be taxed as income directly. We turn, then, to an examination of the "measured by" theory,
which, it may be observed, was invoked by Congress for the express
purpose of rendering taxable the net income of national banks, including
that derived from exempt securities. It should be said at this point,
however, that this discussion does not purport to exhaust the refinements and implications in the rules of decision in the cases which have
dealt with the measurement theory. An alttempt will be made, however,
to analyze all the cases which seem vital to an understanding of the
present state of the law on this subject so far as concerns the immediate problem involved.
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A state tax upon bo s of the United States is clearly void as a tax
upon a federal instr entality.' 3 The inclusion of income arising therefrom in a tax on t income is invalid for the same reason.14 But a long
line of cases h e held that a corporate franchise tax measured by property or by income from the property of a corporation, is not a tax on
the income itself, and is, therefore, valid even though the property or
the income is itself not taxable.' The reasons assigned in these cases
are summed up in the opinion of the court in Home Insurance Co. v.
New York.' 6 In that case an annual franchise tax was imposed upon
every corporation, with certain exceptions, doing business in the state,
to the amount of one quarter of a mill upon its capital stock for each
13 Weston v. City of Charleston (1829) 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 289; Home Savings
Bank v. Des Moines (1906) 205 U. S. 503, 509, 27 Sup. Ct. 571; Farmers & M.
Say. Bank v. Minnesota (1913) 232 U. S. 516, 34 Sup. Ct. 354.
See supra n. 3, for references to Congressional statutes declaring United States
bonds exempt from taxation. In Plummer v. Coler (1900) 178 U. S. 115, 20 Sup.
Ct. 829, which sustained a state inheritance tax on the succession to non-taxable
federal securities, and which will be discussed more fully later, the court was of
the opinion that such statutes were unnecessary to prevent state taxation of the
bonds: "As, then, for the reasons advanced and applied in the previous cases, it is
not within the power of a State to tax Federal securities, it was not necessary
for Congress, in order to secure such immunity, to declare in terms, in the act
of July 14, 1870, and on the face of the bonds issued thereunder, that the principal and interest were exempt from taxation in any form by or under State,
municipal, or local authority. Such a declaration did not operate to withdraw
from the States any power or right previously possessed, nor to create, as between
the States and the holders of the bonds, any contractual relation. It doubtless
may be regarded as a legitimate mode of advising purchasers of such bonds of
their immunity from State taxation, and of manifesting that Congress did not
intend to waive this immunity, as it had done in the case of national banks, which
are admittedly governmental instrumentalities."
14 Weston v. Charleston supra n. 13; Gillespie v. Oklahoma (1922) 257 U. S.
501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171. See also Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. (1895)
158 U. S. 601, 15 Sup. Ct. 912, holding federal income tax void as regards income
from state and municipal securities; Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin (1927) 275 U. S. 136, 48 Sup. Ct. 55.
15 Society for Savings v. Coite (1868) 73 U. S. (6 Wall.) 594; Provident
Institution v. Massachusetts (1868) 73 U. S. (6 Wall.) 611; Hamilton Co. v.
Massachusetts (1868) 73 U. S. (6 Wall.) 632; Home Ins. Co. v. New York (1889)
134 U. S. 594, 10 Sup. Ct. 593; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (1911) 220 U. S. 107,
31 Sup. Ct. 342, ANw. CAs. 1912 B. 1312. See also Plummer v. Coler (1900) 178
U. S. 115, 20 Sup. Ct. 829, upholding state inheritance tax on succession to federal
securities and Greiner v. Llewellyn (1922) 258 U. S. 384, 42 Sup. Ct. 324, upholding federal estate tax as applied to transfer of state bonds. See also Kansas City,
Fort Scott and Memphis Ry. Co. v. Kansas (1916) 240 U. S. 227, 36 Sup. Ct. 261;
Kansas City M. & B. R. Co. v. Stiles (1916) 242 U. S. 111, 37 Sup. Ct. 58; Metcalf v. Mitchell (1925) 269 U. S. 514, 523, 46 Sup. Ct. 172. See (Jan. 1929)
17 CALronwza L. REV. 83, 115 et seq. for cases sustaining state taxation of shares
in national banks without deducting the value of federal securities from the
assessed value of the shares.
1
8Sepra n.15.
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one per centum of its dividends. A less rate was provided where there
were no dividends or where the dividends were less than six per cent.
It was contended by plaintiff company that the tax was in fact levied
upon the capital stock of the company and that there should be deducted from it the value of federal bonds held by the corporation. The court
held, however, that the tax was not upon the capital stock nor upon any
bonds of the United States composing part of that stock, but was upon
the corporate franchise and that reference was made to capital stock
and dividends for the purpose of determining the amount of the tax to
be exacted. The basic principle upon which the case was decided is set
forth in the following language of Mr. Justice Field who delivered the
opinion of the court:
"The right or privilege to be a corporation, or to do business as such
a body, is one generally deemed of value to the corporators. . . . The

granting of such right or privilege rests entirely in the discretion of the
State, and, of course, when granted, may be accompanied with such conditions as its legislature may judge most befitting to its interests and policy. It may require, as a condition of the grant of the franchise, and also
of its continued exercise, that the corporation pay a specific sum to the
State each year, or month, or a specific portion of its gross receipts, or of
the profits of its business, or a sum to be ascertained in any convenient
mode which it may prescribe. The validity of the tax can in no way be
dependent upon the mode which the State may deem fit to adopt in fixing
the amount for any year which it will exact for the franchise. No constitutional objection lies in the way of a legislative body prescribing any
mode of measurement to determine the amount it will charge for the
privileges its bestows. It may well seek in this way to increase its revenue
to the extent to which it has been cut off by exemption of other property
from taxation. As its revenues to meet its expenses are lessened in one
direction, it may look to any other property as sources of revenue, which
is not exempted from taxation. Its action in this matter is not the subject
17
of judicial inquiry in a federal tribunal."

In Plummer v. Coler'8 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a state inheritance tax upon the succession to $40,000 of United
States bonds. 19 The rule of the case is clearly stated by the court, per
Mr. Justice Shiras, as follows:
17 Supra n. 15, at p. 599.
Supra n. 15.
19 In Greiner v. Llewellyn, supra n. 15, the court upheld the federal estate
tax on the transfer of an estate by death measured by the net value of the estate
without deducting therefrom the value contributed by non-taxable municipal
bonds forming part of the estate. The court, per Mr. Justice Brandeis distinguished
between a direct tax on municipal bonds and an excise tax on the transference
of the bonds:
"That the Federal Government has power to tax the transmission of legacies
was settled by Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41; and that it has the power to
tax the transfer of the net assets of a decedent's estate was settled by New York
18
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"We think the conclusion, fairly to be drawn from the state and Federal cases, [for the most part franchise tax cases] is, that the right to
take property by will or descent is derived from and regulated by municipal law; that, in assessing a tax upon such right or privilege, the State
may lawfully measure or fix the amount of the tax by referring to the
value of the property passing; and that the incidental fact that such
property is composed, in whole or in part, of Federal securities, does not
20
invalidate the tax or the law under which it was imposed."

It was contended by the plaintiff that the cases on corporate franchises which were measured by non-taxable property were not controlling because of the vital differences between individuals and corporations but the court after reviewing at length the corporate franchise
cases dismissed this contention as follows:
"...

we are unable to perceive any sound distinction that can be drawn

between the power of the State in imposing taxes upon franchises of corporations, composed of individual persons, and in imposing taxes upon
the right or privilege of individuals to avail themselves of the right to
grant and to receive property under the statutes regulating the descent
of the property of decedents." 21

And somewhat earlier in the opinion in answer to the contention that
the tax in question would burden the borrowing power of the United
States it was asserted:
"And here, again, it is obvious that to affirm the second proposition
[that the tax would burden the Federal borrowing power] will require an
overruling of our previous cases. F6r, on principle, if a tax on inheritances,
composed in whole or in part of Federal securities, would, by deterring individuals from investing therein, and, by thus lessening the demand for
such securities, be regarded as therefore unlawful, it must likewise follow that, for the same reasons, a tax upon corporate franchises measured
by the value of the corporation's property, composed in whole or in part
of United States bonds, would also be unlawful." 22
Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345. The latter case has established also that the
estate tax imposed by the Act of 1916, like the earlier legacy or succession tax, is
a duty or excise, and not a direct tax like that on income from municipal bonds.
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., supra. A State may impose a legacy tax
on a bequest to the United States, United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, or on a
bequest which consists wholly of United States bonds, Plummer v. Coler,.
Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278. Likewise the Federal Government may impose a
succession tax upon a bequest to a municipal corporation of a State, Snyder v.
Bettman, 190 U. S. 249, or may, in determining the amount for which the estate
tax is assessable, under the Act of 1916, include sums required to be paid to a
State as inheritance tax, for the estate tax is the antithesis of a direct tax, New
York Trust Co. v. Eisner, supra. Municipal bonds of a State stand in this respect
in no different position from money payable to it. The transfer upon death is
taxable, whatsoever the character of the property transferred and to whomsoever
the transfer is made. It follows that in determining the amount of decedent's net
estate municipal bonds were properly included."
20 (1900) 178 U. S. 115, 134, 20 Sup. Ct. 829.
21lIbi p. 137.
22JIbid. p. 135.
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The basic theory of these cases seems to be that if the state chooses a
proper subject for taxation the court will not concern itself with the
form or measure of the assessment of the tax. Simply stated, "The
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a state tax is to be determined, not by the form or agency through which it is to be collected,
but by the subject upon which the burden is laid."23
The decisions upholding these taxes would seem definitely to sustain
any corporate franchise taxes measured by total net income which may
be levied in order to take advantage of the new provisions of Section
5219.24 But the states cannot rely too confidently upon the language
of these decisions. The court in recent cases seems to be withdrawing
from the broad position originally taken and its present position, as
will presently appear, cannot with certainty be precisely and definitely
stated.
In 1910, in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas,25 the measurement theory, set forth in the cases just discussed, was for the first time
greatly qualified. Indeed, the reasoning of the court seemed to repudiate the theory completely. The Supreme Court in that case held invalid
an excise tax on a foreign corporation for the privilege of doing an
intrastate business, measured by the total capital stock of the corporation. The statute provided that corporations not paying the tax should
be ousted from doing all intrastate business. The case was brought to
the United States Supreme Court upon the question whether a decree
of ouster granted by the State supreme court restraining the corporation
from all intrastate business for non-payment of the tax was invalid as
a regulation of interstate commerce as to a corporation engaged in both
interstate and intrastate commerce. The case came clearly within the
language of the earlier cases to the effect that as long as the subject
taxed was a proper one the measure of assessment adopted was of no
concern to the court. The court held, however, that the statute was an
invalid attempt to tax the right to do interstate business and to tax
property beyond the confines of the state:
"The authorities cited show that this court has guarded with both
diligence and firmness the freedom of interstate commerce against hostile
state or local action, as such action has been manifested by regulations
28 Case of State Freight Tax (1872) 82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 232, 272.
24 In Macallen Co. v. Commonwealth (1928) - Mass. -, 163 N. E. 75, the

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld such a tax. In an able opinion,
the court, per Mr. Chief Justice Rugg, emphasizes the point that the tax in question
is an excise tax as distinguished from a property tax, and very effectively summarizes the traditional law sustaining the measurement of corporate excise taxes by
income from property of corporations, although a part of such income is derived
from non-taxable property.
25 (1910) 216 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 190.
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operating, in some instances, directly, in others indirectly, upon the means
or instruments employed in that commerce. . . .
"But it is said that none of the authorities cited are pertinent to the
present case, because the State expressly disclaims any purpose by the
statute in question to obstruct or embarrass interstate commerce, but seeks
only to prevent the Telegraph Company from entering the field of domestic business in Kansas without its consent and without conforming to the
requirements of its statute. But the disavowal by the State of any purpose
to burden interstate commerce cannot conclude the question as to the
fact of such a burden being imposed, or as to the unconstitutionality of
the statute as shown by its necessary operation upon interstate commerce.
If the statute, reasonably interpreted, either directly or by its necessary
operation, burdens interstate commerce, it must be adjudged to be invalid,
whatever may have been the purpose for which it was enacted, and although the company may do both interstate and local business. This court
has repeatedly adjudged that in all such matters the judiciary will not regard mere forms, but will look through forms to the substance of things.
Such is an established rule of constitutional construction as the adjudged
cases abundantly show. . . .
"Looking, then, at the natural and reasonable effect of the statute,
disregarding mere forms of expression, it is clear that the making of the
payment by the Telegraph Company, as a charter fee, of a given percent
of its authorized capital representing, as that capital clearly does, all of
its business and property, both within and outside of the State, a condi-

tion of its right to do local business in Kansas is, in its essence, not simply
a tax for the privilege of doing local business in the State, but a burden
and tax on the company's interstate business and on its property located
or used outside of the State." 26

In other words, this case apparently holds that if the tax is in substance and effect a tax upon interstate commerce and on property outside the state, the measure through which the burden is imposed cannot
be employed. The cases following the Western Union case, hold, in
accordance with the principle there laid down, that the determining factor is the question whether the tax in fact imposes a burden on interstate commerce. 2 7
26

Ibid. pp. 26, 27, and 30. The principle of this case is not confined to foreign
corporations engaged in interstate transportationwhere, because of the nature of
the facilities used, ouster from intra-state commerce might have a greater effect
upon interstate commerce than would be the case where other forms of interstate
commerce are carried on but applies equally to foreign corporations engaged in
making interstate and local sales or engaged in interstate sales and local manufacturing. Looney v. Crane Co. (1917) 245 U. S. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. 85; International
Paper Co. v. Massachusetts (1918) 246 U. S. 135, 141, 38 Sup. Ct. 292; Locomobile Co. of America v. Massachusetts (1918) 246 U. S. 146, 38 Sup. Ct. 298.
27Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts (1913) 231 U. S. 68, 85, 34 Sup. Ct. 15;
Kansas City & Co. Ry. v. Botkin (1916) 240 U. S. 227, 36 Sup. Ct. 261; Kansas
City M. & B. R. Co. v. Stiles (1916)

242 U. S. 111, 118, 37 Sup. Ct. 58; Cheney

Bros. v. Massachusetts (1918) 246 U. S. 147, 38 Sup. Ct. 295; General Ry. Signal
Co. v. Virginia (1918) 246 U. S. 500, 38 Sup. Ct. 360.
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Before discussing the apparent inconsistency between this decision
and the Home Insurance case, it will be well to set out a fairly full
statement of three cases decided since the Western Union decision. Some
fourteen months after the Western Union case the Supreme Court decded Flint v. Stone Tracey Co., 28 which is one of the most important
of the cases sustaining an excise tax on corporations measured by their
total net income and the case most nearly in point on the problem arising in thip connection under Section 5219. The court in that case upheld a federal excise tax on corporations measured by their net income
without deduction from such income of the interest received from tax
exempt securities, both state and federal. In the course of the court's
opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Day, the early cases supporting this
type of tax are briefly summarized. The court also distinguished the
case from Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas:
"It is further contended that some of the corporations, notably insurance companies, have large investments in municipal bonds and other nontaxable securities, and in real estate and personal property not used in the
business, that therefore the selection of the measure of the income from all
sources is void, because it reaches property which is not the subject of
taxation. . . . But this argument confuses the measure of the tax upon the
privilege, with direct taxation of the estate or thing taxed. . . .
"Nor does the adoption of this measure of the amount of the tax do
violence to the rule laid down in Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio
Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, nor the Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas,
216 U. S. 1. In the Galveston Case it was held that a tax imposed by the
State of Texas, equal to one percent upon the gross receipts 'from every
source whatever' of lines of railroad lying wholly within the State, was
invalid as an attempt to tax gross receipts derived from the carriage of
passengers and freight in interstate commerce, which in some instances
was much the larger part of the gross receipts taxed. This court held that
this act was an attempt to burden commerce among the States, and the
fact that it was declared to be 'equal to' one percent made no difference,
as it was merely an effort to reach gross receipts by a tax not even disguised as an occupation tax, and in nowise helped by the words 'equal to.'
In other words, the tax was held void, as ts ,pubstance and manifest
intent was to tax interstate commerce as such.
"In the Western Union Telegraph Case the State undertook to levy a
graded charted fee upon the entire capital stock of one hundred ,millions
of dollars of the Western Union Telegraph Company, a foreign corporation, and engaged in commerce among the States, as a condition of doing
local business within the State of Kansas. This court held, looking through
forms and reaching the substance of the thing, that the tax thus imposed
was in reality a tax upon the right to do interstate business within the
State, and an undertaking to tax property beyond the limits of the State;
that whatever the declared purpose, when reasonably interpreted, the
28

Supra n. 5.
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necessary operation and effect of the act in question was to burden interstate commerce and to tax property beyond the jurisdiction of the State,
and it was therefore invalid.
"There is nothing in these cases contrary, as we shall have occasion
to see, to the former rulings of this court which hold that where a tax is
lawfully imposed upon the exercise of privileges within the taxing power
of the State or Nation, the measure of such tax may be the income from
the property of the corporation, although a part of such income is derived
from property in itself non-taxable. The distinction lies between the attempt to tax the property as such and to measure a legitimate tax upon
the privileges involved in the use of such property.
"In Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, a tax was sustained
upon the right or privilege of the Home Insurance Company to be a corporation, and to do business within the State in a corporate capacity, the
tax being measured by the extent of the dividends of the corporation in
the current year upon the capital stock. Although a very large amount,
nearly two of three millions of capital stock, was invested in bonds of the
United States, expressly exempted from taxation by a statute of the United
States, the tax was sustained as a mode of measurement of a privilege
tax which it was within the lawful authority of the State to impose.
Mr. Justice Field, who delivered the opinion of the court, reviewed the
previous cases in this court, holding that the State could not tax or burden the operation of the Constitution and of laws enacted by the Congress
to carry into execution the powers vested in the General Government.
Yielding full assent to those cases, Mr. Justice Field said of the tax then
under consideration: 'It is not a tax in terms upon the capital stock of
the company, nor upon any bonds of the United States composing a part
of that stock. The statute designates it a tax upon the 'corporate franchise
or business' of the company and reference is only made to its capital stock
and dividends for the purpose of determining the amount of the tax to
be exacted each year.' In that case, in the course of the opinion, previous
cases of this court were cited, with approval, Society for Savings v.
Coite, 6 Wall. 594; Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611.
"In the Coite Case a privilege tax upon the total amount of deposits in
a savings bank was sustained, although $500,000 of the deposits had been
invested in securities of the United States, and declared by act of Congress
to be exempt from taxation by state authority. In that case the court
said: 'Nothing can be more certain in legal decision than that the privileges and franchises of a private corporation, and all trades and avocations
by which the citizens acquire a livelihood, may be taxed by a State for
the support of the state government. Authority to that effect resides in the
State independently of the Federal Government, and is wholly unaffected by
the fact that the corporation or individual has or has not made investment
in Federal securities.' In Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, supra,
a like tax was sustained.
"It is therefore well settled by the decisions of this court that when the
sovereign authority has exercised the right to tax a legitimate subject of
taxation as an exercise of a franchise or privilege, it is no objection that
the measure of taxation is found in the income produced in part from
property which of itself considered is non-taxable. Applying that doctrine
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to this case, the measure of taxation being the income of the corporation
from all sources, as that is but the measure of a privilege tax within the
lawful authority of Congress to impose, it is no valid objection that this
measure includes, in part at least, property which as such could not be
directly taxed. See in this connection Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142
U. S. 217, as interpreted in Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry.
Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 226."29

In Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Stiles,30 a case decided six years
after the decision in the Western Union case, the court upheld a franchise tax on a domestic railroad corporation measured by total capital
stock. The corporation was formed by the consolidation of three different railroad corporations incorporated after the taxing law had been
enacted 3 ' and was engaged in both intrastate and interstate commerce.
It was contended that the tax was void as a tax upon property beyond
the jurisdiction and because it imposed a direct burden upon interstate
commerce. The court, per Mr. Justice Day, dismissed these contentions
as follows:
"Objections of this character were so recently discussed and the previous cases in this court considered, in Kansas City &c Railway Co. v.
Kansas, 240 U. S. 227,32 that it would be superfluous to undertake extended discussion of the subject now. In that case, after a full review of
the previous decisions in this court, it was held that each case must depend
upon its own circumstances, and that while the State could not tax property beyond its borders, it might measure a tax within its authority by
capital stock which in part represented property without the taxing power
of the State. As to the objection based upon the due process clause of the
Constitution, we think that principle controlling here. There is no attempt
in this case to levy a property tax; a franchise tax within the authority
of the State is in part measured by the capital stock representing property
owned in other States.
"The tax is not of the character condemned in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, and kindred cases. In the latter case, a
29

Ibid. pp. 162-165.
so Supra n. 27.
31 That this fact was of some importance is evidenced by the consideration
given to it in the opinion of the court: "The railroads comprising this consolidation
entered upon it with the Alabama statute before them and under its conditions,
and, subject to constitutional objections as to its enforcement, they cannot be heard
to complain of the terms under which they voluntarily invoked and received the
grant of corporate existence from the state of Alabama." Supra n. 27, at p. 117.
32 The case here cited by the court upheld a graduated state franchise tax upon
a domestic corporation measured by total paid-up capital stock with a proviso,
however, that the tax should not exceed $2,500. The Stiles case is stronger authority
for the measurement theory than this case because of the fact that the decision in
the latter was not made fully dependent upon the measurement theory and can be
explained on the ground that the fixed limit prevented a burden upon interstate
commerce from arising and upon the ground that even if the maximum were
reached it would be at most a fair equivalent of what the state could have exacted
directly without the use of a measure.
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tax of large amount was imposed upon a foreign corporation engaged in
interstate commerce for the privilege of doing local business within the
State. Under the circumstances therein disclosed and the character of the
business involved, this court held that the statute was in substance an
attempt to tax the right to do interstate business, and to tax property
beyond the confines of the State, and was therefore void. Here, a franchise tax is levied upon a corporation consolidated under the laws of the
State by its own acceptance of that law in incorporating under it.
"So of the objection that the tax imposes a burden upon interstate
commerce, the test of validity recognized in previous cases and repeated
in Kansas City &c Railway Co. v. Kansas, supra, is the nature and character of the tax imposed. The State may not regulate interstate commerce
or impose burdens upon it; but it is authorized to levy a tax within its
authority, measured by capital in part used in the conduct of such commerce, where the circumstances are such as to indicate no purpose or
necessary effect in the tax imposed to burden commerce of that character.
In the present case, the franchise tax is imposed upon the capital stock
of a corporation consolidated under the state law, and engaged in both
interstate and intrastate commerce.
"We find nothing in the amount or character of the tax which makes
it a burden upon interstate commerce, and so beyond the authority of
the State to impose." 33

In the recent case of Frick v. Pennsylvania it was held that a
state cannot levy a tax upon the transfer, upon the death of the owner,
of tangible personal property having an actual situs outside the state
even though the owner was domiciled within the taxing state. It was
also held that in measuring a tax on the succession to property within
the state, tangible personal property having an actual situs in other
states cannot be included in the measure. The measurement theory by
which such an attempt was made to reach extraterritorial tangibles, was
emphatically condemned:
"One ground on which the state court put its decision was that, in
taxing the transfer of property which the decedent owned in Pennsylvania, it was admissible to take as a basis for computing the tax the combined value of that property and the property in New York and Massachusetts. Of course, this was but the equivalent of saying that it was admissible to measure the tax by a standard which took no account of the
distinction between what the state had power to tax and what it had no
power to tax, and which necessarily operated to make the amount of the
tax just what it would have been had the state's power included what was
excluded by the Constitution. This ground, in our opinion, is not tenable.
It would open the way for easily doing indirectly what is forbidden to
be done directly, and would render important constitutional limitations
of no avail. If Pennsylvania could tax according to such a standard other
states could. 1J would mean, as applied to the Frick estate, that Pennsyl33 (1916) 242 U. S. 111, 118-120, 37 Sup. Ct. 58.
34 (1925) 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603.
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vania, New York, and Massachusetts could each impose a tax based on
the value of the entire estate, although severally having jurisdiction of
only parts of it. Without question each State had power to tax the transfer
of so much of the estate as was under its jurisdiction, and also had some
discretion in respect of the rate; but none could use that power and discretion in accomplishing an unconstitutional end, such as indirectly taxing
the transfer of the part of the estate which was under the exclusive jurisdiction of others. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster, 247 U. S. 105,
114 and cases cited; Looney v. Crane Company, 245 U. S. 178, 188; International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135, 141; Air-Way Corporation v. Day, 266 U. S. 71, 81; Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66, 69;
Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Company v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385,
395."s5

The court thus appears in no uncertain terms to repudiate the notion
that the measurement theory can be used as a disguise to impose a tax
burden that could not have been imposed by a direct tax. It seems fairly
clear, from the language quoted, that if a forbidden burden is actually
imposed the measurement theory will not save it.**
35

Ibid. pp. 494-495.
36 The language of the court in Miller v. Milwaukee (1927) 272 U. S. 713, 47
Sup. Ct. 280, is important in this connection. In that case the court held invalid
an income tax exempting shareholders from taxation on dividends on which the
corporation had already paid a tax. Inasmuch as the most conspicuous instance of
exemption from the corporate income tax was the interest from, United States
bonds, the income tax on the shareholder reached little else but the income from
those bonds. In holding the tax invalid, the court, per Mr. Justice Holmes, declared:
"If the avowed purpose or self-evident operation of a statute is to follow the
bonds of the United States and to make up for its inability to reach them directly
by indirectly achieving the same result, the statute must fail even if but for its
purpose or special operation it would be perfectly good. Under the laws of Wisconsin the income from the United States bonds may not be the only item exempted
from the income tax on corporations, but it certainly is the most conspicuous instance of exemption at the present time. A result intelligently foreseen and offering the most obvious motive for an act that will bring it about, fairly may be
taken to have been a purpose of the act. On that assumption the immunity of
the national bonds is too important to allow any narrowing beyond what the
Acts of Congress permit. .. . A tax very well may be upheld as against any casual
effect it may have upon the bonds of the United States when passed with a different intent and not aimed at them, but it becomes a more serious attack upon their
immunity when they are its obvious aim. In such a case the Court must consider
the public welfare rather than the artifices contrived for private convenience and
must look at the facts." Italics added.
The portion of the opinion italicized is of particular importance when it is observed that the avowed purpose and self-evident operation of a franchise tax
measured by total net income is to reach income from tax exempt securities. The
debates in Congress over the adoption of the 1926 amendment to Section 5219,
supra n. 1, clearly show that such was the purpose of that amendment. Such purpose is also admitted by the California tax commission in recommending that
method of bank and corporation taxation in its Special Report of August 10, 1928,
at p. 40:
"As has been pointed out, the 1926 amendment to section 5219 was drafted
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We have, then, two lines of cases which, so far as the reasoning
stated by the court is concerned, seem hard to reconcile. On the one
hand the rule stated is that so long as the subject taxed is taxable the
amount of the tax can be measured by property or income which is
not taxable: This, because the rate lies completely within the discretion
of the legislature, a premise which is unquestionable whatever be the
merit in the conclusion drawn therefrom. On the other hand) the Western Union and Frick cases seem to say clearly and forcefully that if a
tax on a taxable subject is measured by the amount of a class of property or income which is not taxable, it follows that since the necessary
effect is in substance a taX on the property or income used as a measure
the tax is void. It seems unquestionable that the rules as just stated
cannot exist simultaneously in any coherent system of law. Some solution which will distinguish these two lines of cases must be sought. A
number of solutions seem to be possible: (1) It may be that the rules
as stated are not the rules laid down in the cases. It is submitted, however, that they fairly paraphrase the reasoning of the court contained
in its opinions as above quoted. (2) It may be that the Western Union
case was intended to repudiate the doctrine of the Home Insurance case.
This explanation, however, does not seem satisfactory because it convicts the court of a degree of vacillation which it would be unreasonable
to suppose the court guilty of in fact. Thus, this explanation would require the conclusion that the court repudiated the doctrine of the Home
Insurance case in the Western Union case, repudiated the latter, and
returned again to its original position in the Flint case and again reversed its position and returned to the Western Union doctrine in the
Frick case. (3) It is possible to argue that the court is upholding or
condemning each tax as it is presented according as the court believes
it to be excessively burdensome as a matter of degree. This theory gathers some weight from the circumstance that the court has upheld taxes
which could not possibly be justified under the measurement theory as
qualified in the Western Union case, putting their validity on the ground
that the burden on non-taxable property was inconsiderable.37 Morewith the avowed object of permitting the inclusion in the tax base of such income
as the interest from tax-exempt bonds. In the case of corporations other than
banks, the point is not of vital importance. But the banks hold such large quantities of these tax exempt bonds that the effect of a decision holding that the state
may not include them in the base would be very serious indeed. An analysis of the
replies of the banks to the Commission's questionnaire indicates that the noninclusion of federal bond interest would reduce the tax base of the banks approximately one-fourth and the non-inclusion of all interest exempt from the federal
income
tax would reduce that base by more than one half."
3
7 Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, supra n. 27; General Ry. Signal Co. v.
Virginia, supra n. 27.
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over, it has upheld taxes which were in lieu of other taxes on the ground
that they were a fair compromise in a situation admittedly difficult of
solution.38 But this conclusion that the court is deciding each case
simply on the basis of the extent of discrimination or burden there imposed by the tax does not seem to be an adequate explanation of the
apparent contradiction between the cases above quoted, for the reason
that in almost all of those cases the court, far from basing its decision
on the extent of the burden, attempts carefully and at length to base
its decision upon other grounds, that is, upon the measurement theory
in the one group and in the other group upon the proposition that the
tax is in substance and effect a tax upon non-taxable property. 39 (4)
One other solution seems to be possible, which, although not supported
by any clear language in the court's opinions, is, nevertheless, consistent
with and serves to explain all40 of the decisions if the facts of each case
be kept in mind. In the Home Insurance case, the tax was a franchise
tax upon the privilege of being a domestic corporation and the tax was
measured by dividends paid, i. e., by the benefits derived by the share-
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38
Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (1891) 142 U. S. 217, 12 Sup. Ct. 121, as interpreted in Galveston H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Texas (1908) 210 U. S. 217, 28 Sup.
Ct. 638; United States Express Co. v. Minnesota (1912) 223 U. S. 335, 32 Sup. Ct.
211; Pullman Co. v. Richardson (1923) 261 U. S. 330, 43 Sup. Ct. 366; Bass,
Ratcliffe & Gretton v. State Tax Commission (1924) 266 U. S. 271, 45 Sup. Ct. 82.
39 See Locomobile Co. v. Massachusetts (1918) 246 U. S. 146, 38 Sup. Ct.
298, where the court held that a Massachusetts statute of 1914 removed the $2000
maximum limitation feature of the act of 1909 upheld in Baltic Mining Co. case,
supra n. 27, and therefore held the statute invalid, regardless of the fact that the
tax in question amounted to $1300 which was less than the allowed maximum
of the statute sustained in the Baltic case. Thus, since the law was declared invalid, taxes on corporations of small capital who derived no benefit from the
limitation of the 1909 Act because their taxes under neither statute would reach
$2000 were no longer taxable under the 1914 statute. See Thomas Reed Powell,
Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers of the State
(1918) 31 HARVARD L. REV. 932, 941.
See also, Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts (1925) 268 U. S. 203,
45 Sup. Ct. 477, where the Massachusetts excise tax on corporations measured by
the proportion of capital shares attributed to transactions in Massachusetts and
the proportion of net income attributed to such transactions was declared invalid
as regards corporations engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, because the
state could not tax the privilege of doing interstate business: this, although a tax
on the net income itself derived from interstate business in Massachusetts (United
States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek (1918) 247 U. S. 321, 38 Sup. Ct. 499) and a tax
on the property itself used in Massachusetts would have been valid (Henderson
Bridge Co. v. Ky. (1897) 166 U. S. 158, 17 Sup. Ct. 532) and the very tax itself
would have been sustained had the company done some local business (Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain (1920) 254 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. 45;
Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Doughton (1923) 262 U. S. 413, 43 Sup. Ct. 620.
See also, Texas Transport Co. v. New Orleans (1924) 264 U. S. 150, 44 Sup. Ct.
242; Ozark Pipe Line Co. v. Monier (1925) 266 U. S. 555, 45 Sup. Ct. 184.
40 Except the case of Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York (1892) 143 U. S.
305, 12 Sup. Ct. 403, discussed later on.
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holders from the corporation's exercise of its franchise. In the Stiles
case, the tax was also upon the franchise granted by the taxing state,
and was measured by the amount of capital employed in the exercise
of the franchise, in other words was measured by the extent of the franchise granted. The Flint case involved a federal tax on doing of business as a corporation (a tax under the constitutional grant of power
to levy excise taxes), and the tax was measured by the net income of
the corporation, i. e., by the benefits derived from the operations taxed,
namely, the doing of business as a corporation.
On the other hand, in the opposing group of cases one element common to the cases just mentioned is missing. In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas the tax was on the privilege of doing intrastate
business within the taxing state and the tax was measured, not by the
benefits derived from the privilege taxed nor by the amount of property
employed in its exercise, but by the total capital stock of the company,
a great part of which represented property located outside the state.
In Frick v. Pennsylvania, the tax was upon the privilege of succession
to property of one who died domiciled in the state. The measure of the
tax included the value of tangible personal property located outside the
state. The court held that the succession to the outside property could
not be controlled by the taxing state merely because it was the domicile
of the deceased owner. It follows that although the tax was upon the
privilege of succession, it included in its measure property succession
to which was not attributable to the privilege taxed.
It is apparent that a principle can be inferred from these two groups
of cases which is not only consistent with all of them, but which, if law,
is a sufficient ground for each of the decisions. This principle is that a
tax upon the privilege of owning property as a corporation can be
measured by the extent of the privilege (specifically, capital stock
outstanding), even though some at least of the property so owned is
beyond the borders of the taxing state; and that a tax either upon this
privilege or upon the doing of business as a corporation, (whether the
existence of the corporation was granted by the taxing state or not),
may be measured by the fruits of the privileges exercised, or derived
from the doing of business (net income), even though it be true that
part of those fruits were received as income not taxable as such. This
principle is submitted not as having any necessary validity a priori,
but simply as an inference which can be drawn from the cases. The
fact is that in all these cases the court was faced with a dilemma and,
since it had to decide, was forced to find a compromise. In the Home
Insurance case, for example, the state's power to tax the privilege of
existence and operation as a corporation was unquestionable and, as
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between the state and the federal government was a power with which
the latter should not lightly interfere. But this corporation derived income from bonds which the federal government, in the exercise of its
unquestionable powers, had forbidden the states to tax. If the court upheld the tax, the result would undeniably be, in a sense at least, a state
tax in substance upon the bonds. If the court condemned the tax, the
result would be federal interference with the power of the state over
its creatures.41 Among the considerations present was the fact that the
tax was not a direct tax upon the income from the bonds, but could
fairly be said to be rather a tax on the actual net benefits derived from
the exercise of the corporate privilege. The court might, as pointed out
above, nevertheless have considered that the interference with federal
power involved in the tax was more serious than the interference with
the state's taxing power which would be involved in its condemnation.
The fact is, however, that it chose the contrary alternative and upheld
the tax.42
In the opposing line of cases, beginning with the Western Union
case, the dilemma with which the court had to deal was in substance the
same, but the considerations pro and con were not. It seems fair, for
example, to characterize the tax condemned in the Western Union case
as an attempt by the state to use its power to tax intrastate business
as a means of taxing property beyond its taxing powers; property, and
this is the point to be observed, which has no connection whatever with
the subject taxed, i. e., doing of intrastate business. It is apparent that
the court might, so far as logical consistency is concerned, have upheld
41 In Metcalf v. Mitchell (1926) 269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup. Ct. 172, in which it
was decided that an engineer who received compensation for services rendered
under a contract with a state, but who was not an officer thereof, was not entitled to exemption from the federal income tax, the court recognized the dilemma
that arises in situations like the one discussed in the text: "In a broad sense, the
taxing power of either government, even when exercised in a manner admittf"* '
necessary and proper, unavoidably has some effect upon the other. The burden of
federal taxation necessarily sets an economic limit to the practical operation of the
taxing power of the states, and vice versa. Taxation by either the state or the
federal government affects in some measure the cost of operation of the other.
"But neither government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial
manner the exercise of its power. Hence the limitation upon the taxing power of
each, so far as it affects the other, must receive a practical construction which
permits both to function with the minimum of interference each with the other;
and that limitation cannot be so varied or extended as seriously to impair eithqr the
taxing power of the government imposing the tax (South Carolina v. United States,
199 U. S. 437; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., supra at page 172) or the appropriate
exercise of the function of the government affected by it. Railroad Co. v. Peniston,
18 Wall. 31."
42 Teforegoing is submitted, not as a statement of the actual grounds of the
decision in this case, but as the grounds upon which it rests in the light of the
subsequent cases.
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this tax if it had chosen to do so, on the ground that since the amount
of the tax on intrastate commerce was within the discretion of the
state, the measure of that amount was of necessity also within its discretion. This in fact was the contention of Mr. Justice Holmes in his
dissent in the Western Union case, and its seems quite probable that it
is also the view taken by the court in the Home Insurance case. Obviously, however, the Home Insurance decision did not require so extensive a principle, and whether or not the court adopted it in that case,
it was unequivocally repudiated in the Western Union case.
It is proposed to consider now, in the light of the foregoing analysis,
certain other cases which have an important bearing upon the problem
here discussed.
Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York" is one case clearly inconsistent with the theory advanced above. In that case the court upheld a state
franchise tax on the privilege of doing business in the state levied on a
foreign corporation engaged only in intrastate business in the state
measured by its total capital stock, without regard to what part thereof
was employed within the state. In fact only a small proportion was employed in the state. In the course of the court's opinion delivered by
Mr. Justice Field, it is said:
"Having the absolute power of excluding the foreign corporation, the
State may, of course, impose such conditions upon permitting the corporation to do business within its limits as it may judge expedient; and it may
make the grant or privilege dependent upon the payment of a specific
license tax, or a sum proportioned to the amount of its capital. No individual member of the corporation, or the corporation itself, can call in
question the validity of any exaction which the State may require for
the grant of its privileges."4

The measure here imposed bore no relation whatever to the privilege
granted. The tax was not measured by the benefits derived from the
privilege granted nor by the extent thereof. The case is clearly out of
line with the development of the law on this subject, and if not yet
overruled is clearly condemned by the reasoning of modern cases.45
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Wisconsin" is one of
43
Supran. 40.
44
Ibid. p. 315.
45

In addition to the cases discussed in the text where the taxes were held invalid sqe Terral v. Burke Construction Co. (1922) 257 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 188;
Michigan ftblic Utilities Commission et al. v. Duke (1925) 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup.
Ct. 191; Frost v. R. R. Commission (1926) 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605.
See Thomas Reed Powell, The Changing Law of Foreign Corporations (1918)
33 Pox,. Sc. Q. 549, 558-562 for reasons why the Home Silver case might not yet
be considered completely overruled.
46 (1927) 275 U. S. 136, 48 Sup. Ct. 55.
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the most recent cases involving the measurement theory and a case
directly related to the problem of taxing the income from exempt securities. The state of Wisconsin required domestic life insurance companies
to pay into the state treasury, as an annual license fee for transacting
such business, 3 percent of their gross income from all sources. The payment of such license fee was in lieu of all taxes except taxes on real
estate. The law was held invalid so far as it affected the receipt of interest on United States bonds. It was contended by the state that the tax
was a privilege or franchise tax exacted for certain privileges, including
exemption from personal property taxation and right to do business,
and that although measured by total income, including income from
United States bonds, it was not a tax on that income. But the court,
per Mr. Justice McReynolds, distinguished Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.
and the similar cases:
"It cannot be denied (and denial is not attempted) that bonds of the
United States are beyond the taxing power of the states. Home Savings
Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U. S. 503, 509; Farmers & Mechanics Bank v.
Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516; and First National Bank v. Anderson, 269 U. S.
341, 347. Certainly since Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 505, it has
been the settled doctrine here that where the principle is absolutely immune, no valid tax can be laid upon income arising therefrom. To tax this
would amount practically to laying a burden on the exempted principal.
Accordingly, if the challenged Act, whatever called, really imposes a direct
charge upon interest derived from United States bonds, it is pro tanto
void.
"The fundamental question, often presented in cases similar to these,
is whether by the true construction of the statute the assessment must be
regarded as a tax upon property or one on privileges or franchise of the
corporation. Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594; Home Insurance
Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594.
"Section 76.34 [Wisconsin Statutes] undertakes to impose a charge
not measured by dividends paid, as in Home Insurance Co. v. New York,
134 U. S. 594, nor by net income as in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S.
107; and those cases are not controlling. The distinction between an imposition the amount of which depends upon dividends or net receipts
and one measured by gross returns is clear. U. S. Glue Co. v. Town of
Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 328, and earlier opinions there cited. . . .
"Here the statute undertook to impose a charge of 3 per cent upon
every dollar of interest received by the Company from United States
bonds. So much, in any event, the State took from these very receipts.
This amounts, we think, to an imposition upon the bonds themselves and
goes beyond the power of the State." 47
47 Ibid. pp. 140-141.
If franchise taxes measured by total net income are to be upheld as regards
income from tax exempt securities it is apparent from a reading of the opinion
just quoted that they must be so upheld on the ground that the tax is measured by
net rather than by gross income. Regardless of what the tax is called, or the
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It will be observed that the court in this case stated something very
like the solution above suggested.
Another case which should be mentioned in this connection is Nalanguage in which it is framed, it seems certain that if it directly reaches the income
from exempt securities it will be held invalid. The problem is thus reduced to a
consideration of whether the measurement theory will sustain a tax measured by
net income which would admittedly be void if measured by gross income, or in
other words, whether a tax measured by net income is or is not a direct tax on
that income. There can be no doubt that a tax measured by gross income which
reaches "every dollar of interest received from United States bonds" directly and
immediately reaches the income from those bonds. On the other hand, a franchise
tax measured by net income, i. e., the fruits or benefits of the franchise, is contingent upon the making of profits, that is, losses in the business may swallow up
the income from the securities, the holder having the benefit of cancelling some or
all of his indebtedness without paying taxes on the receipt of the income.
If, however, the premise should be established that a tax on a good subject
cannot be measured by non.taxable property or income (to establish such a premise several cases discussed in the text would have to be overruled), it would be
difficult to sustain a distinction holding a franchise tax measured by net income
valid and one measured by gross income invalid, since the net income from exempt
securities cannot be taxed. The cases emphasizing the distinction between taxes on
net and gross income from interstate commerce, or from exports (United States
Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek (1918) 247 U. S. 321, 328, 38 Sup. Ct. 499, and
Peck & Co. v. Lowe (1918) 247 U. S. 165, 38 Sup. Ct. 432) would not be in point
because they sanction a direct net income tax and are in noway dependent upon
the measurement theory. The tax exempt bond situation is entirely different from
the interstate commerce and export situation. The receipt of net income from
such bonds cannot be directly taxed. It would seem that a non-discriminatory tax
upon net income from federal securities would interfere no more with the federal
borrowing power than such a tax on the net income from interstate commerce
would burden that commerce. The court, however, in Gillespie v. Oklahoma, supra
-f. 14 at p. 505-506, refused to follow the reasoning of the Oak Creek case in the
matter of taxing the net income of federal instrumentalities. In the Oklahoma case
the court held that the state could jot tax a lessee of restricted Indian lands upon
his net income derived from these leases, as the leases constitute him in effect an
instrumentality used by the federal government in fulfilling its duties to the
Indians. The state contended that the cases sustaining taxes upon net income from
interstate commerce were controlling, but the court, per Mr. Justice Holmes, met
this contention as follows:
"The criterion of interference by the States with interstate commerce is one of
degree. It is well understood that a certain amount of reaction upon and interference with such commerce cannot be avoided if the States are to exist and make
laws. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628.
Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., 187 U. S. 611, 616. The rule as to
instrumentalities of the United States on the other hand is absolute in form and at
least stricter in substance. Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404, 416, 417, 419.
Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51, 55. 'A tax upon the leases is a tax upon the
power to make them, and could be used to destroy the power to make them.'
240 U. S. 530. The step from this to the invalidity of the tax upon income from the
leases is not long.
"In cases where the principal is absolutely immune from interference an inquiry is allowed into the sources from which net income is derived and if a part
of it comes from such a source the tax is pro tanto void; Pollock v. Farmers Loan
& Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429; 158 U. S. 601; a rule lately illustrated by Evans v.
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tional Life Insurance Co. v. United States.48 This case will receive careful and extended examination in the next installment of this article in
connection with the recently enacted California bank and corporation
tax statute. It is mentioned at this point only to state the considerations
that show it does not bear one way or the other upon the measurement
theory. The case involved a federal income tax on life insurance companies. In determining the "net income," i. e., the tax base, certain
deductions were allowed including the following: (1) The amount of
interest from tax exempt securities; (2) A sum equal to 4 per cent of
the company's legal reserve less the amount of interest deducted under
(1). The court held the statute invalid, so far as it required the deduction of the tax exempt income from the sum of 4 per cent of the reserves. The court was of the opinion that to deny the full 4 per cent
deduction to exempt security holders allowed those not holding such
securities was in effect a tax upon such securities. In the words of the
court, "One may not be subjected to greater burdens upon his taxable
property solely because he owns some that is free." 49 Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Holmes and Stone
concurred. Mr. Justice Stone also wrote a dissenting opinion in which
Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred. Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented on the
ground that the effect of the decision was to add to the requirement
that the bonds should be exempt from taxation, a further requirement
that any property or income tax is void unless it is higher with respect
to persons not owning exempt securities than it is with respect to persons who do own them. He contended that there was no authority for
this decision and that it defeated the proper purpose of Congress which
was simply to allow insurance companies deductions equal in any case
to 4 per cent of their reserves, but to allow them no more unless the
income from federal securities exceeded that sum. He contended that
Gore, 253 U. S. 245; and applied in a case somewhat like the present by the
Supreme Court of Hawaii. Oahu Ry. & Land Co.*'v. Pratt, 14 Hawaii, 126.
Whether this property could be taxed in any other form or not, it cannot be
reached as profits o; income from leases such as those before us. The same considerations that iniIA~date a tax upon the leases invalidate a tax upon the profits
of the leases, and, stopping short of theoretical possibilities, a tax upon such profits
is a direct hamper upon the effort of the United States to make the best terms
that it can for its wards. Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 468." (Italics added.)
This tax, it is true, was imposed directly upon the net income of a federal
instrumentality, but the italicized portion of the opinion offers an opening for the
court to distinguish indirect taxes measured by net income, including income from
federal securities which it might wish to hold invalid, from cases in which a tax
is measured by net income including income from interstate commerce which it
might wish to uphold.
48 (1928) 277 U. 5. 508, 48 Sup. Ct. 591.
**Ibid. p. 519.
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the case was controlled by a principle necessarily implied in the Home
Insurance and subsequent cases including Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
namely, that a tax is not void merely because it operates to deny an
advantage to holders of exempt securities, but is valid unless it also
imposes a direct burden thereon. Mr. Justice Stone dissented on the
ground that the discrimination occurred only in respect of an act of
bounty which Congress could confer, in carrying out its particular purpose, without repugnancy to the Constitution.
It is submitted that this case does not bear upon the validity or
invalidity of the measurement theory. It is apparent that the considerations involved in the National Life Insurance case have no bearing upon
the problems presented by the measurement theory, for the reason,
among others, that it was a tax directly upon income. It is interesting
to observe that a new measurement theory problem would have been
presented if the tax involved in the National Life Insurance case had
been an excise tax measured by net income and had allowed the same
deductions as those which were allowed in fact. If such a tax were declared void the decision would not, it seems, be inconsistent with the
cases previously decided in the field, but would simply add a new limitation to the measurement theory, namely, that the denial of an exemption
cannot be -measured by the value of exempt securities.

41

as

V. THE MACALLEN CASE'
last installment of this article 2 contained a detailed discussion
of the measurement theory (i.e. the theory that a tax upon a taxable subject may be measured by a measure which includes non-taxable
property or income if the measure bears a reasonable relation to the
subject taxed) and also a discussion of its importance to the new methods of taxing national banks permitted by Section 5219 of the United
States Revised Statutes.3 Since that installment was published the
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Macallen Company v.
Massachusetts - a case of the greatest importance to the measurement
theory. It is proposed to discuss the Macallen case here only so far as
is necessary to determine what was decided and the effect of the decision
upon the recently enacted California Bank and Corporation Franchise
Tax Act.
The Massachusetts statute with which the decision deals attempts
among other things, as does the California statute,4 to levy an excise
tax on domestic corporations measured by net income including income
from federal and other tax exempt securities. The tax was held void in
so far as it was derived from the income from exempt securities. The
reasoning of the court was briefly as follows:
(1) The court declared its power and duty to "determine for itself
by independent inquiry whether the tax is what, in form and by the
decision of the state court, it is declared to be, namely, an excise tax
on the privilege of doing business, or, under the guise of that designation, is in substance and reality a tax on the income derived from taxexempt securities." 5 In support of this proposition the court cited and
discussed a number of its earlier decisions wherein it held void various
taxes which it found to be "in substance and reality" taxes upon nontaxable property though otherwise entitled.
It is of course true that all the taxes in this field of inquiry whether
held valid or void relate to situations in which taxable and non-taxable
property are so intertwined that a tax on either class of property is in

~pI

1 Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts (May 27, 1929) -

432.

2 17 CALIoRm L. REv. 232.
344 STAT. 223 (1926), 12 U. S. C. § 548 (1928).
4 Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 13.

5 49 Sup. Ct. 432, 434.

U. S. -,

49 Sup. Ct.
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some sense and to some extent a burden on the other." Taxes upon
taxable subjects thus intertwined with non-taxable subjects are valid
or void depending upon whether they have or have not been based upon
a measure which bears a reasonable relation to the taxable subject and
not too intimate a relation to the non-taxable subject. When the court
holds a statute in this field void, it generally does so by characterizing
the statute as "in substance and effect" a tax upon the non-taxable
element of the complex involved. If the court's proposition above
quoted means anything, it means that the answer to the question which
the court says it can and must determine might be that the tax involved
in this case is void under the test applied in the cases cited by the coupt
and set out above, i.e. on the ground that it is in "substance and effect"
a tax on exempt securities. This, however, is not true; for the tax
involved is identical so far as the present point is concerned, with that
involved in Flint v. Stone Tracy Company,7 where it was held that a
corporate excise was valid though measured by net income including
income from exempt securities.
(2) The court examined the facts of the case and found as a fact
that the motive of the legislature of Massachusetts in enacting this
statute was to reach the non-taxable securities held by the corporations
taxed. The court did not find that the legislature did not have other
and legitimate motives as well.
(3) The court turned to the cases upon which the court below
relied, "of which [says the court] Flint v. Stone Tracy Company . . . is
the extreme example, holding that a tax lawfully imposed upon the
exercise of corporate privileges within the taxing power may be measured by income from the property of the corporation although a part
of such income is derived from non-taxable property." 8 Speaking of
these cases the court said, "It is implicit in all that the thing taxed in
form was in fact and reality the subject aimed at, and that any burden
put upon the non-taxable subject by its use as a measure of value was
fortuitous and incidental."* (Italics added.) The words italicized indicate the ground upon which the rest of the opinion distinguishes Flint
v. Stone Tracy Company from the instant case.
It should be noted that the court did not find it necessary to overrule Flint v. Stone Tracy Company in order to hold the present statute
void, although it is undeniable that the actual objective operation of

I See Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell (1926) 269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup. Ct. 172 quoted
at length in this connection in the previous installment of this article. 17 CALrwomu
L. REv. 232, 252, n. 41.
7 (1911) 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342.
849 Sup. Ct. 432, 434.
949 Sup. Ct. 432, 434.
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the tax upheld in the Flint case and that condemned in the instant case
is identical. This fact is plainly recognized by the court in its opinion
and indeed was necessarily alive in the court's mind since Flint v.
Stone Tracy Company was the principal authority upon which the state
relied. Necessarily, therefore, one premise in the court's reasoning is
the proposition that the tax in the instant case was unobjectionable so
far as concerned its actual operation and was void because of the rule
laid down that such a tax if imposed for the purpose of reaching exempt
securities is for that reason and without more invalid. It is true that
in some cases in this field the court has used language which seemed
to make validity or invalidity of the particular statute depend upon
the intent with which it was enacted. The extreme example is Miller
v. Milwaukee'o (quoted at some length on this point in the last installment of this article") which is quoted in the instant case by the court
in part as follows:
"A tax very well may be upheld as against any casual effect it may
have upon the bonds of the United States when passed with a different
intent and not aimed at them, but it becomes a more serious attack upon
12
their immunity when they are its obvious aim."

In view of the foregoing discussion there is no question but that
the court held the tax void even assuming that had that motive been
10 (1927) 272 U. S. 713, 47 Sup. Ct. 280.
11 17 CAuFoRuiA L. REv. 232, 248, n. 36. It might perhaps be said on the basis
of the court's language in the Miller case that such a tax would be void under the
rule of that case solely because of its effect even though the purpose of its enactors
was unimpeachable but this it seems would be a rather unreasonable conclusion
from the language quoted for although the court first describes the test to be
applied as, "the avowed purpose or self evident operation" of a statute it seems to
end by making "self evident operation" not a direct ground for holding the
statute void but rather as simply furnishing conclusive evidence of intent. Whether
the court means this to be actual intent or only the kind of intent sometimes
presumed by the law to supply a necessary premise in a legal syllogism does not
appear. The facts in the Macallen case were treated as in effect identical with those
in the Miller case. In form the Massachusetts legislature had enacted an amendment the only effect of which was to achieve the same result as would a tax on
the net income of exempt securities. It had done this by adding net income from
these securities to the net income of domestic corporations which was used to
measure the franchise tax. But although the facts are treated as identical with
those in the Miler case, the reasoning of the court is somewhat different in that
the court examines evidence (a report of the Massachusetts Tax Commission) for
the purpose of determining the actual motive of the legislature in enacting the
amendment and finds that their actual motive was to reach exempt securities by
indirection, i.e. by applying the form of tax upheld in Flint v. Stone Tracy Company.
12 272 U. S. 713, 715, 47 Sup. Ct. 280.
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lacking the tax would have been valid, for the reason that it was enacted
with the purpose of reaching non-taxable property.' 3
Two questions are presented: (1) is the court's test of honest or
dishonest motive a good test wherewith to judge these statutes; and
(2) do the facts of this case justify the court's finding in regard to
the purpose of the state of Massachusetts?
The second question will not be discussed here except to suggest
that it would have been at least as consistent with the facts before the
court and rather more consistent with the integrity ordinarily attributed to a state, to say that the earlier Massachusetts statute excluded
income from exempt securities from the measure of the franchise tax
because it was thought to be necessary, and that the statute was changed
to include that income because this court had decided that a franchise
tax is properly so measured.
The other question is more important. It seems rather unfortunate
that the court should have chosen as a test of the validity of these
statutes the motive impelling the legislature in each particular case.
Admittedly the only justification for condemning any of these statutes
is the duty of the Supreme Court to protect the federal government
and its agencies from burdensome interference by the states. The
application given to the court's test in the instant case, in the light of
the Flint case, which the court here recognizes as good law, compels the
conclusion that the statute here involved would have been valid if
the state of Massachusetts could have convinced the court that its motives were unimpeachable. But the statute would have been no less a
burden upon the borrowing power of the federal government. In other
words there is no reasonable relation between the test adopted by the
court and the only justification for its application. The court has in
effect adopted a rule of retributive justice. It seems obvious that a
rule adopted in aid of the court's duty to prevent undue burdens on
the activities of the federal government should turn upon the seriousness
of the burdens rather than upon some factor varying independently of
those burdens. The argument immediately suggests itself that such
statutes may be void independently of the extent of the burden because
13
It is rather important to observe that the proposition just stated was the
ground not only for distinguishing Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. but was the sole
ground of the decision itself, for if legislative motive had been invoked only to
distinguish the Flint case and the decision itself had been put upon some other
ground it would have been possible to suspect that the court had repented its
decision in the Flint case and that its ground for distinguishing the case was not
to be taken very seriously. It cannot be thought, however, that the court has
based the decision itself on a proposition of law in which it does not believe
simply because the only alternative was the outright repudiation of its earlier
decision.

*

:4.
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of the motive of their enactment. It seems fairly safe to say, however,
that there is nothing in the Constitution or elsewhere which compelled
the court to hold that the motive of the legislature has any bearing
whatever upon the validity of these taxes. If a statute does not impose
an undue burden it seems rather difficult to say that it must nevertheless be held void if the legislature which enacted it consciously desired
to go as far as it could.
The court's argument might be stated in another form as follows:
(a) A valid tax of this kind is valid, in spite of the incidental burden
on exempt securities, only because it is a justifiable attempt to tax a
properly taxable subject in circumstances where this cannot be done
without imposing an incidental burden on exempt securities; (b) if the
motive of such a tax is the incidental effect itself that effect ceases to
be incidental and the tax ceases to be a legitimate attempt to tax a
taxable subject. It is apparent, however, that the essential vice of the
rule is still present. The rule as last stated condemns taxes imposed
with a bad motive, as first stated it upholds taxes imposed with a laudable motive. Clearly the criticism above set out applies equally to
either.
It should be noted that the present case did not involve a tax on
national banks. The question with respect to national banks is not
identical with the question in the instant case for the reason that Congress has expressly consented to the imposition by the states of this
kind of tax on national banks. The court expressly declined to decide
whether such a tax on national banks would be valid:
"Whether under recent federal statutes, states are authorized to impose a tax upon the income from United States bonds held by national
banks, we need not stop to inquire. Certainly there is no statute of the
United States which undertakes to authorize a state to impose a tax upon
such bonds held by other kinds of corporations. And what power Congress has under the Constitution in respect to such authorization we need
14
not now determine."

It seems that the question with respect to such a tax is whether Congressional consent is an impairment of the obligation of contract and
as such is contrary to the due process of law clause. Prior to the instant
case it was by no means clear that the contracts of exemption of the
sorts ordinarily made with the exempt security holders are sufficiently
explicit to lead the courts to hold that excise taxes were within the
exemption contracted for. The present decision holds that taxes of this
sort, when imposed with the intention and purpose of reaching the
securities, are included within the meaning of the contract of exemp14 49

Sup. Ct. 432, 436.
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tion." That Congress' intention was to accomplish this purpose seems
to have been confessed as clearly as was that of the state of Massachusetts.' 6 Although the court has never held that all statutes involving an
impairment of the obligatibn of contracts are for that reason void under
the due process clause it seems fairly clear that the taking of property
effected by a tax is at least as serious and immediate a deprivation as
was that involved in the Sinking Fund cases' 7 and United States v.
Northern Pacific Railway Company,'8 wherein the court strongly intimated that the government's impairments of contract there involved
were as such void under the due process clause.
The tax being void as to other corporations it may seem subject to
a further objection as applied to national banks because, since applied
to them only, it operates to discriminate against them. This objection
was discussed at considerable length in the previous installment of this
article.19
The report which was before the California legislature when it
enacted the tax law corresponding to the Massachusetts tax statute,
contained in substance the same observations 20 on the possibility of
reaching exempt securities as did that before the Massachusetts legislature which is quoted by the court as showing intention to tax them
by indirection. Furthermore, both the form and the effect of the taxes
in the two states are substantially identical so far as concerns the
qualities that led the court to hold the Massachusetts tax void. The
only difference of any consequence between the two taxes is that the
Massachusetts tax acquired these qualities and effects by virtue of an
amendment which had no effect save to bring the income from exempt
securities within the measure of the tax. If the court means to adopt
the rule that the actual intention in the minds of the legislators is controlling, this difference is irrelevant. But it is still possible perhaps,
though not probable, that the court invoked legislative intention because
it thought that intention to reach exempt securities was a necessary
premise, as a matter of law, to the conclusion that the state had exceeded its powers. If the court desired to do so, therefore, it could dis15 49 Sup. Ct. 432, 437.
16

See the report of the Committee on Banking and Currency, submitted to
the House of Representatives, March 11, 1926, 67 CONG. Rxc. 5760-5761, 5822, 60806089 (1926) quoted in 17 CAnuoNuI L. REv. 232, n. 2.
17 (1878) 99 U. S. 700, 718.
18 (1921) 256 U. S. 51, 41 Sup. Ct. 439. See 17 CALiFoRNA L. REV. 232, 233
n. 4 for a discussion of the relation of the due process clause to the impairment of
the obligation of contracts by the federal government.
19 17 CALinonNA L. REv. 232, 237-238.
20 See the Special Report of the California Tax Commission of August 10, 1928,
p. 40, quoted in 17 CALuroRNu L. REv. 232, 248, n. 36.
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tinguish the California tax from that held void in the instant case, for
the burdening of exempt securities is only one of the elements of the
operation of the California statute. 21
VI.

SUMMARY

Before taking up a detailed consideration of the bank tax situation
in California, it will perhaps be profitable to sum up rather dogmatically
the federal statutory and decisional law upon the subject of state taxation of national banks set forth in the preceding sections of this article. 22
A summary of that law will be convenient in determining whether a
change in the California law was necessary in order to meet the federal
requirements, and in determining to what extent those requirements
have been met by the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act recently enacted by the California legislature. 23
I. The Constitutional Basis of State Taxation of National Banks. 24
A. The states' power to tax national banks depends entirely 25 upon
21 The court could logically distinguish at least five possible situations: (1)
taxes operating solely or primarily to burden exempt securities and enacted with
that intent. This is the instant case; (2) taxes operating solely or primarily to
burden exempt securities the actual motive for which does not appear, the intention to accomplish the only purpose effected being presumed. This is Miller v.
Milwaukee, supra n. 10; (3) taxes the operation of which is solely or primarily to
burden exempt securities enacted in good faith. Such a tax would presumably be
brought under the rule of the Miller case; good faith would probably be held to
be legally impossible; (4) taxes the operation of which is only incidentally to
burden exempt securities enacted in good faith. This is Flint v. Stone Tracy Company; (5) taxes of the operation of which the burdening of exempt securities is
only an incident, enacted with the intent of reaching (among other things) exempt
securities. This is the California Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act.
22 17 CALIFoRNIA L. REv. 83, 232.
23 Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 13.

24 See 17 CALiFoRNIA L. REv. 83-94.
25Bank of California, National Association v. Richardson (1919) 248 U. S.
476,

39
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"The legislature of each State may deterSection 5219 now reads as follo
ect, su ject to the provisions of thit section, the manner andr place of
e an
taxing all the shares of national banking associations located within its. limith The
severair States inay (1) tax said shares, or (2) include dividends derived
ref0o
in the taxable income of an owner or-holder thereo(, or (3) tax such associations
on theirtincome, or (4) according to or measured by their net income, provided
"1. (a) The imposition by any State of any one of the above four forms of
taxation shall be in lieu of the others, except as hereinafter provided iagsubdivision
of this clause.
S"(b) In the case of a tax on said shares the tax imposed shall not be at a
greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individunal
citizens of such State coming into competition with the business of national banks: ~
Provided, That bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness in the hands of in i
dividual citizens not employed or engaged in the banking or investment busin 4~

\(c)

9
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Section 5219 of the United States Revised Statutes in which the
various methods for the state 26 taxation of national banks, consented to by Congress, and the prescribed conditions to which
each is subject, are set forth.
1. Section 5219 should be considered an express declaration by
Congress that certain forms of state taxation of national
banks will not be deemed an interference with the purposes
of Congress in creating such banks, and an implied declaration that all other kinds and degrees of state taxation will
be deemed an interference with those purposes.
a. State taxation of national banks if invalid is so because
it conflicts with the purposes of Congress in creating such
instrumentalities.
and representing merely personal investments not made in competition with such
business, shall not be deemed moneyed capital within the meaning of this section.
"(c) In case of a tax on or according to or measured by the net income of an
association, the taxing State may, except in case of a tax on net income, include the
entire net income received from all sources, but the rate shall not be higher than
the rate assessed upon other financial corporations nor higher than the highest of
the rates assessed by the taxing State upon mercantile, manufacturing, and business
corporations doing business within its limits: Provided, however, That a State
which imposes a tax on or according to or measured by the net income of, or a
franchise or excise tax on, financial, mercantile, manufacturing, and business corporations organizd under its own laws or lawg of other States and also imposes a.
tax upon the income of individuals, may include in'such individual income dividends
soation"ocated within. the StaVkostaondition

fm.tia

that it

also includes dividends from domestic corporations and may likewise include dividends from national banking associations located without the State on condition
that it also includes dividends from foreign corporations, but at no higher rate than
is imposed on dividends from such othefcorporations
In case the dividends derived from the s% shares are taxed, the tax
"I"(d)
income fromoher
,shall not be at a greater rate'than is assessed upon -net

I

I

tal.

motie

ares of any national banking association owned by nonresidents of
any State, shall be't ed by the taxing district or by the State where the association is located and not elsewhere; and such association shall make return of such
shares and pay the tax thereon as agent of such nonresident shareholders.
"3. Nothing herein shall be construed to exempt the real property of associations from taxation in any State or in any subdivision thereof, to the same extent,
azording' to its value, as other real property is taxed.
"4. The provisions of section 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the United States
as i' force prior to March 25, 1926, shall not prevent the legalizing, ratifying, or
confliaing by the States of any tax heretofore paid, levied, or assessed upon the
Whatet df national banks, or the collecting thereof, to the extent that such tax would
le valid under said section." 44 STAT. 223 (1926), 12 U. S. C. § 548 (1928), U. S.
RvSA.w ord state is construed to mean territory as well; Talbott v. Board
County Comms. of Silver Bow County (1891) 139 TLJS. 438, 11 Sup Ct. 594.
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b. The only limitation upon the power of Congress to create instrumentalities is that they promote in some degree the fulfillment of the congressional purpose to which
they are directed. If a tax-free instrument is, in the
opinion of Congress, necessary to carry out its powers,
Congress may so declare; if it believes its powers may be
carried out by an instrument subject to state taxation, it
may likewise so declare. If Congress has created an instrument and expressly withheld from it an immunity
from state taxation, there is no conflict with an exercise
of federal power, and the state's taxing power becomes
operative.
B. State taxes on national banks permitted by Section 5219 are
as follows:
1. Real property of national banks in the state or any subdivision thereof may be taxed to the same extent and according
to its value as other real property is taxed even though the
state in addition may employ any one of the forms of taxation mentioned below.
2. Personal property of national banks cannot be taxed as no
permission is granted to tax it and thus is impliedly pro-

hibited. 2 7
3. Four different methods of taxing national banks by the
states are provided for:
a. Taxation of the shares of the banks to their owners;
b. Inclusion of the dividends from national bank shares in
the taxable income of the owners or holders thereof under
personal income taxes;
c. Taxation of the banks on their net income;
d. Taxation of the banks according to or measured by their
net income.
4. These methods may be utilized by the states only upon compliance with certain conditions:
a. As a general condition Section 5219 provides that the
imposition by the state of any one of the four forms of
taxation must be in lieu of the others, 28 except that,
27

Rosenblatt v. Johnston (1881) 104 U. S. 462.
See First Nat. Bank in St. Louis v. Buder (E. D. Mo. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 883.
Missouri for some years imposed a tax on the shares of national banks., In 1917
the state levied a personal income tax upon incomes derived from all sources. In
1923 Section 5219 was amended by Congress to permit among other things the
taxation of the dividends from national bank shares under personal income taxes
and provided that the use of one of the four methods of taxing national banks then
28
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i.

If the state employs method (c) or (d) supra, it may
at the same time employ method (b) on condition
that it also includes dividends from domestic corporations (and may likewise include dividends from national banks located without the state on condition
that it also includes dividends from foreign corporations) but at no higher rate than is imposed on dividends from such other corporations.
b. Certain prescribed conditions summarizied in the following sections are related to the particular methods set
forth in Section 5219.
II. The share method of national bank taxation:
A. In General:
1. A state cannot tax national bank shares at a "greater rate"
than is assessed upon "other moneyed capital" in the hands
of individual citizens. 2 9
allowed should be in lieu of the others. The District Court held that by reason
of the 1923 amendment to Section 5219 the Missouri income tax was operative
against dividends from national bank shares and therefore the national banks were
being taxed under two methods at once. Since this result was in violation of Section 5219 both taxes were invalid as against the national banks. However, in
Buder v. First Nat. Bank in St. Louis (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) 16 F. (2d) 990 the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding the share tax method to
be the only one in effect in that the share tax was already in force and the provision
that one method should be in lieu of all others prevented any other from taking
effect. A petition for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals was denied by the Supreme Court, First Nat. Bank in St. Louis v. Buder (1927) 274
U. S. 743, 47 Sup. Ct. 588.
29 It is generally recognized that when property is taxed at a greater rate
than is authorized by law, the tax is not entirely void, but is invalid only as to
the excess beyond that legally authorized. State Railroad Tax Cases (1875) 92
U. S. 575. In recognition of this principle it is held that as a condition precedent
to the granting of an injunction to restrain the collection of excessive taxes, that
the part which is not excessive must be paid or tendered. State Railroad Tax
Cases, supra; German Nat. Bank v. Kimball (1880) 103 U. S. 732; Albuquerque
Bank v. Perea (1893) 147 U. S. 87, 13 Sup. Ct. 194; Northern Pac. R. R. Co. v.
Clark (1894) 153 U. S. 252, 14 Sup. Ct. 809; Peoples Nat. Bank v. Marye (1903)
191 U. S. 272, 24 Sup. Ct. 68; Mobile & 0. R. Co. v. Schnipper (E. D. Ill. 1929)
31 F. (2d) 587. However, for certain exceptions to this rule regarding injunctions
in this situation see Ritterbusch v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (C. C. A. 8th,
1912) 198 Fed. 46 and Village of Norwood v. Baker (1898) 172 U. S. 269, 291,
19 Sup. Ct. 187, 195. The general rule has been repeatedly applied in cases where
shares of national banks are taxed "at a greater rate than other moneyed capital."
Pelton v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Cleveland (1879) 101 U. S. 143; Cummings v.
Merchants Nat. Bank of Toledo (1879) 101 U. S. 153; German Nat. Bank v.
Kimball, supra; Hills v. Nat. Albany Exchange Bank (1881) 105 U. S. 319; First
Nat. Bank of Albuquerque v. Albright (1908) 208 U. S. 548, 28 Sup. Ct. 349.
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a. The Supreme Court, adopting a purposive rather than a
purely literal connotation for the words "other moneyed
capital" has held that they only include capital that
competes with the business of national banks. 30
"Moneyed capital is brought into such competition where it
is invested in shares of state banks or in private banking; and also
where it is employed substantially as in the loan and investment
features of banking in making investments by way of loan, discount or otherwise in notes, bonds, or other securities with a view
to sale or repayment and reinvestment." 31

b. The words "greater rate" refer to the entire process of
assessment as well as to the rate of percentage and thus
apply to any substantial discriminatory taxation (except
II-B-2 infra) of national bank shares.32
2. Section 5219 does not require absolute equality of treatment
of national bank shares and other moneyed capital in the
hands of individual citizens. Nor does it prescribe any uniform rule as to the manner of taxing national bank shares.
If the actual burden on such shares is not in excess of the
burden upon "other moneyed capital" the state may exercise its own independent judgment regarding its tax methods
without fear of violating Section 5219. The states are thus
given what seems a quite proper and harmless freedom in the
choice of methods of taxing "other moneyed capital." 33
a. The burden of proving discrimination is upon the taxpayer.34
B. Specific things the states may do under the share method of
national bank taxation:
SOMercantile National Bank of New York v. Mayor of New York (1887)
121 U. S. 138, 7 Sup. Ct. 826.
31 First National Bank of Guthrie Center v. Anderson (1926) 26J U. S. 341,
347-348, 46 Sup. Ct. 135, 138.
32 People v. Weaver (1879) 100 U. S. 539; Pelton v. - Com. Nat. Bank of
Cleveland (1879) 101 U. S. 143; Boyer v. Boyer (1885) 113 U. S. 689, 5 Sup. Ct.
706; Stanley v. Albany Co. (1887) 121 U. S. 535, 7 Sup. Ct. 1234. See also cases
cited, infra n. 33. Cf. Clement Nat. Bank v. Vermont (1913) 231 U. S. 120, 135,
34 Sup.
Ct. 31, 35.
33
Davenport National Bank v. Board of Equalization (1887) 123 U. S. 83,
8 Sup. Ct. 73. See also San Francisco National Bank v. Dodge (1905) 197 U. S.
70, 25 Sup. Ct. 384; Amoskeag Savings Bank v. Purdy (1913) 231 U. S. 373, 386,
34 Sup. Ct. 114, 119; First National Bank of Guthrie Center v. Anderson (1926)
S. 341, 348, 46 Sup. Ct. 135, 138.
269 U.
34
First National Bank of Hartford v. Hartford (1927) 273 U. S. 548, 47 Sup.
Ct. 462, 59 A. L. R. 1; Georgetown National Bank v. McFarland (1927) 273 U. S.
568, 47 Sup. Ct. 467.
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1. Include in the value of national and state bank shares the
value contributed thereto by (a) tax exempt securities held
by the banks; 35 (b) real estate located in the state and taxed
there,36 and (c) real estate in other states and taxed there. 7
a. The court has repeatedly held that as the tax is on the
shares alone, it makes no difference how the bank's capital is invested.38
2. Tax national bank shares without deducting the value of
federal securities held by the bank from the taxable value of
the shares, although private bankers, taxed upon their banking capital, are allowed to deduct therefrom the value of
39
federal securities held by them.
3. Exempt the following from taxation even though national
bank shares are taxed:
a. Savings bank$ deposits,o shares of mining companies,
gas companies, 42 telephone companies,43 building and
45
loan associations,4 4 and insurance companies.
4. Tax shares held by national banks in other national banks.46
35
Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines (1907) 205 U. S. 503, 27 Sup. Ct. 571;
Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Fairweather (1923) 263 U. S. 103, 44 Sup. Ct. 23.
36 City National Bank v. Paducah (C. C. D. Ky. 1877) Fed. Cas. No. 2743;
Peoples Nat. Bank v. Marye (C. C. E. D. Va. 1901) 107 Fed. 570.
37 Commercial Nat. Bank of Ogden v. Chambers (1901) 182 U. S. 556, 561,
21 Sup. Ct. 863, 865.
3
8 First National Bank of Louisville v. Kentucky (1869) 76 U. S. (9 Wall.)
353; Palmer v. McMahon (1890) 133 U. S. 660, 666, 10 Sup. Ct. 324, 326; Bank
of Commerce v. Tennessee (1896) 161 U. S. 134, 146, 16 Sup. Ct. 456, 460; New
Orleans v. Citizens Bank (1897) 167 U. S. 371, 402, 17 Sup. Ct. 905, 915; Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander (1902) 184 U. S. 111, 22 Sup. Ct. 394; Home Savings
Bank v. Des Moines (1907) 205 U. S. 503, 27 Sup. Ct. 571; First Nat. Bank of
Council Bluffs v. Hannan (1924) 266 U. S. 638, 45 Sup. Ct. 9.
39 Van Allen v. The Assessors (1865) 70 U. S. (3 Wall.) 573; Des Moines Nat.
Bank v. Fairweather (1923) 263 U. S. 103, 44 Sup. Ct. 23.
40 Davenport Nat. Bank v. Board of Equalization (1887) 123 U. S. 83, 8 Sup.
Ct. 73; National Bank of Redemption v. Boston (1888) 125 U. S. 60, 8 Sup. Ct.
772; Mercantile Nat. Bank of Cleveland v. Hubbard (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1899) 98
Fed. 465. See also Merc. Nat. Bank of N. Y. v. Mayor of New York (1887) 121
U. S. 138, 7 Sup. Ct. 826.
41 Talbott v. Bd. of County Commrs. of Silver Bow County (1891) 139 U. S.
438, 11 Sup. Ct. 594.
42 First Nat. Bank of Aberdeen v. County of Chehalis (1897) 166 U. S. 440,
17 Sup. Ct. 629.
43 National Bank of Redemption v. Boston (1888) 125 U. S. 60, 8 Sup. Ct. 772.
44 Mercantile Nat. Bank of Cleveland v. Hubbard (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1899)
98 Fed. 465. See also other cases cited, supra n. 40.
4 People v. Commissioners (1866) 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 244; National Bank of
Redemption v. Boston (1888) 125 U. S. 60, 8 Sup. Ct. 772.
46National Bank of Redemption v. Boston (1888) 125 U. S. 60, 8 Sup. Ct.
772. See also First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Durr (S. D. Ohio 1917) 246 Fed. 163.
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5. Tax national bank shares at the place within the state where
the bank is located without regard to the residence of the
shareholders. 47
6. Require national banks to pay the taxes levied on the shareholders as agent for the shareholders and subject the banks
to penalties for failing to do so even though state banks are
not required to make such payments for their shareholders.a
a. But a tax on the bank measured by the value of its shares
is not one on the shares and is therefore invalid.49
C. Specific things the state may not do under the share method of
national bank taxation:
1. Allow deductions from the value of state bank shares, e.g.,
capital invested in exempt securities or intangible elements
of value, or allow the deduction of debts by state shareholders from the value of their shares without allowing the same
deductions to be made in the assessment of national bank
shares.5 o
2. Tax state banks directly, deducting from their assets the
value of federal securities held by them when national bank
shares are taxed at full value.51
3. Impose a heavier tax burden upon national bank shares than
upon bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness in the
hands of individual citizens. 52
47

490.

48

Tappan v. Merchants' Nat. Bank of Chicago (1873) 86 U. S. (19 Wall.)

First National Bank of Louisville v. Kentucky (1869) 76 U. S. (9 Wall.)
353. See also Merchants' and Manufacturers' Bank v. Pennsylvania (1897) 167
U. S. 461, 17 Sup. Ct. 829; Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines (1907) 205 U. S.
503, 27 Sup. Ct. 571.
49 First Nat. Bank of Gulfport v. Adams (1922) 258 U. S. 362, 42 Sup. Ct.
323.
50 People v. Weaver (1879) 100 U. S. 539; San Francisco Nat. Bank v. Dodge
(1905) 197 U. S. 70, 25 Sup. Ct. 384; Montana Nat. Bank of Billings v. Yellowstone County (1928) 276 U. S. 499, 48 Sup. Ct. 331.
51
Montana National Bank of Billings v. Yellowstone County (1928) 276 U. S.
499, 48 Sup. Ct. 331. For a discussion of this case see 17 CAUwoRNA L. REv. 83,
116 et seq. If national and state banks hold federal securities and the state wants to
tax national bank shares at full value, it must tax state bank shares at full value
and not the state banks directly, for in levying a direct tax on state banks the
value of federal securities must be exempted and this exemption brings about the
forbidden discrimination.
52 Mecat'Nat. Bank of Richmond v. Richmond (1921) 256 U. 5. 635, 41
Sup. Ct. 619- Cf. National Bank of Baltimore v. Baltimore (C. C. A. 4th, 1900)
100 Fed. 24. In First National Bank of Guthrie Center v. Anderson (1926) 269
U. 5. 341, 46 Sup. Ct. 135, the court considered the following amendment to Section 5219, passed in 1923: " . . . Provided, That bonds, notes, or other evidences
of indebtedness in the hands of individual citizens not employed or engaged in the
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4. Tax national bank shares without deducting from their
value the value of shares held by the bank in another national bank when the shares in the other national bank are taxed
by the state.53
5. Tax national banks on shares they hold in state banks.5 4
6. Tax national bank shares, kegardless of whether they are
held by residents or non-residents elsewhere than at the
place within the state where the bank is located.65
banking or investment business and representing merely personal investments not
made in competition with such businbss, shall not be deemed moneyed capital within
the meaning of this section." 42 STAT. 1499 (1923), 12 U. S. C. §548 (1926).
Apparently Congress, in this provision, made an attempt so to define "other moneyed capital" as to allow the states to tax "bonds, notes and other evidences of
indebtedness" in the hands of individuals at a lower rate than national bank shares
without rendering the bank share tax invalid under Section 5219. This attempt was
ineffective, for the court, in considering this amendment, held it declaratory of the
rule already followed in respect to other moneyed capital. Therefore, after this
amendment, the states could no more give preferential treatment to individual
holders of bonds, notes and other evidences of indebtedness without violating Section 5219 than they could before its passage.
The decision of the court in the Anderson case would seem, also, to render
innocuous the following provision added to Section 5219 as part of the above
amendment, which provided, "The provisions of Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the United States; as heretofore in force, shall not prevent the legalizing,
ratifying, or confirming by the States of any tax heretofore paid, levied, or assessed
upon the shares of national banks, or the collecting thereof, to the extent that such
tax would be valid under said section." 42 STAT. 1499 (1923), 12 U. S. C. § 548
(1926). The meaning of this provision is not clear, for it is not certain whether
"under said section" means Section 5219 before the amendment of 1923, or Section
5219 as amended in 1923. As long as it was believed that the amendment changed
"other moneyed capital" so that a measure, formerly invalid, would be valid under
the new provision, the question whether or not "said section" referred to the
amended or unamended Section 5219 was highly important. In Minnehaha National Bank v. Anderson (D. S. D. 1924) 2 F. (2d) 897, "said section" was held to
mean the unamended section. In McFarland v. Georgetown National Bank (1925)
208 Ky. 7, 13, 270 S. W. 995, 997, the opposite and seemingly better view was
taken: "The words 'said section' must mean the section as amended by this act,
or else the words 'would be valid' are meaningless. The provision plainly refers to
taxes which would be valid under the act but might not be valid under the
original act. The states needed no authority to collect taxes properly levied under
the old act. The section was intended to give the power to collect taxes levied
under the old act, if such levy was valid under the amended act. This is conclusively shown by the words 'legalizing, ratifying or confirming' for there was no
need to legalize, ratify, or confirm previous levies if they were valid under the old
statute." Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of this provision is specially to be noted
in that it applies only to the share method of national bank taxation.
5
Bank of California, National Association v. Richardson (1919) 248 U. S.
476, 39 Sup. Ct. 165.
54Bank of California, National Association v. Richardson, supra n. 53. See
also First Nat. Bank of Albuquerque v. Albright (1908) 208 U. S. 548, 28 Sup.
Ct. 349.
55
National Bank of Redemption v. Boston (1888) 125 U. S. 60, 8 Sup. Ct. 772.
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7. Systematically and intentionally undervalue other moneyed
capital through tax officials, although the state's statutes do
not sanction such action.56
8. Tax the capital of a national bank in solido against the
bank.57
9. Tax the shares of national banks and also include dividends
derived therefrom in the taxable income of an owner or
holder thereof.5 8
10. Prior to the 1926 amendment to Section 5219, exact a license,
franchise or analogous tax.59

III. Taxation of dividends derived from national bank shares as a part
of the taxable income of a holder thereof under personal income tax:
A. Is valid although there is also levied a tax on national bank
shares on, or according to, or measured by their net income
subject to limitations set forth in I-B-4-a-i supra.60
B. Cannot be at a greater rate than is imposed upon the net income
from "other moneyed capital."
1. "Other moneyed capital" will probably have the same meaning in this connection as under the share method of bank
taxation.
IV. Taxation of national banks on their net income and "or according
to, or measured by their net income":
A. A tax according to, or measured by net income is a tax upon
the bank in the nature of an occupation or excise tax upon the
occupation of banking.
B. The rate of such tax shall not be higher than the rate assessed
upon other financial corporations nor higher than the highest of
the rates assessed by the state upon mercantile, manufacturing
and business corporations doing business within its limits.
1. By using the limiting words, "higher than the highest" rather than the word "higher" in regard to mercantile, manufacturing and business corporations, the statute allows the state
a reasonable freedom in classifying the types of corporations
mentioned for purposes of taxation and means in substance
56 Pelton v. Commercial National Bank of Cleveland (1879) 101 U. S. 143.
57

First Nat. Bank of Richmond v. Richmond (C. C. E. D. Va. 1889) 39 Fed.
309, appeal dismissed, Richmond v. First Nat. Bank of Richmond (1892) 149 U. S.
769, 13 Sup. Ct. 1044.
58 Section 5219, supra n. 25.
59 Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro (1899) 173 U. S. 664, 19 Sup. Ct
537.
0 Section 5219, supra n. 25.
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that national banks in the matter of state taxation cannot be
the least favored class of corporations doing business within
the state.
C. If national banks are taxed "on" their net income, income from
tax exempt securities cannot be included in the tax base.e1
1. The same is probably true of a tax measured by the net
income of national banks although the question is not absolutely free from doubt.6 2
D. If the net income method, or the according to, or measured by,
net income method is employed, bonds, notes, mortgages and
other evidences of indebtedness or other moneyed capital may
be given preferential treatment or be entirely exempt from
taxation."3
E. It would seem, on the authority of the cases under the share
method of national bank taxation, that if national banks are
taxed on their net income, or according to, or measured by, their
net income, the tax on the other corporations mentioned need not
be in form an income tax so long as the ultimate burden, when
translated into an income tax, does not violate the conditions
set forth under IV-B-1 supra.64
VII.

THE SITUATION IN CALIFORNTA.

A. WAS THE CALIFORNIA SHARE TAX ON NATIONAL BANKS INVALID?

The share method of national bank taxation was employed continuously in this state from 1910 until 1929.85 This method, which, except
for the taxation of the real property of national banks, was the only one
permitted at the time of its adoption, is set forth in Article XIII, Section 14(c) of the State Constitution and in Section 3664c of the California Political Code. In pursuance of these constitutional and statutory provisions national and state bank shares were taxed by the state
at a flat rate on their book value, i.e., capital, surplus and undivided
profits, less a deduction of the assessed value, as fixed by the county
assessors, of any real estate, "other than mortgage interests therein,"66
61 Weston v. Charleston (1829) 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 449; Gillespie v. Oklahoma
(1922)6 2 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171.
Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts (1929) U. S. -- , 49 Sup. Ct. 432. See
supra p. 456 for discussion of this case.
SSee 17 CAzIFrnIA L. REV. 232 et seq.
04
See 17 CAutroNxn L. REV. 232, 236, n. 11.
45Fran excellent discussion of the situation prior to 1910 see the Report of
the Commission on Revenue and Taxation of the State of California for 1906 and
1910.
* See infjra n. 68. See argument (2), heading (1) of the text for the significance of the failure to allow the deduction of mortgage interests in real estate
held by banks.

1wgii6
7it
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owned by the banks and taxed locally. Because of the interpretation
given by the United States Supreme Court0 7 to the words "other moneyed capital" as used in Section 5219, the California statutes imposing
taxes on bonds, notes, mortgages and solvent credits generally must be
considered in relation to statutes taxing bank shares. Such consideration reveals that the methods employed by this state in taxing bank
shares and "other moneyed capital" might be regarded as having violated the restrictive conditions of Section 5219 because of the constitutional and statutory provisions for (1) the exemption of mortgages;
(2) the preferential treatment of other intangibles. This possible violation will be briefly analyzed in the following discussion.
The Taxation of Mortgages in California.
The arguments upon which the California share tax on national
banks might be deemed to have violated the conditions of Section 5219
because of the preferential treatment of mortgages may be summarized
briefly as follows:
(1) Mortgages on real property situated in California are exempt
from taxation in the hands of owners subject to ad valorem taxation in
California." Investments made by individuals in this type of security
are "other moneyed capital" within the meaning of Section 521969 for
national banks are authorized, subject to certain restrictions, to loan
(i)

67

See 17 CALIFORNIA L. REv. 83, 95-107.
Mortgages: " . . . a mortgage, deed of trust, contract, or other obligation by
which a debt is secured when land is pledged as security for the payment thereof,
together with the money represented by such debt, shall not be considered property
subject to taxation." CAL. CONST. Art. XIII, § 1. See also CAL. POL. CODE § 3617,
tit. 2, subd. 3; tit. 6; § 3628 and § 3629 (7). The extent to which national banks
may deal in real mortgages is governed by Section 24 of the Federal Reserve Act,
38 STAT. 273 (1913), 12 U. S. C. § 371 (1926), as amended in 1927, 44 STAT. 1232
(1927), 12 U. S. C. § 371 (1928). Formerly national banks had no power to make
loans on real estate. Union Nat. Bank of St. Louis v. Matthews (1878) 98 U. S.
621; National Bank of Genesee v. Whitney (1880) 103 U. S. 99. This prohibition
was partially withdrawn by the passage of the aot mentioned. The power of national banks to deal in real mortgages is now governed by the terms of that act.
First Nat. Bank of Guthrie Center v. Anderson (1926) 269 U. S. 341, 46 Sup. Ct.
135. A summary of a bank's powers in this regard follows: (1) The mortgage lien
must be a first lien; (2) the real estate must be situated within the Federal Reserve
District or within 100 miles radius of the bank's location; (3) the amount of the
loan must not exceed 50 per centum of the actual value of the real estate offered
for security; (4) the loan must not be made for a period exceeding five years;
(5) the bank may make such loan in the aggregate sum equal to 25 per centum of
the capital stock actually paid in and unimpaired and 25 per centum of its unimpaired surplus fund, or, at the election of the association, to an aggregate amount
of one-half of its savings deposits.
69 First Nat. Bank of Guthrie Center v. Anderson (1926) 269 U. S. 341, 46
Sup. Ct. 135; First Nat. Bank of Hartford v. Hartford (1927) 273 U. S. 548, 47
Sup. Ct. 462, 59 A. L. R. 1; Minnesota v. First Nat. Bank of St. Paul (1927) 273
U. 5. 561, 47 Sup. Ct. 468. The following is quoted from the opinion of the court,
68
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money on real estate mortgages. National bank shares are thereby taxed
at a higher rate than this particular form of "other moneyed capital"
which is not taxed at all. Therefore the tax on such shares is repugnant
to the provisions of Section 5219.
However, as has been pointed out by Professor Plehn in his penetrating article in the last issue of THE CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, 7 0 there
is no real exemption as to this form of moneyed capital, since the land
represented by the mortgages is already taxed. It is, no doubt, an economic fact that the sum of a piece of land, plus a mortgage thereon,
does not amount to or represent any more wealth than would the unencumbered land. It follows that "exemption" of mortgages from taxation is not, economically, the exemption of any of the wealth of the
state from taxation. But this, in the present context at least, does not
remove the objection to the exemption of mortgages, as shown in the
paragraph next following.
(2) Mortgages on California real property, then, are not taxed, because to tax them, as well as the land hypothecated for them, would
involve double taxation. But the value of national bank shares is due
in part to the value of the mortgages held by such bank. It follows that
in the case of bank share taxation there is present the double taxation
avoided in the case of individual holders of mortgages. Since mortper Mr. Justice Stone in First Nat. Bank v. Hartford: "Here plaintiff is shown to
have investments in real estate mortgages and to be engaged in selling them. The
sale of mortgages and 'other evidences of debt' acquired by way of loan or discount with a view to reinvestment is, we think, within the recognized limits of the
incidental powers of national banks. . . . To that extent the business of acquiring
and selling such mortgages and evidences of debt, carried on by numerous individuals, firms, and corporations in Wisconsin, comes into competition with this
incidental business of national banks. That the exercise of this incidental power
has become of great importance in the business of national banks appears from the
Report of the Comptroller of the Currency for 1924, 44 et seq. showing that approximately one-third of the investment of national banks consists of Government,
railroad, public service corporation and other bonds, and 'collateral trust and other
corporation notes."' 273 U. S. at 560, 47 Sup. Ct. at 466, 59 A. L. R. at 9. See
also the opinion of the court in First National Bank of Guthrie Center v. Anderson, supra: "We find [in the allegations in the petition] no specific mention of farm
mortgages, nor anything indicating that they refer only to such mortgages. No doubt
they are broad enough to include farm mortgages; but this does not weaken the
allegation of competition, for while national banks were formerly prohibited from
making loans on real estate, Rev. Stats. §§ 5136, 5137; Union National Bank v.
Matthews, 98 U. S. 621, 625; National Bank of Genessee [sic] v. Whitney, 103 U.
S. 99, the prohibition was partly withdrawn and much of that field was opened to
such banks by the Acts of December 22, 1913, c. 6, § 24, 38 Stat. 273, and September 7, 1916, c. 461, 39 Stat. 754." 269 U. S. at 353, 46 Sup. Ct. at 140.
70 Plehn, The Taxation of National Banks (1929) 17 CALIFORNIA L. REv. 357.

See also James H. Gilbert, The General Property Tax as Affected by the Bank
Decision in Oregon, PROCEEDINGS OF NATIONAL TAx ASSOCIATION (Twenty-first National Conference 1928) p. 218.
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gage investments are "other moneyed capital," there is, in violation of
Section 5z1, a clear discrimination against national bank shares in /
favor of "other moneyed capital." There seems to be no escape from
this conclusion.
It is clear, then, that the exemption of mortgages rendered the tax
on national bank shares contrary to the provisions of Section 5219.
Would it have been possible to remedy this defect by providing that
the value of mortgages held by national banks should be deducted from
the taxable value of the shares thereof? The argument stated in the
last paragraph leaves this question open, since that argument goes no
further than to say that regardless of whether or not the allowance of
this exemption to the banks would remedy the defect, failure to make
such allowance to the banks was fatal. It is by no means clear, however, that the objection to the exemption of mortgages could have been
thus remedied, for even if banks were allowed this exemption it would
still be true: (a) that bank shares were taxed; (b) that mortgages are
"other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens." Section
5219 requires that bank shares shall be taxed no higher than other
moneyed capital, and at least the letter of this prohibition would be
violated. It might be argued, however, that the spirit of the statute
was not infringed, for it is well established that the purpose of the
statute was to prevent discrimination against national banks in favor
of competing capital and it may be that no such discrimination would
exist if mortgages were exempted both to banks and individuals. It
may bjherefeedhat tyJiremtxationcredits
securedymortgages could have been remedied by deducting the lue
of such obligations held by the banks from
value of their

*q,

shares.l
(2)

72
The Taxation of Intangibles in California.

Acting in reliance upon the supposed 73 authorization granted the
states by the congressional amendment of 1923 to Section 5219, to
71

This is not unquestionable, however, for it might still be held that individually held mortgages competed with other varieties of investments by banks which
were not exempted. But the language of the court in the Anderson case, quoted
supra n. 69, which seems to imply that mortgages became "other moneyed capital"
only when national banks were given power to deal in them seems to call for the
conclusion that the court believes that mortgage investments do not compete with
other types of bank business.
72
The following is a summary of: (1) the types of intangibles which were
exempt from taxation; (2) the types of intangibles taxable under the laws in effect
in this state prior to the 1929 enactments of the legislature. Inasmuch as the
purpose of this part of the present article is to determine whether or not the share
tax on national banks was invalid because of the methods of taxing intangibles the
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accord preferential treatment to bonds, notes, and other evidences of
indebtedness in the hands of individual citizens without invalidating
their taxes on national bank shares, California, in 1924, added Section
new intangible tax law (Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 14) will not be considered here, but the
discussion will be confined to the law as it existed at the time the share tax on
national banks was in effect.
I. Intangibles exempt from taxation:
1. Shares of Stock in Corporations: "Shares of stock in corporations possess
no intrinsic value over and above the actual value of the property of the corporation which they stand for and represent. The assessment and taxation of such
shares, and also of all the corporate property, would be double taxation. All
property belonging to corporations shall be assessed and taxed, in the manner
provided by law; but no assessment shall be made of shares of stock in any corporation except as prescribed in the constitution of this state and the laws enacted
pursuant to such provisions of the constitution." CAL. POL. CODE § 3608.
Section 3627 of the Political Code, as amended in 1927, provided: "All taxable
property must be assessed at its full cash value. In determining the full cash value
of shares of capital stock there shall be deducted the value of the property in
California of the corporation by which such shares of capital stock are issued. .. ."
Dealing in stocks of other corporations, while not expressly prohibited national
banks, is impliedly prohibited by a failure to grant the power, and a purchase
thereof by such banks is ultra vires. The prohibition, however, does not prevent a
bank from taking stock in payment of a preexisting indebtedness when it is necessary to do so to save itself from loss. California Savings Bank v. Kennedy (1897)
167 U. S. 362, 17 Sup. Ct. 831. It is therefore apparent that the exemption accorded
by the above quoted statute has no effect upon the validity of the bank tax. It was
pointed out in the first installment of this article, in commenting upon the case of
First National Bank of Guthrie Center v. Anderson (1925) 269 U. S. 341, 46 Sup.
Ct. 135, that the extension of the power of national banks apparently effects a
corresponding extension of the field of business activities that compete with the
business of national banks. It is important to point out in this connection that the
National Bank Act, as amended in 1927, allowing national banks to deal in "investment securities" gives the Comptroller of the Currency the power to define this
term so that the banks may deal in these types of securities. 44 STAT. 1227 (1927),
12 U. S. C. § 57 (1928). The limitations upon the exercise of this power by the
comptroller are not defined. A broad discretion to extend the application of the
term "investment securities" would apparently widen the scope of the words
"other moneyed capital," and this in turn would involve a corresponding increase
in the number of possibilities of holding invalid state taxes on national bank shares.
2. Mortgages on California real property. See supra n. 68.
3. Bonds:
a. Bonds "issued by the State of California, or by any county, city and
county, municipal corporation, or district (including school, reclamation, and irrigation districts) within this state." CAL. CoNsT. Art. XIII, § 14.
For a discussion of the taxation of shares of stock, although part of the book
value thereof is contributed by tax exempt bonds held by the .corporation, see
17 CALronwnA L. REV. 83, 114-118; and for a consideration of the problem of corporate franchise taxation measured by total net income without deducting therefrom
income from tax exempt securities, see 17 CAuFORNIA L. REV. 232 et seq.
b. Bonds secured by California real estate. CAL. POL. CODE §3617, subd. 2(3).
4. Savings deposits. CA. PoxL. CODE § 3617, subd. 6.
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123/274 to Article XIII of its Constitution authorizing the legislature to
tax non-exempt intangibles at a rate, or rates, and at a valuation different from other taxable property. In carrying out this constitutional
grant of power, the legislature in 1925 modified Section 362775 of the
Political Code and added thereto Section 3627a, 76 providing that "notes,
debentures, shares of capital stock, bonds, solvent credits, and mortgages or deeds of trust which are taxable to the owner thereof under
provisions of the laws of this State other than this Section and Section
3627" should be assessed at seven per cent of their full cash value. 7
Under the decision of the United States Supreme Court in First National Bank of Guthrie Center v. Anderson7 8 (which held the 1923 Amendment to Section 5219 merely declaratory of the existing law) the 1925
modification in the California law even if it had been valid under the
II. Taxable intangibles:
1. Credits, i.e. debts owing taxpayers: See CAL. POL. CODE §§ 3617(6), 3627a,
3628, 3628b, 3629, 3650, 3693.
a. Accounts receivable;
b. Notes not secured by real estate;
c. Commercial bank accounts;
d. Bonds unsecured by real estate in California;
e. Chattel mortgages;
f. Real mortgages not secured in California;
g. Deeds of trust not secured in California;
h. Conditional sales contracts, see Whiting Finance Co. v. Hopkins (1926)
199 Cal. 428, 249 Pac. 853.
i. Debentures.
2. Franchises:
CAL. CoNsT. Art. XIII, § 14(d): "All franchises, other than those expressly
provided for in this section, shall be assessed at their actual cash value, in the
manner to be provided by law, and shall be taxed at the rate of one per centum
(changed pursuant to Subdivision F of this section) each year, and the taxes collected thereon shall be exclusively for the benefit of the state." See also CAL. PoL.
CODE §§ 3664, 3667a, 3667b, 3667c, 3667(12).
3. Stock in foreign corporations.
7
3 Supra n. 52.
74
This amendment was necessary to authorize special treatment of intangibles
because of Section 1 of Article XIII of the California Constitution, which reads in
part as follows: "All property in the state except as otherwise in this constitution
provided, not exempt under the laws of the United States, shall be taxed in proportion to its value to be ascertained as provided by law or as hereinafter provided." See REVENUE LAWS OF CALIFORNIA, annotated (1928) p. 19 et seq. for the

citations and holdings of the court decisions interpreting this section. For the
latest constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the taxation of intangibles see CAL. CONST. Art. XIII, § 16(4), adopted November, 1928, and Cal. Stat.
1929, c. 14, passed in pursuance thereof.
75 Cal. Stat. 1925, p. 12.
76 Cal. Stat. 1925, p. 13.
77 Section 3617(5) of the Political Code reads as follows: "The terms 'value'
and 'full cash value' mean the amount at which the property would be taken in
payment of a just debt from a solvent debtor."
78

Supra n. 52.

NATIONAL BANK TAXATION

477

State Constitution would undoubtedly have had the effect of making
the share tax on national banks a tax at a higher rate than that levied
against other moneyed capital contrary to the conditions of Section
5219. In an effort to remove the discrimination, the legislature in 192771
completely changed the provisions of Sections 3627 and 3627a and
imposed a rate of 1.457o (the bank share rate) upon the full cash value
80
of all taxable intangibles. However, in the case of Arnold v. Hopkins,
both the 1925 and 1927 laws were declared unconstitutional by the
State Supreme Court for non-compliance with the terms of the State
Constitutional Amendment of 1924.
With these laws rendered inoperative, the forms of intangible property covered by them would be governed by the tax provisions which
the 1925 and 1927 statutes aimed to supersede. 8 ' Consequently, these
particular intangibles were still taxable at full cash value as determined
by the county assessorS82 and at rates fixed by the local taxing authoriCal. Stat. 1927, p. 399.
80 (1928)

-

Cal. -,

265 Pac. 223.

The case involved an application of a

dtzpayer for a writ of mandate to prohibit the assessor of Los Angeles County, who
considered the 1927 law invalid, from proceeding under the 1925 law. The court
read the provisions of the amendment (Section 12Y of Article XIII) together as
follows: "First, 'the Legislature . . . shall have the power to provide for the assessment, levy, and collection of taxes upon all notes,' etc.; second, 'taxes imposed by
any act of the Legislature adopted pursuant to the powers hereby conferred shall
be in lieu of all other property taxes, state, county' . . . ; third, 'the Legislature
shall provide for an equitable distribution of such taxes to the county, municipality
or district in which such property is taxed'; fourth, 'the rate op rates of taxation
of such securities and penalties shall not exceed those assessed or imposed upon
other property in the state not exempt from taxation'; fifth, 'when the same shall
have been fixed by the Legislature they shall not be altered except by vote of twothirds of all the members elected to each of the two houses voting in favor
thereof.' " The court then went on to say, "When these provisions of this amendment are thus read together, they would seem to compel the conclusion that the
duty imposed upon the Legislature thereby was that of providing a law covering
the entire field of taxation of the forms of property designated therein, and embracing in its express provisions [1] the valuation, [2] the rate or rates of taxation, and [3] the equitable distribution of the taxes to be derived from the burden
thus to be laid upon such properties." 265 Pac. at 226. The court then held the
1925 law invalid because of the failure of the legislature to fulfill its duty under
(2), and held the 1927 law invalid for failure to comply with requirement (3).
See Note (1928) 16 CALiFoImA L. REv. 301 for a discussion of the reasoning of the
court in this case.
of Article XIII, under authority of which the
81 Inasmuch as Section 12
1925 and 1927 laws were passed, is not self executing, the provisions of §I 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution that all taxable property shall be taxed in proportion
to its value unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, and the provisions of
Section 3627 of the Political Code that all taxable property must be assessed at its
full cash value would, therefore, seem applicable.
82 CAL. POL. CODE

§§

3617, 3627, 3628, 3629, 3650.
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ties.83 Thus it would seem that, unless the local authorities imposed discriminatory rates, the owners of national bank shares would have no
complaint insofar as the effects of the invalidity of the 1925 and 1927
statutes are concerned. However, as to the claimed discrimination resulting from allowance of the deduction of debts from credits as to
other moneyed capital and not to national banks, a different problem
is raised.
(3)

Deduction of Debts from Credits.

The legislature is given power to provide for the deduction of debts
from credits by the provision in Section 1 of Article XIII of the State
Constitution, which reads: "The legislature may provide, except in
the case of credits secured by mortgage or trust deeds, for a deduction
from credits of debts due to bona fide residents of the state." In pursuance of this constitutional section, the deduction of debts from solvent
credits is provided for in Section 3628 of the Political Code wherein
the prescribed method for tax assessments is set forth. However, such
deductions are not allowed as to bank shares. This is explained by the
fact that bank shares are dealt with in other sections of the code, and to
these sections the provisions as to deductions are not considered as
applying.

8 CAL. POL. CODE §3714, par. 2 of subd. 4.
Because of the omission to mention Section 3627a in the provisions of the
Political Code for the reassessment of property (CAL. PoL. CODE § 3681a), an interesting question arises whether those provisions should have applied in this situation. Section 3681a provides in part as follows: "Every assessment of property
made under the provisions of section three thousand six hundred twenty seven and
three thousand six hundred twenty eight of the Political Code which is or may
hereafter be adjudged to be invalid by reason of indefinite description, any Megality, invalidity, or irregularity declared or existing in the assessment of such
property, or in any of the acts thereafter performed . . . shall be remade and the
property reassessed and equalized for each year for which such assessment is
invalid as aforesaid and for the year for which the assessment of such property
was invalid as aforesaid and such reassessment and eqpalization shall be made by
the same officers and boards at the same time or times as are prescribed by law
for the assessment and equalization of property of the same classes or kinds as the
property which is hereby required to be reassessed." It might be argued that the
enumeration of these two code sections would require an exclusion of Section
3627a so that the reassessment provisions would be inapplicable thereto. However,
inasmuch as Section 3627a is unconstitutional and, therefore, as inoperative as if
it had never been passed (Wheeler v. Herbert (1907) 152 Cal. 224, 92 Pac. 353),
the assessments should have been made under Sections 3627 and 3628 in the first
place and for that reason it seems reasonable to say that the previous assessment
under the void statute was in legal effect no assessment at all, so that a new assessment would be simply a delayed original assessment. See the following cases for a
discussion of the validity of reassessment statutes: Weyerhaueser v. Minnesota
(1900) 176 U. 5. 550, 20 Sup. Ct. 485; Hunt v. Perry (1896)'1 165 Mass. 287, 43
N. E. 103; Auditor General v. Rutter (1910) 161 Mich. 470, 126 N. W. 630;
Douglas v. Board of Supervisors (1902) 68 App. Div. 296, 74 N. Y. Supp. 144.
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The fact that owners of credits receive this right of deduction and
owners of national bank shares do not, amounts, it is claimed, to discrimination against the bank shares in violation of Section 5219. This
form of alleged discrimination was early considered by the courts. In
People v. Weaver,84 the United States Supreme Court held that a
New York statute allowing debts to be set off against all forms of personal property, except national and state bank shares, was in violation
of Section 5219. However, it should be remembered, as pointed out in
the first installment of this article, that a shareholder cannot attack
the statute unless he has debts to deduct,85 and furthermore an actual
discrimination must be proved. Such proof is exceedingly difficult where
two different systems of taxing are involved, as in the case where national banks are taxed in a manner different from that employed in
the taxing of "other moneyed capital."
In Amoskeag Savings Bank v. Purdy,86 the Supreme Court upheld
a New York statute which taxed national bank shares without allowing
deductions while other moneyed capital was allowed debt deduction.
In this case, however, national bank shares were assessed on their book
value, which did not include good will and other elements affecting
market value, while other moneyed capital was taxed upon full value
which, apparently, included the elements not included as to national
bank shares. The Court pointed out the difference in method of taxing
bank shares as a basis for distinguishing the statute in question from
that involved in the Weaver case. In view of the different basis of taxation, it was held that allowing deduction of debts from the value of
other property was unlikely to discriminate against national bank shares
but "as against the owner of bank shares, who, by alleging discrimination, assumes the burden of proving it, and, who fails to show that
the method of valuation is unfavorable to him, it may be assumed to
be advantageous." Section 5219 "clearly prohibits discrimination
against shareholders in national banks and in favor of the shareholders
of competing institutions, but it does not require that the scheme of
taxation shall be so arranged that the burden shall fall upon each and
every shareholder alike, without distinction arising from circumstances
personal to the individual."
It may be concluded, therefore, that, as far as the allowance of deductions of debts from credits in California is concerned, it is doubtful,
in view of the striking parallel between the California situation and
that before the court in the Amoskeag case, if national bank share*84(1879) 100 U. S. 539.
85 17 CALiFORNA L. REv. 83, 112.
86 (1913) 231 U. S. 373, 393, 34 Sup. Ct. 114, 122.
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holders could prove the discrimination necessary to render the California bank share tax invalid. In both situations the tax upon national
bank shares is fixed upon a basis different from that employed in the
taxing of "other moneyed capital." In California this follows from
the fact that national bank shares are taxed upon the basis of "book
value" which does not take into account such elements of value as
"good will" while the tax upon "other moneyed capital" is based upon
"actual value." A further difference is found in the fact that under the
share tax national banks enjoyed an exemption from the payment of
personal property taxes and all other taxes and licenses, state, county
and municipal while "other moneyed capital" was not granted such
exemption.
Aside from the Amoskeag case, the burden of establishing the
claimed discrimination is upon the taxpayer, and with such different
systems of taxation, it is virtually impossible to reduce two different
types of taxes to a unit standard so that comparative values may be
presented and the discrimination shown.
B.

DOES THE INVALIDITY OF THE SHARE TAX ON NATIONAL BANKS
INVALIDATE THE SHARE TAX ON STATE BANKS?

The claim may be made that if the tax on national bank shares
under Political Code Section 3664c is invalid, the tax on state bank
shares is also invalid for the following reasons:
1. The tax on national bank shares and the tax on state bank shares
were enacted by the legislature as inseparable provisions, so that
the failure of one must necessarily mean the failure of the other;
2. To tax the state bank shares while no tax or a lower tax is laid upon
national bank shares is to grant more favorable terms to a foreign
than to a domestic corporation contrary to the provisions of Article
XII, Section 15 of the State Constitution.
3. To tax state bank shares while no tax or a lower tax is levied
against national bank shares is to deny the state bank shareholders
equal protection of the law contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States.
In view of this claim it is necessary to inquire into the arguments for
and against each of these three contentions.
(r)

Partial Unconstitutionality and Inseparability.

It is clearly established that a legislative enactment may be declared invalid in part, while effect is given to the remaining valid provisions. However, to be effective these remaining provisions must be in
fact separable, and must have been intended by the legislature to be
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effective even though the other provisions were held invalid.8 7 Thus,
in these cases the problem is one of construction - first of determining
whether there is separability in fact, by construing the parts, and secondly, of determining the intention of the legislature as to whether
the remaining several provisions should be given effect standing alone.
In the bank tax situation it would seem that the provisions in question are in fact separable. As between the tax on the national bank
shares and the tax on state bank shares there seems to be no fundamental interdependence. In so far as giving effect to the provision is
concerned, the state bank shares can be taxed without taxing the shares
of national banks. Hence, if the provisions are to be held inseparable
it must be upon the basis of legislative or constitutional intent.
It may be that in the absence of other legislative declaration the
presumption is that the legislature intends an act to be effective as an
entirety.88 But this presumption is rebuttable. Since the taxation of
national bank shares is only by the authorization of, and is subject to,
the technical and far-reaching provision of Section 5219, a state's tax
upon the shares of national banks runs the constant danger of being
held invalid whenever other features of the state's tax system conflict
with the restrictions of the federal statute. Therefore, in view of the
fact that the tax on national bank shares is more or less always in a
precarious position, for reasons which do not affect other taxes, it is
not unreasonable to hold that the legislature intended that the tax on
state bank shares should be given effect even if the tax on national bank
shares were invalid. For the same reason it may be held that separability was intended by the constitutional provision, i.e. Article XIII,
Section 14c, in pursuance of which Section 3664c of the Political Code
was enacted.
Although the legislative intent of separability is reasonably justified
from the circumstances alone, it finds more definite expression in the
so-called saving clause found in Section 6 of the Act of March 5, 1921,
amending Section 3664c and other sections of the Political Code.89
87 Hale v. McGettigan (1896) 114 Cal. 112, 45 Pac. 1049; Bacon Service Corporation v. Huss (1926) 199 Cal. 21, 248 Pac. 235; People v. Capelli (1921) 55
Cal. App. 461, 203 Pac. 837; People v. Sterling Refining Co. (1927) 54 Cal. App.
Dec. 777, 261 Pac. 1080. See also Berea College v. Kentucky (1908) 211 U. S. 45,
54, 29 Sup. Ct. 33, 36; Dorchy v. Kansas (1924) 264 U. S. 286, 44 Sup. Ct. 323.
88 Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana (1929) 278 U. S. 235, 49 Sup.
Ct. 115.
89 Cal. Stat. 1921, p. 23. It should be noted that the saving clause as applied
to Section 3664c was by way of amendment. Therefore, an inquiry into the circumstances of the amendment is necessary in view of the holding that the intent of
the legislature must be determined from the terms of the statute at the time of its
enactment and not by any amendments subsequently adopted. Town of Martinez
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Courts have differed in their opinions as to the effect of such clauses.
While it is evident that such a clause cannot save a provision that cannot be given effect standing alone, there may be a difference of opinion
as to how conclusive a saving clause is as to legislative intent. It may
be considered as a mere aid to the court's determination of the legislative intent,9 0 or it may be considered as imposing upon the court a
duty to hold separable as far as possible. The California courts in
considering saving clauses seem to hold them to be conclusive evidence
of intention of separability. 9 '
In view of the above it would seem that in so far as Section 3664c is
concerned the tax on state bank shares is separable, and that this section is not in conflict with Article XIII, Section 14c, which it is reasonable to hold also intended separability.
(2)

Article XII. Section 15 of the California Constitution.

Would the tax on state bank shares under Section 3664c of the
Political Code violate Article XII, Section 15 of the California Constitution if the tax on national bank shares were invalid? This section
provides:
"No corporation organized outside the limits of this state shall be
allowed to transact business within this state on more favorable conditions
than are prescribed by law to similar corporations organized under the
laws of this state."

If the tax on national bank shares under Section 3664c is invalid
and state bank shares are taxed under that section, national bank shares
would be receiving more favorable treatment than that accorded state
bank shares. Therefore, upon the assumption that national banks are
"corporations organized outside the limits of this state" it may be
argued that under Section 3664c they are "allowed to transact business
within this state on more favorable conditions than similar domestic
v. Johnson (1927) 201 Cal. 397, 404, 257 Pac. 853, 856, However, in the case cited
the provisions of the original act were not reenacted, the amending material being
enacted as additional matter. Since, in the case of Section 3664, the amendment incorporating the saving clause was a reenactment of the entire section, the intention
of the legislature so expressed controls, regardless of the legislative intent at the
time of the original enactment.
90 Bacon Service Corporation v. Huss (1926) 199 Cal. 21, 34, 248 Pac. 235,
240: "But we cannot view the language of the statute as an inexorable command,
for it is a judicial question in each case whether the good may stand notwithstanding the bad." See also Dorchy v. Kansas (1924) 264 U. S. 286, 44 Sup. Ct.
323; Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana (1929) 278 U. S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct.
115.
91 In re Schuler (1918) 167 Cal. 282, 289, 139 Pac. 685; Bacon Service Corporation v. Huss (1926) 199 Cal. 21, 248 Pac. 235; People v. Sterling Refining Co.
(1927) 54 Cal. App. Dec. 777, 261 Pac. 1080.
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corporations, i. e. state banks, for while the tax is not upon the bank as
such the imposition of a tax upon its shareholders is obviously onle of
the "conditions" upon which it transacts business within the state. The
merit of this claim depends upon the meaning given to the constitutional
provision in respect to the particular conditions that were intended to
be included under the language, "more favorable conditions" of the
constitutional provision.
It is evident that if the phrase "more favorable conditions" is construed in an absolute sense, any inequality whatever operating in favor
of foreign corporations is prohibited. Under this construction, the effect
would be that all the limitations which by reason of the federal system
are imposed upon the state by an outside force in its dealings with
foreign corporations would be operative against the state in dealing
with its own corporations. It is unreasonable to believe that the enactors of the constitutional provision intended an interpretation that
would result in such an extensive limitation upon the state in the control of its internal affairs. It is more reasonable to hold that Article XII,
Section 15, is not applicable when "in the nature of things, it is impossible to provide exactly the same system of laws for foreign as for
domestic corporations." 92 That this provision was not intended to prohibit all inequality of whatsoever nature is apparently the view taken
by the California courts.93
To apply this reasoning to the problem before us, it seems if Congress, as it unquestionably could, should enact that national banks
should be totally exempt from state taxation, Article XII, Section 15
of the Constitution, literally interpreted, would compel the conclusion
that the state could not levy any taxes whatsoever on state banks, for
then national banks would be doing business in the state "on more
favorable conditions than are prescribed by law to similar corporations
organized under the laws of this state." However, for the reasons given
above, it seems highly improbable that Article XII, Section 15 would be
so construed. The court would be faced with two alternatives: it would
either have to hold that the constitutional prohibition against favoring
foreign corporations was not intended to operate in such a situation, or
hold that all the property and business of all the banks in the state were
exempt from taxation permanently or temporarily at the will of Congress. It would be unreasonable to ascribe intent to effect such a result.
The present case differs from the one supposed only because the alternative to holding the statute valid is not quite so obviously undesirable. It
92

899.

First Nat. Bank of Butte v. Weidenbeck (C. C. A. 8th, 1899) 97 Fed. 896,

93

Miles v. Woodward (1896) 115 Cal. 308, 311, 46 Pac. 1076.
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is nevertheless very seriously so. Here the state, by submitting to the
conditions imposed by Congress, may tax national bank shares. It can
not tax those shares except in compliance with the prescribed conditions.
As those conditions stand, this tax can only be levied by adjusting the
state's entire system of taxation of intangibles to meet the conditions
prescribed. It seems reasonably clear that if the state can, but does not,
tax the shares of foreign corporations under its customary tax system
while the shares of domestic corporations are so taxed, such treatment
should amount to allowing the "more favorable conditions" prohibited
by the Constitution. However, it is not clear that if the state can only
tax foreign corporations at the cost of changing its customary tax
system, and at the risk of having its whole tax system upset for noncompliance with technical conditions of uncertain meaning imposed by
federal authority, e. g. Section 5219, and does not do so, but taxes the
shares of its domestic corporations in a manner prohibited as against
the foreign corporations, such treatment should be within the intended
constitutional prohibition. In fact, it is unreasonable that such an
interpretation was intended, for upon the basis of the arguments advanced above such interpretation would compel the state to accept outside conditions imposed, not merely upon its treatment of its domestic
corporations, but upon the lines of its entire system of taxation. Therefore the more reasonable view seems to be that the taxation of state
bank shares under Section 3664c, while national bank shares are untaxed or more favorably taxed, is not in violation of the prohibited
"more favorable conditions" clause of Article XII, Section 15 of the
Constitution.
A further argument may be based upon the language of Article XII,
Section 15 itself. This section provides that:

a

"No corporation organized outside the limits of this state shall be
allowed to transact business within this state on more favorable conditions
than are prescribed by law to similar corporations organized under the
laws of this state." (Italics added.)

This section may be interpreted in two ways: (1) It may be construed
to mean simply what it says. Now it will be observed that the thing
prohibited is a certain variety of affirmative treatment of foreign corporations. The section does not say that domestic corporations shall or
shall not be allowed to do business thus and so, but deals only with
the treatment of foreign corporations. So far as anything this provision
says, domestic corporations may be treated in whatever way the legislature pleases. The section simply provides that however they are
I
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shall be treated no better.9 4 (2) The situation presented by national banks is unique. When the section prohibits
the conferring of privileges upon, or the exemption from burdens on,
94
This interpretation seems to be followed in California and in almost all
jurisdictions with like constitutional provisions. Thus, the constitutional provision
ir-rusdered as self executing. That is, it is interpreted as automatically extending
to domestic corporations all statutes conferring more favorable terms on foreign
corporations and extending to foreign corporations all burdens imposed on domestic
corporations. London and S. F. Bank v. Block (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1902) 117 Fed.
900; Bank of British North America v. Madison (1893) 99 Cal. 125, 33 Pac. 762;
Anglo-Californian Bank Ltd. v. Field (1905) 146 Cal. 644, 80 Pac. 1080; General
Conference of Free Baptists v. Berkey (1909) 156 Cal. 466, 105 Pac. 411; Thomas
v. Wentworth Hotel Co. (1910) 158 Cal. 275, 110 Pac. 942; Franscioni v. Soledad
Land and Water Co. (1915) 170 Cal. 221, 149 Pac. 161; Provident Gold Mining
Co. v. Haynes (1916) 173 Cal. 44, 159 Pac. 155; Commonwealth Acceptance Corporation v. Jordan (1926) 198 Cal. 618, 246 Pac. 796. If the section is considered
as self-executing it may only amount to a constitutional provision as to the scope
of corporation legislation, so that by virtue of the section any legislation addressed
to "domestic corporations" or "foreign corporations" which would result in "more
favorable conditions" will be construed as reading, "all corporations." If this view,
as to the purpose of the section, be accepted, there can be no cases, so far as state
law is concerned, of unequal legislative treatment in favor of foreign corporations;
for every such statute having such an effect will apply to all corporations, both
domestic and foreign. Consequently, it may be claimed that there is no violation of
the section if, in the equal application of a statute, a superior power makes equal
effectiveness impossible.
Thus, under this view, if the state bank shares had been taxed with no mention made of national bank shares, the effect of the provision would not have been
to declare the tax invalid, but instead to make it applicable to national banks as
well as to state banks. The provisions of the section would have been satisfied by
such application; and while by reason of Section 5219, if the tax could not have
been given effect against the national bank shares, this fact would not have invalidated the tax as to the state bank shares. In carrying out this view, it would seem
that no different result should obtain as to Section 3664c, and that where the state
has taxed both state and national bank shares, Article XII, Section 15, is satisfied,
although effect cannot be given to the tax on national bank shares by reason of
Section 5219. While there does not seem to be any case involving the constitutional section so as to bring out the arguments advanced above, it must be noted
that in California no statute has ever been declared invalid under Article XII,
Section 15.
While, in view of the above, it would seem that without other argument, it is
more reasonable to hold that the tax on state bank shares under Section 3664c does
not violate Article XII, Section 15, there remains another somewhat technical argument against the opposite claim. Even if it be assumed that Article XII, Section
15, intends to prohibit any inequality whatever between domestic and foreign corporations this absolute prohibition must be subject to the exceptions of later constitutional provisions. Article XIII, Section 14c, provides for the tax against both
national and state bank shares and Section 3664c of the Political Code is the statutory enactment of this tax. Therefore, if under 3664c the state bank shares are.
taxable while the national bank shares are untaxed, it is because the two tax provisions in that code section are held separable, and to be held separable it must be
that the constitutional provision in Article XIII, Section 14c, also irtended separability. Hence, if the tax against the state bank shares under 3664c stands, it is
by viprtue of the fact that Article XIII, Section 14c, intended that the state bank;
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foreign corporations (which are determined specifically by reference to
those imposed or conferred upon domestic corporations) it obviously
implies that the burdens and privileges of which it speaks are of a sort
which the legislature has power to confer or impose on foreign corporations, since it would be idle to prohibit conduct beyond the power of
the authority addressed. The objection to the state bank share tax is
that a similar tax is not imposed upon national banks, with the result
that the latter are doing business in the state on more favorable conditions than the former. But this is not because the statute has
"allowed" this advantage to national banks, since it was an advantage
which the statute could not deny. The statute has offended, if at all,
not by allowing an advantage to a national bank which it denied to a
state bank, but by imposing a burden on a state bank which it could
not impose on a national bank. With this introduction, the second possible construction of the statute may be stated in two parts as follows:
(a) The legislature shall with respect to foreign corporations confer no privileges which it can withhold, nor withhold any burdens which
it can impose which are conferred or imposed on domestic corporations.
(b) The legislature shall not impose upon domestic corporations
burdens which it is without power to impose on similar foreign corporations. Part (b) is not expressly stated in the constitutional provision either in form or substance. It rests upon the supposition that
the statute prohibits not only the allowing of favors to foreign corporations but prohibits any legislation which has the same result as the
allowing of favors to foreign corporations. This is no doubt a perfectly
sound interpretation of the general intent of the provision, but it is so
not because the statute says so, but because it is fair to suppose that
was its general purpose. Obviously, the court is not compelled in
effectuating the assumed ultimate purpose of the provision to treat the
provision as if that purpose were stated expressly in so many unequivocal and unqualified words which left no room for construction.
(3) Equal Protection of the Laws.
Assuming the tax on national bank shares under Political Code
Section 3664c to be invalid in whole or in part, it may be contended
that the levying of the full tax upon the share of state banks under
shares should be taxed even though the national bank shares were untaxed, that is,
Article XIII, Section 14c, provided an exception to the assumed absolute prohibition of Article XII, Section 15. It is evident in conclusion that Section 3664c,
even if it taxed state bank shares without taxing national bank shares it would not
be invalid under Article XII, Section 15, regardless of the view taken of the
intended meaning of the section, unless the tax is already invalid under Article
XIII, Section 14c, by reason of inseparability.
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that section is invalid by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States as denying the holders of state bank
shares the equal protection of the laws. In construing this constitutional
provision the Supreme Court has held that mere inequality of treatment does not amount to a denial of equal protection of the laws 9 5 in
that the provision "does not prevent a state from adjusting its legislation to differences in situation or forbid classification in that connection, although it does require that the classification be not arbitrary."9
Therefore, while under this provision there must be a discrimination to
give rise to the claim of denial of equal protection of the laws the
merit of the contention rests not upon the fact of discrimination alone
but upon the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the classification
upon which the discrimination is based. 7 It is evident that if the state
bank shares are taxed while those of national banks are untaxed, or
taxed at a lower rate, there is an inequality of treatment. However,
this will only be invalid as a denial of equal protection of the laws if
the classification of national as against state banks for the purpose of
this particular tax be judged unreasonable. In respect to classifications
the Supreme Court has held that, "any classification is permissible
which has a reasonable relation to some permitted end of governmental
action.' 98
In the instant situation the state legislature imposed the same tax
on national and state bank shares. If, as is assumed, the tax on national
bank shares is invalid in whole or in part, the tax on state bank shares
takes full effect only upon the basis of holding that the legislature
intended separability, that is, that state bank shares should be taxed
even though national bank shares were taxed less or not at all. This is
to hold that the legislature intended that in the event that the attempt
95

Bells Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania (1890) 134 U. S. 232, 237, 10 Sup.
Ct. 533, 535: "The provision in the fourteenth amendment that no state shall deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, was not
intended to prevent a state from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and
reasonable ways. It may, if it chooses, exempt certain classes of property from
any taxation at all.... We think we are safe in saying that the fourteenth amendment was not intended to compel the state to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation."
See also Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Arkansas R. R. Comm. (1923) 261 U. S. 379,
384, 43 Sup. Ct. 387.
98Power Manufacturing Co. v. Saunders (1927) 274 U. S. 490, 493, 47 Sup.
Ct. 678, 679.
97
Quong Wing v. Kirkendall (1912) 223 U. S. 59, 32 Sup. Ct. 192; Metropolis
Theatre Co. v. Chicago (1913) 228 U. S. 61, 33 Sup. Ct. 441; Roberts & Schaefer
Co. v. Emmerson (1926) 271 U. S. 50, 46 Sup. Ct. 375; Road Improvement District No. 7 v. St. Louis-S. F. R. Co. (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) 28 F. (2d) 825.
98 Watson v. State Comptroller of N. Y. (1920) 254 U. S. 122, 124, 41 Sup.
Ct. 43, 44.
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to tax national bank shares was invalid bank shares were to be classified
as national and state for different treatment. Under the equal protection of the laws clause this classification will be valid only if not unreasonable, that is, if it has a "reasonable relation to some permitted end
of governmental action."
It may be that if the state in all respects had the same power to
tax national bank shares as it had to tax state bank shares, a classification for different tax treatment would be related to nothing other
than a purpose to discriminate and might be a denial of equal protection.99 However, in the situation at hand, the state has no such equal
power over national and state bank shares. Therefore, the inability to
treat alike furnishes the basis for classification which should be valid
if reasonably related to an approved governmental end.?" As was
brought out in the discussion under the preceding heading, the state
can tax national bank shares only by complying with conditions affecting its entire tax system. It is submitted that in view of the widespread
effect of complying with these conditions, it is a reasonable tax policy
of the state' 01 to refuse to submit to conditions imposing such a burden
upon its system of taxation. In other words, the state could refuse to
99
It is suggested that under the reasoning of Quong Wing v. Kirkendall (1912)
223 U. S. 59, 32 Sup. Ct. 192, even if the state intended to discourage state
banks a discriminatory tax to that end would be valid. This case involved a Montana statute imposing a fee upon all persons engaged in the laundry business other
than the steam laundry business, providing that it should not apply to women so
engaged when not more than two women were employed. In the course of the
opinion, delivered per Mr. Justice Holmes, it is said: "A state does not deny the
equal protection of the laws merely by adjusting its revenue laws and taxing system
in such a way as to favor certain industries or forms of industry ... It may make
discriminations, if founded on distinctions that we cannot pronounce unreasonable
and purely arbitrary, as was illustrated in American Sugar Refining Co. v.
Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 92, 95; Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 276; W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452, 469. . . . If the State sees fit to encourage
steam laundries and discourage hand laundries that is its own affair." 223 U. S.
at 62, 32 Sup. Ct. at 193.
100 This is the attitude of the courts justifying a difference of treatment as between domestic and foreign corporations. Clement National Bank v. Vermont
(1913) 231 U. S. 120, 135, 34 Sup. St. 31; Kansas City, Memphis & Birmingham
R. Co. v. Stiles (1916) 242 U. S. 111, 37 Sup. Ct. 58; Northwestern Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin (1918) 247 U. S. 132, 38 Sup. Ct. 444; Air-way Electric Appliance Corporation v. Archer (S. D. Ohio 1922) 279 Fed. 878, 887; Colorado and
Southern Ry. Co. v. The People (1916) 61 Colo. 230, 236, 156 Pac. 1095. The
Supreme Court of California in Kaiser Land and Fruit Co. v. Curry (1909) 155
Cal. 638, 657, 103 Pac. 341, held that the California constitutional requirement of
uniformity (Art. I, Sec. 11) was not violated by reasonable classification.
101Quong Wing v. Kirkendall (1912) 223 U. S. 59, 32 Sup. Ct. 192; Fort
Smith Lumber Co. v. Arkansas (1920) 251 U. S. 532, 40 Sup. Ct. 304. Compare,
however, Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania (1928) 277 U. S. 389, 48 Sup. Ct.
553.
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tax national bank shares at all because of its unwillingness to accept
the burdensome conditions of Section 5219, and could classify national
and state bank shares to that end. Surely, if the state could refuse to
tax national bank shares at all, in pursuance of its tax policy, without
rendering invalid the state bank share tax, it could as well provide that
if the concessions made by it were inadequate to meet the conditions of
Section 5219, it would make no further concessions and state bank
shares should be taxed regardless of the validity or invalidity of the
tax on national bank shares.102
C.
(z)

THE PRESENT SYSTEM

The Constitutional Amendment of r928.

An exaggerated fear that the state might lose $22,050,000 in revenue
if the share tax on banks was not changed;' 03 unwillingness to recommend a change in the law regarding mortgage exemption; and a desire
to have preferential treatment provided for intangibles, induced the
California Tax Commission to recommend to the Governor the calling
of a special session of the legislature for the purpose of proposing an
102
These arguments were not considered in State Bank of Omaha v. Endres
(1923) 109 Neb. 753, 757, 192 N. W. 322, where the Supreme Court of Nebraska
held that the state constitutional provision that required that taxes be uniform as to
class, prohibited tax discrimination as between national and state bank shares so
that the invalidity of the national bank share tax invalidated the state bank tax.
103 See the Final Report of the California Tax Commission submitted to the
Governor, March 5, 1929, p. 252, 253. For a brief review of the facts regarding the
litigation pertaining to the 1926 and 1927 bank share taxes, see the Report of the
State Board of Equalization for 1927-1928, in which it is pointed out that the
entire amount involved in the bank tax suits for the 1926 and 1927 levies is
$2,253,245.51. Political Code Section 3669a would seem to bar any other actions
than those already instituted for the recovery of taxes levied for the years mentioned. For these same years, the Tax Commission fixed the possible loss to the
state at $7,685,000. Comparable over-estimation appears to have been made with
reference to the 1928 revenues deemed in jeopardy. The remainder of the $22,050,000 is composed of taxes projected for 1929 and 1930 on the share tax method and
estimated at $9,680,000. To avert this loss (involving the assumption that no
taxes whatever could have been exacted from banks during 1929 and 193, which
is extremely unlikely) the substituted taxes based on net income must yield approximately $4,840,000 annually during the next two years. However, tlois yield
cannot be anticipated because in all probability, interest from tax exempt sources
must be excluded from the tax base as a result of the decision in Macallen Co. v.
U. S. -,
49 Sup. Ct. 432. In fact, the commission's
Massachusetts (1929) advisor and director of research, Professor Robert Murray Haig of Columbia University, has observed, "the exclusion of tax exempt interest from the base was of
importance only in the case of the banks, who were the only large holders of government bonds. For them, it meant practically complete exemption. Several of the
largest and most prosperous banks in the state . . . would pay no franchise tax
whatsoever.... Had the proposal (to exclude tax exempt interest) prevailed, the
new tax would have been completely wrecked." (XIV, Bulletin of the National
Tax Association, 231, 236.) See also infra n. 104.
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amendment to the State Constitution permitting the taxation of banks
according to the fourth alternative of Section 5219, i. e. according to
or measured by their total net income.' 04 A special session of the
legislature, convened September 4, 1928, voted unanimously to submit
the commission's amendment to the people for approval in November,
1928. The amendment, which is quoted in the margin,' 0 5 was adopted
by a large majority at the general election November 6, 1928.
104 In view of the dangers and pitfalls in the use of the "measured by theory"
to reach income from exempt securities, discussed in the course of this article (17
CALIFORNIA L. REV. 232 et seq. and supra p. 456-462), and in view of the fact that

it was by no means clear that the California bank share taxes here invalid (see
supra p. 471-489), it would seem that a more uncertain and precarious system from
the standpoint of the possible loss of revenue involved, was recommended for taxing banks than the one already existing,
105 "Sec. 16. Notwithstanding any other provision of the constitution:
1. (a) Banks, including national banking associations, located within the limits
of this state, shall annually pay to the state a tax according to or measured by
their net income, which shall be in lieu of all other taxes and licenses, state, county
and municipal, upon such banks, or the shares thereof, except taxes upon their
real property. The amount of the tax shall be equivalent to four per cent of their

net income.
(b) The Legislature, two-thirds of all the members elected to each of the two
houses voting in favor thereof, in lieu of such tax, may provide by law for any
other form of taxation now or hereafter permitted by the congress of the United
States respecting national banking associations; provided, that such form of taxation shall apply to all banks located within the limits of this state.
(c) If it be finally determined that any tax levied upon or respecting any bank,
national banking association, or the shares thereof, is invalid, said bank or association, or the shares thereof, shall be reassessed in conformity with any method provided by law. No claim against the state for refund or rebate of taxes paid shall be
allowed without first deducting therefrom the amount of any such unpaid reassess-

ment.
2. (a) All financial, mercantile, manufacturing and business corporations doing
business within the limits of this state, subject to be taxed pursuant to subdivision
(d) of section 14 of this article, in lieu of the tax thereby provided for, shall annually pay to the state for the privilege of exercising their corporate franchises
within this state a tax according to or measured by their net income. The amount
of such state tax shall be equivalent to four per cent of their net income. Such tax
shall be subject to offset, in a manner to be prescribed by law, in the amount of
personal property taxes paid by such corporations to the state or political subdivisions thereof, but the offset shall not exceed ninety per cent of such state tax.
In any event, each such corporation shall pay an annual minimum tax to the state,
not subject to offset, of twenty-five dollars.
(b) The Legislature, two-thirds of all the members elected to each of the two
houses voting in favor thereof, may provide by law for the taxation by any other
method authorized in this constitution of the corporations, or the franchises, subject to be taxed pursuant to subdivision (a) of paragraph 2 of this section or subdivision (d) of section 14 of this article.
3. The Legislature, two-thirds of all the members elected to each of the two
houses voting in favor thereof, -may change by law the rates of tax, or the percentage, amount or nature of offset provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof.
4. Notes, debentures, shares of capital stock, bonds, solvent credits, deeds of
trust, mortgages, and any legal or equitable interest therein, of the classes now
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On March 1, 1929, the legislative enactment passed in pursuance of
this amendment known as "The Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax
Act,' 106 was signed by the Governor.
An examination of the amendment discloses that it is amenable to
certain objections, namely, (1) it is not clear what corporations are
taxable under its provisions; (2) it contains provisions the validity of
which may be questioned; (3) because of its wording, it may have
undesirable effects not intended by its framers. Each of these defects
will be briefly analyzed in the following discussion.
(a) What CorporationsAre Taxable Under the Amendment?
The amendment as worded leaves open interesting and puzzling
questions as to the corporations taxable under its provisions, questions
which will undoubtedly require determination by the courts. The
amendment provides that the corporations taxable are all banks and
"all financial, mercantile, manufacturing, and business corporations
doing business within the limits of this state, subject to be taxed pursuant to subdivision (d) of section 14 of this article in lieu of the tax
thereby provided for [shall pay the tax herein provided]." In other
words, to be taxable under this amendment the corporation must (1) be
a bank, or a financial, mercantile, manufacturing or business corporation doing business within the limits of the state; and (2) if it is a
corporation other than a bank it must have been subject to taxation
under Section 14(d) of Article XIII. This second condition precludes
the taxation under the amendment of the franchises of insurance companies, public utilities and highway transportation companies, for they
taxable to the owner thereof and not otherwise taxed under subdivisions (a) or (b)
of section 14 or under section 15 of this article, shall be declared in a manner to be
prescribed by law and shall be taxed upon their actual value at the rate of threetenths of one per cent. The Legislature, two-thirds of all the members elected to
each of the two houses voting in favor thereof, may by law change the rate or
rates upon any one or more of the classes of property herein enumerated, provided
that no rate shall exceed four-tenths of one per cent. Said tax shall be in lieu of all
other property taxes thereon, and the proceeds of said tax shall not go to the state
but to such political subdivisions thereof, and in such manner, as may be provided
by law.
5. The Legislature shall define 'corporations' and 'doing business'; shall define
'net income,' and may define it to be the entire net income received from all
sources; shall provide for the allocation of income, for the assessment, levy and
collection of the aforesaid taxes, and for reassessment in the event of the invalidity
of any tax under 2 (a) or 2 (b) hereof. Said taxes shall become a lien on the first
Monday in March of 1929 and of each year thereafter. The Legislature shall pass
laws necessary to carry out this section. The acts of the forty-eighth session of the
Legislature passed pursuant to this section shall be effective immediately upon their
passage." CA,. CoNsT. Art. XIII, § 16.
106 Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 13.
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were not subject to taxation under Section 14(d) of Article XIII of the
constitution.
Although under the amendment, and the statute passed in pursuance
thereof, the corporations taxable are "all financial, mercantile, manufacturing and business corporations doing business within the limits of
the state," the terms "business corporation" and "doing business" are
likely to cause difficulty by reason of their generality and vagueness.
Since the terms "corporations" and "doing business" have been defined
by the statute, these parallel provisions of the amendment and statute
as to corporations taxable will be discussed together at this point.
In the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act (Section 5) the
legislature sets forth the following definitions:
(1) "The term 'corporation,' as herein used, shall include every financial
corporation, other than a bank or banking association, and every mercantile, manufacturing and business corporation of the classes referred to in
subdivision one (c) of Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States."
(2) "The term 'doing business' as herein used, means any transaction
or transactions in the course of its business by a corporation created under
the laws of this state, or by a foreign corporation qualified to do or doing
intrastate business in this state."

It is evident that as applied to "business corporations" in the first provision above, and as used in the phrases "doing business" and "doing
intrastate business" in the second provision, the term "business" refers
to three different situations. In the first use it characterizes a kind of
corporate activity; in the second it relates corporate activity to corporate purpose, and in the third it characterizes the kind and degree of
corporate activity of foreign corporations over which the state may have
taxing jurisdiction. It is apparent that these three different uses of the
term can not be related for the purpose of mutual definition.
In the first use "business" refers to a difference in kind between
corporations. Only corporations of the kind specified are taxable under
the act. The provision classifies the taxable types as "financial," "mercantile," "manufacturing," and "business." It is true that the section
does not define the quality that characterizes a corporation as a "business corporation," however, neither does it do so as to "financial,"
"mercantile" or "manufacturing" corporations. The exact definition in
each case must be found in judicial decision with the difference perhaps
that the nature of a "business corporation" is less clearly recognized
than that of the other types listed.
In view of the fact that the wording of the statute incorporates the
wording of Section 5219, judicial determination of the term "business
corporation" as used in that section would determine the definition of
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that term as used in the California statute. However, since there has
been no decision upon this point under Section 5219, we must turn to
other decisions for assistance in determining the nature of a business
corporation,' 07 and we find numerous cases supporting the view that any
corporation whose purpose is that of personal material gain of a
pecuniary nature to its members is a business corporation. 0
In view of the statutory definitions above quoted it may be asked
if a non-profit corporation is or is not a business corporation within the
meaning of the amendment and statute. Since it would seem to follow
from the second definition above quoted that profit in the sense of
money dividends is not the necessary quality of a business activity, it
would appear that an examination of the nature of each particular
non-profit corporation would be necessary. If non-profit activities are
means of furthering a non-business purpose (as in the case of charitable
or fraternal organizations), corporations engaging in such activities
should not come under the act. However, where the non-profit activity
is in furtherance of a business or mercantile end (as in the case of a
cooperative marketing association), corporations engaged in such activities will probably be subject to taxation under the act as other corporations organized for financial, "mercantile, manufacturing or business
ends."
The act itself supports this view by implication, for subdivision (k)
of Seion thereof provides, with respect to "associations organized
107
See
108

Adams v. Boston, H. & E. R. Co. (D. Mass. 1870) Fed. Cas. No. 47.
McLeod v. Lincoln Medical College of Cotner University (1903) 69 Neb.
550, 553, 96 N. W. 265, 266: "The character of a corporation is determined from
its articles of incorporation and the statute authorizing its formation. In this case
it is apparent from both the articles of incorporation and the provisions of section
15, chapter 16, Compiled Statutes, that this organization is an educational and not
a 'business' or 'trading corporation' for the pecuniary profit of its members."
Greenough v. Board of Police Commissioners of Town of Tiverton (1909) 30 R. I.
212, 219, 74 Ati. 785, 789: "Is it embraced within the provisions of 'Class I.Business Corporations'? The definition of the noun 'business', according to Webster's Internat. Dict. is: (3) 'Financial dealings; buying and selling; traffic in general; mercantile transactions.' A corporation organized for such purposes is therefore a business corporation." Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (1911) 220 U. S. 107, 171,
31 Sup. Ct. 342, 357: A business is that "which occupies the time, attention, and
labor of men for the purpose of a livelihood or profit." People v. Board of Trade
of Chicago (1875) 80 Ill. 134, 136, in which the court, speaking of the Chicago
Board of Trade, said: "This organization is not maintained for the transaction of
business or for pecuniary gain, but simply to promulgate and enforce among its
members correct and high moral principles in the transaction of business. It is not
engaged in business, but only prescribes rules for the transaction of business."
George R. Barse Live Stock Company v. Range Valley Cattle Co. (1897) 16 Utah
59, 65, 50 Pac. 630, 632: "'To do business' as defined by Webster is 'to carry on
any particular occupation or employment for a livelihood or gain, as agriculture,
trade, mechanic arts, or profession'."
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and operated in whole or in part on a codperative or a mutual basis,"
for exempting from the tax base, income derived from non-profit activities. In light of this provision it is evident that the act itself intended
that non-profit organizations engaged in financial, mercantile, manufacturing and business ends should come under the provisions of the act.
The most important practical effect of this conclusion, as it affects these
corporations, is that, if there is no net income after the statutory deductions are allowed, the provision for a minimum tax of $25.00 on every
corporation taxable applies.
The specified kinds of corporations are taxable if they "do business"
within the state. The act, in the second provision quoted above, merely
provides that a corporation is "doing business" if it engages in any
transaction or transactions in the course of its corporate purpose, that
is in the course of its business. Thus, under this definition, regardless
of the nature of a corporation, any act done to further its purpose is
"doing business," although such "doing business" makes the corporation
liable to taxation under the act only if it furthers a corporate purpose
classified as "financial," "mercantile," "manufacturing," or "business"
in the sense of the first provision. Furthermore, it would seem as a
consequence that the character of an act in furtherance of a corporate
purpose is determined not by the nature of the act itself, but by the
nature of the corporate purpose it serves. 109 Apparently this was the view
taken by the California Supreme Court in the case of General Conference of Free Baptists v. Berkey."i0 Here a corporation organized for a
charitable purpose sold certain land. The court held that, since this
act was in furtherance of its religious and charitable activity, the act
took its quality from the end it served and did not amount to doing
business in the sense of engaging in activity for personal profit.
The question of the taxability of a holding company is also raised
in connection with the words "doing business". Under the constitutional and statutory provisions, it would seenm that the status of this
type of corporation is no different from that of any other. If its corporate purpose is that of holding the stocks of other corporations, then
109 Silveira v. Associated Milk Producers (1923) 63 Cal. App. 572, 219 Pac. 461.

110 (1909) 156 Cal. 466, 470, 105 Pac. 411: "This corporation was certainly
not engaged in the business of buying and selling land. As we have said, in another
connection, its charter plainly indicates that the power conferred upon it to make
such purchase and sale was not granted for the purpose of enabling it to do such
acts as a means of making a profit thereon. The buying and selling permitted to
it were merely incidental to the carrying on of the main purposes of the corporation. A distinction is to be drawn between the purposes of a corporation and its
powers. (Floyd v. Perrin, 30 S. C. 1, 12, (8 S. E. 14).)".
See also, Finance and Construction Co. of Cal. v. Sacramento (1928) 76 Cal.
Dec. 73, 75, 269 Pac. 167.
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any transaction of that kind is "doing business" within the statute and
taxable if the holding purpose of the corporation is "financial, mercantile, manufacturing or business." Hence it seems clear that a domestic
holding corporation would be taxable under the statute. The taxability
of a foreign holding corporation will depend on whether stock-holding
is considered "doing business," if done within the state, so as to be
intrastate business taxable by the state. The federal court seems to
take a similar view of the status of holding corporations under the Federal Capital Stock Act.1 '
A third use of the term "business" is found in the phrase "intrastate business" used in the second provision above quoted. The provision states, in effect, that corporate activities, in pursuance of the
specified corporate purposes, are taxable when conducted by a domestic
corporation or by a foreign corporation qualified to do, or doing, "intrastate business" in this state. Thus "business" used in this connection
refers to those acts held as amounting to that degree and kind of corporate activity by a foreign corporation within a state sufficient to give
the state jurisdiction to tax. M.hat amounts to "intra-state business"
depends upon the decisions of the federal courts. The rules established
by the federal courts in this connection are found in an extensive line of
cases.112 An examination of these cases at this point is prevented by
lack of space and is unnecessary for the purposes of this article.
An additional pr9blem in respect to corporations taxable arises in
111 Edwards v. Chile Copper Co. (1926) 270 U. S. 452, 46 Sup. Ct. 345. See
also Rose v. Nunnally Investment Co. (C. C. A. 5th, 1927) 22 F. (2d) 102; Mason
et al v. United States (D. Mass. 1928) 27 F. (2d) 1013.
The wording of the statute making "doing business" any transaction "in the
course of its business by a corporation" raises the question as to whether acts
merely going to the maintenance of corporate existence as owning and holding
property, paying taxes, etc., are included in this provision. To hold such acts as constituting "business" is a logical possibility. However, the decisions upon this point
where it has been raised regarding statutory "doing business" provisions seem to
express the better view. A typical expression is found in Von Baumbach v. Sargent
Land Co. (1917) 242 U. S. 503, 516, 37 Sup. Ct. 201, 205, involving the interpretation of "doing business" as used in the Federal Corporation Tax Law of
1909. "It is evident, from what this court has said in dealing with the former
cases, that the decision in each instance must depend upon the particular facts
before the court. The fair test to be derived from a consideration of all of
them is between a corporation which has reduced its activities to the owning and
holding of property and the distribution of its avails and doing only the acts
necessary to continue that status, and one which is still active and is maintaining
its organization for the purpose of continued efforts in the pursuit of profit and
gain and such activities as are essential to those purposes." See also United States
v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co. (1915) 237 U. S. 28, 35 Sup. Ct. 499.
112 See Dozier v. Alabama (1910) 218 U. S. 124, 30 Sup. Ct. 649, 28 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 264; Browning v. Waycross (1914) 233 U. S. 16, 34 Sup. Ct. 578; General
Ry. Signal Co. v. Virginia (1918) 246 U. S. 500, 38 Sup. Ct. 360; York Manufacturing Co. v. Colley (1918) 247 U. S. 21, 38 Sup. Ct. 430, 11 A. L. R. 611; Kansas
City Structural Steel Co. v. Arkansas (1925) 269 U. S. 148, 46 Sup. Ct. 59.
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determining the effect of the language of the amendment which states
that the tax therein provided for is in lieu of the tax provided for in
Section 14(d) of Article XIII. What, if any, corporations are still
taxable under Section 14(d)? In the first place it has been observed
that it is not certain whether the corporations other than banks which
are subject to the new tax, namely, "all financial, mercantile, manufacturing, and business corporations," include all taxable corporations. If
and in so far as it may be decided that there are some not included
they will obviously still be subject to taxation under Section 14(d) if
they were before. Secondly, the amendment takes only those corporations enumerated out of the operation of Section 14(d) that are "doing
business within the limits of this state," and since some corporations
will be subject to the franchise tax imposed by Section 14(d) that are
not doing business "within the limits of this state" it is clear that any
such corporation is both excluded from the corporations taxable under
the new tax because not "doing business" and not included within the
corporations excepted from the tax imposed by Section 14(d) for the
same reason.
Another problem is raised by the fact that the tax provided for in
subdivision 2(a) of Section 16 is in lieu of the tax provided for in Section 14(d) of Article XIII. Unlike the tax on banks under subdivision
1(a) of Section 16, it is in lieu of no other tax. Therefore it might be
contended that, unless Section 16 be the exclusive authority for the
taxation of corporation franchises, there is no constitutional prohibition
against local taxation of such franchises.
The contention that they are so taxable may be based on the following arguments: (1) Section 14(d), which was adopted in 1910, made
provision for a state tax upon franchises in addition to the tax then
levied on franchises by the local authorities but did not preclude local
taxation of such franchises for, although it states that the tax collected
thereunder "shall be exclusively for the benefit of the state," it does
not provide that it shall be in lieu of other taxes on franchises. Therefore, Section 16, which is a substitute for 14(d), which is in lieu of no
other tax, does not preclude such taxation.113 (2) Even if Section
113 In response to a request for an opinion upon the local taxability of corporate franchises under the existing law, the State Attorney General said: "Subdivision (d) of Section 14, Article XIII, does not impose or provide for the imposition of a lieu tax. A corporation which has been subject thereto has also been
subject to local taxation of its corporate excess. Chapter 13 of 1929 does not provide a lieu tax so far as the corporations described in Section 4 thereof are concerned, and their corporate excess may go on the local tax rolls." Opinion of the
Attorney General No. 6747 (June 18, 1929). However, on later consideration he
concluded that the corporate excess was assessable locally only for outstanding
local bonded indebtedness under subdivision E of Section 14 of Article XIII.
Opinion of the Attorney General No. 6747 (a). (June 27, 1929.)
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14(d) precluded local taxation of corporate franchises, they are none
the less taxable locally. The franchise tax provided for in Section 16
is not a property tax but a privilege tax. Since the state has ceased to
tax this corporate excess, the local subdivisions have a right to tax it.
The repeal by implication of Section 14(d), which alone stood in the
way of local taxation of franchises, restores the full applicability to
franchises of Sections 1 and 10 of Article XIII. Section 1 of that
Article includes franchises in the definition of property and directs that
all property be taxed in proportion to its value. Section 10 of the same
Article provides that all property, except as otherwise in the Constitution provided, "shall be assessed in the county, city and county, town
or township or district in which it is situated, in the manner prescribed
by law." It is submitted that these arguments are unsound. The theory
that franchises were properly taxable by the local authorities, while
Section 14(d) was in full effect, seems contrary not only to the known
history and purpose of that section,' 14 but is contrary to the express
language of the constitution itself." 5 The basic theory of the new
system adopted in 1910, of which Section 14(d) is a part, was the
separation of state and local subjects of taxation. This theory as
applied to franchises has been closely adhered to since 1910 by both
state and local taxing authorities and is supported by express language
of the State Supreme Court."16 In fact, the theory received such definite
expression in the first paragraph of Section 14 of Article XIII as conclusively to settle the question:
"Taxation upon all franchises of every kind and nature shall be entirely and exclusively for state purposes, and shall be levied, assessed and
collected in the manner hereinafter provided."
114 See the Report of the California Commission on Revenue and Taxation
1910,115
p. 28, 37 et seq.
CATL.
CONST. Art. XIII, § 14, par. 1.
116 Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Richardson (1920) 182 Cal. 115, 119, 187 Pac. 411,
412. This case involved the interpretation of the word "franchise" as used in 14(d)
and was particularly concerned with the method of evaluating franchises for purposes of taxation. In the course of the opinion the court reviewed the history of
the taxation of franchises in this state and the effect of the new system set up in
1910: "The provision in question is part of an amendment to the constitution
proposed by a special session of the legislature in 1910 and approved by the people
in the fall of that year. The amendment was the result of the labors of a tax
commission appointed some years before, and its primary purpose was to effect a
separation of state and county taxes, and in that behalf to set off exclusively for
taxation for state purposes certain particular subjects, consisting in a general way
of the properties of public utility corporations other than their non-operative properties, of the properties of insurance companies and banks other than their real
estate, and of franchises." (Italics added.)
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Section 16, no doubt, repeals by implication Section 14(d) so far as the
two are applicable to the same subjects together with the limitation that
the tax provided for in 14 (d) be exclusively for the benefit of the state
but it cannot be said to have also repealed the express limitation contained in the first paragraph of Section 14 just quoted.
(b) Provisions of Questionable Validity.
Subdivision 2(a) of Section 16 provides that the tax therein provided for
"shall be subject to offset, in a manner to be prescribed by law, in the
amount of personal property taxes paid by such corporations to the state
or political subdivisions thereof, but the offset shall not exceed ninety per
cent of such state tax."

If corporations are permitted to pay their franchise taxes in part with
offsets, does that bring about an unreasonable classification of corporations for purposes of taxation when certain corporations, because of
their small personal property holdings, are in no position to avail themselves to an equal extent of the advantages of the offset? This problem
is discussed in detail below under the analysis of the parallel provisions
of the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act.
(c) UndesirableResults Probably Not Intended.
Subdivision 1(a) of Section 16 provides in part as follows:
"Banks, including national banking associations, located within the
limits of this state, shall annually pay to the state a tax according to or
measured by their net income, which shall be in lieu of all other taxes
and licenses, state, county and monicipal, upon such banks, or the shares
thereof, except taxes upon their real property." (Italics added.)

The language italicized would seem clearly to make the tax in lieu of
the tax provided for in Section 14(e) of Article XIII which reads in
part as follows:
"Out of the revenues from the taxes provided for in this section together with all other state revenues, there shall be first set apart the
moneys tMobe applied by the state, to the support of the public school
system and the state university. In the event that the above named reve-

nues are at any time deemed insufficient to meet the annual ea~enditures
of the state, including the above named expenditures for educational purposes, there may be levied in the manner to be provided by lav, a a, for
aesof
state purposes on all the property in the state including the
property enumerated in this section, sufficient to meet the deficiency."
(Italics added.)

NATIONAL BANK TAXATION

499

If the words "all other" as used in Section 16 mean not merely the other
current forms of taxation but "any other" taxation so that emergency
taxes are also prohibited, banks, except as to emergency taxes on their
real property, will be given an exemption enjoyed by no other taxpayers
in the state. In other words, if a deficiency occurred in the state revenues, there would be no means of imposing an additional tax on either
the banks or their shares. Such taxes, however, may be levied upon
other corporations, for the tax provided for in subdivision 2 (a) of Section 16 is in lieu of the tax provided for in subdivision (d) of Section
14 of Article XIII, but unlike the tax on banks under subdivision 1(a)
of Section 16, is in lieu of no other tax.
Subdivision 2 (a) also provides:
"In any event, each such corporation shall pay an annual minimum tax
to the state, not subject to offset, of twenty-five dollars." 117

This minimum can apparently never be raised or lowered without constitutional amendment. But if the legislature in pursuance of Section
2 (b) provided for any other authorized method of taxation than a tax
on corporate franchises according to or measured by net income, such
method would apparently not be subject to the limited minimum tax
set forth in Section 2(a). However, to set a fixed minimum even with
regard to the tax contemplated by Section 2 (a) seems to be an unnecessary and inadvisable restraint upon the discretion of the legislature and
is not good constitutional practice.
The framers of the amendment seem unintentionally to have limited
the power of the state to levy income taxes. Subdivision 4 of Section 16
providing for the taxation of notes, debentures, shares of capital stock,
etc., provides that "Said tax shall be in lieu of all other property taxes
thereon

. ..

" If an income tax be considered a property tax and there

is persuasive authority to that effect,s1 8 the provision of Section 16 just
quoted would seem to have repealed by implication, at least so far as
income from intangibles is concerned, Section 11 of Article XIII of
the Constitution, which reads:
"Income taxes may be assessed to and collected from persons, corporations, joint stock associations, or companies resident or doing business in
this state, or any one or more of them, in such cases and amounts, and in
such manner, as shall be prescribed by law."
117It is interesting to observe that banks are not subject to a minimum tax.
A minimum tax of $25 upon a national bank having no net income would, it seems,

violate the provision of Section 5219 that such banks may be taxed according to
or measured by their net income. A minimum tax, when there is no net income,
'would obviously not be measured by net income.
118 Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. (1895) 158 U. S. 601, 15 Sup. Ct.
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(2)

The Bank and CorporationFranchise Tax Act.

On March 1, 1929, the Governor approved the statute passed by the
legislature to carry into execution the provisions of the new constitutional amendment, i.e. Section 16 of Article XIII of the State Constitution. Although the provisions of this amendment when analyzed in the
following discussion will be quoted in the text or in the margin, there
is not sufficient space available to print herewith the whole of the
statute nor to discuss all the administrative details that it involves.
The mechanics of the system set up by the statute are well explained
by Norman L. McLaren and Vincent K. Butler Jr. in their book,
"California Tax Laws of 1929." The present article will concern itself
principally with questions of the validity of the statute and with the
probable legal difficulties in the way of its being carried into effect.
Apart from the question of the inclusion of income from tax exempt
securities in the tax base, discussed above, there are several grounds on
which the statute may be thought to be invalid. (1) There is an apparent failure to comply with the provisions of the state constitutional
amendment because of (a) the provisions for offset from bank taxes;
(b) the provisions for the offset of real estate taxes from the franchise
tax on other corporations. (2) It is arguable whether too much discretion has been given the franchise tax commissioner. (3) The validity
of the method set forth for allocating net income for taxation in this
state where part of such income is derived from extra-state business
may be questioned. (4) The difficulty of understanding certain provisions for the administration of the tax may render the whole act
incapable of enforcement.
(a) Do the Offset Provisions Invalidate the Statute?
It may be contended that the statute does not comply with the
terms of the constitutional amendment by reason of the offset provisions found in Section 3 of the statute. Although the constitution
provides for the offset of personal property taxes for corporations other
than banks, it does not expressly provide for any offset whatever for
banks, and furthermore, as to the tax on banks, it expressly states that
"The amount of the tax shall be equivalent to 4% of their net income."
The statute in question was passed under this constitutional provision. Section 3 allows banks an offset of 10 per centum of the
taxes paid upon their real property with the proviso that the total
amount of the offset shall not exceed 75 per centum of the total tax
under this section. That this provision violates the constitutional section cited above is arguable upon several grounds.
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In the first place, if an offset is allowed banks,
not "4% of their net income" but something else,
net income less the deductions allowed, thus the
clearly not that contemplated by the wording of
the amendment. It must be noted, however, that
the constitutional amendment provides:
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the tax is obviously
namely 4% of their
form of taxation is
subdivision 1(a) of
subdivision 1(b) of

"The Legislature, two-thirds of all the members elected to each of the two
houses voting in favor thereof, in lieu of such tax, may provide by law for
any other form of taxation now or hereafter permitted by the congress of
the United States respecting national banking associations; provided, that
such form of taxation shall apply to all banks located within the limits of
this state,"

so that, although the statute might not conform with 1(a), it might still
be valid if the tax is one "permitted by the congress of the United
States respecting national banking associations."
The legislature was apparently acting to accomplish the tax permitted by the fourth alternative of Section 5219, namely, a tax upon
national banks, "according to or measured by their net income," therefore, the validity of the statute under 1(b) and Section 5219, depends
on whether or not the statute, with the offset provisions allowing deductions for real property taxes, provides for a tax "according to or measured by net income."
A contention that the statute does not provide a tax "according to
or measured by net income" may be based upon the argument that to
allow such offset is to levy a tax that is not strictly measured by net
income but by net income less something else; for, although net income
enters into the computation of the tax, the amount of the tax is, nevertheless, seriously affected by a deduction, whose amount is independent
of income. Although the court might perhaps meet this objection with
the simple proposition that the tax in question comes fairly within the
meaning of the phrase, "according to or measured by net income," it is
none the less true that net income measures not the tax but merely a
sum intermediate the calculations thereof.
The offset provision may possibly render the statute invalid in that
it results in such discrimination between banks as to be a denial of
equal protection of the laws prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution. An example will clearly bring out the
nature of the discrimination effected by the deduction provisions of the
statute. Let us assume two national banks, Bank A and Bank B, with
an equal net income of $100,000 a year so that upon this basis their
franchise tax as 4% of that income would be $4,000 each. Bank A has
real property upon which it pays $20,000 taxes. Bank B rents its
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premises and has no real property and
refore, pays no real property
taxes upon real estate owned by
, ational banks mayb
x
property taxes to the amount of 10o thereof up to 75o of 47 of itsnet income, so that Bank A has a deduction of $2,000 while Bank B
has none. As a result, Bank A pays a $2,000 tax, while Bank B pays
$4,000. According to their net income, these banks should be taxed
equally, yet Bank B is required to pay a tax twice as meat as that
exacted from Bank A. It is no answer to say that Bank rhas paid no
real estate taxes and that this factor should affect the comparison.
Section 5219 contemplates that, in addition to the usual ad valorem
taxes upon real estate owned by them national banks may be taxed
"according to or measured by" their net income. To inject the element
of real estate taxes paid as a direct offset from a tax calculated at a
percentage of net income seems not only an unwarranted variation
from the method prescribed but a denial of equal protection of the laws
as well.
Discrimination within the meaning of the equal protection of the
laws clause is defined as "the act of treating differently two persons or
things, under like circumstances." 119 When different treatment is accorded two persons and one invokes the equal protection clause, the
question to be decided is whether there is any dissimilarity between
their situations of a kind and degree which will justify the unlike treatment complained of. 1 2 0 In the case supposed the unlike treatment consists of unequal franchise-taxes-measured-by-net-income imposed upon
two banks whose net incomes are identical. The dissimilarity of situation, which creates and must justify the inequality of taxation, is the
circumstance that one of the banks owns real property and the other
does not. It is submitted that there is no relation whatsoever between
the unlike treatment here involved and the dissimilarity of situation
upon which it rests. Ownership of real estate is surely no ground for
exemption from occupation taxes imposed upon others.
Another problem is raised by the offset provisions. The constitutional provision for a tax offset for financial, mercantile, manufacturing
and business corporations, specifically mentions personal property taxes
and does not mention real property taxes, vis:
"Such tax shall be subject to offset, in a manner to be prescribed by law
in the amount of personal property taxes paid by such corporations to the
state or political subdivisions thereof, but the offset shall not exceed ninety
per cent of such state tax." (Italics added.)
119 Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in National Life Insurance Co. v. United

States (1928) 277 U. S. 508, 530, 48 Sup. Ct. 591, 597.
12o See the discussion of the problem of equal protection of the laws as regards
taxation, supra p. 486-489.
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And subdivision 3 of the constitutional provision reads:
"The Legislature, two-thirds of all the members elected to each of the
two houses voting in favor thereof, may change by law the rates of tax,
or the percentage, amount or nature of offset provided for in paragraphs
1 and 2 hereof." (Italics added.)

The question immediately arises whether the word "nature" as used in
the preceding constitutional provision will be so construed by the courts
as to justify the offset of real property taxes paid upon the corporations'
property, as provided in Section 4 of the statute:
"Each such corporation [financial, mercantile, manufacturing, business]
shall be entitled to an offset against said franchise tax, in the manner hereinafter provided [Section 26], in the amount of taxes paid upon its real
and personal property to any county, city and county, town, city, or other
political subdivision of the state, but the total offset shall not exceed
seventy-five per centum of the said franchise tax, and in no case shall the
taxpayer be entitled to offset more than ten per centum of its said real
121
property taxes."

It should be noted that besides the provision for offset of a percentage of real property taxes the statute differs from the amendment
121 In prorating offsets, the Franchise Tax Commissioner has disregarded the
method set forth in the act for the computation of the 1929 tax of corporations
with a fiscal year ending in 1928 with the result that many corporations will pay a
higher tax under his method than they are required by the act to pay. The act
provides that fiscal year corporations with a fiscal year ending in 1928 shall pay
a tax for the months of the year 1929 corresponding to the months of 1928 which
fall within the fiscal year ended during 1928 "according to or measured by such
proportionate part of the net income of that fiscal year as the number of months
falling within the calendar year 1928 bears to the total number of months in the
fiscal year ended during that calendar year." Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 13, § 13. Thus, in
accord with this section the tax for the 1929 months is figured at 4% of their
prorated 1928 income. In commoh with all other corporations subject to the act,
such a corporation is entitled to an offset against this tax of 10% of its real
property tax up to a total amount of 75% of its computed franchise tax. It is to
be noted that Section 26 which provides the manner in which the offset is to be
computed does not state that corporations taxed upon the basis of prorated incomes are to be treated differently. Section 26 reads in part as follows: "A corporation subject to the tax herein provided for, shall receive an offset against said
tax, subject to the limitations provided in section 4 hereof, for real and personal
property taxes paid upon its property to any county, city and county, city, town or
other political subdivision of the state during the taxable year." (Italics added.)
Since the act does not provide for the proration of the offset a corporation even
though it pays a tax for only one month of 1929 is entitled to offset its entire
deductible real and personal property taxes up to the 75% limit. The Tax Commissioner does not follow the terms of Section 26, for in addition to prorating the income of the corporations under discussion he also provides for the proration of the
offset. This action of the commissioner seems contrary to the terms of the act.
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in eliminating an offset for personal property taxes paid to the state, 122
and allows an offset for taxes paid "upon" the corporatiors' property
rather than taxes paid "by" the corporations as provided in the constitutional provision.
It might plausibly be argued that eliminating the offset for personal
property taxes paid to the state and allowing an offset for taxes paid
"upon" the corporation's property changed the "nature" of the offset
within the authority of subdivision 3 of the amendment but, in providing for an offset of real property taxes, something additional is added
which can hardly be considered the "offset provided for". The offset,
the "nature" of which may be changed, is the offset provided for in
paragraph 2. Real property tax offsets are not mentioned in that paragraph. Is it merely "changing the nature of the offset provided for" to
add an entirely new offset? If "nature" is broad enough to cover the
deduction of real property taxes paid in this state, it should be broad
enough to cover the deduction of taxes paid in any other state, or, in
fact, to cover any kind of deduction the legislature may see fit to grant.
It may be then that the provision for offset of 10o of the real property
taxes is in contravention to Section 16. If this be true, the question
arises whether the whole statute is void. This raises the general problem of the effect of partial invalidity discussed above.
The offset provisions of the constitutional amendment and the recently enacted state statute raise another interesting question suggested
by the reasoning of the court in National Life Insurance Company v.
United States.123 The case involved a federal income tax on life insurance companies. In determining the "net income," i. e. the tax base,
certain deductions were allowed including the following: (1) The
amount of income from tax exempt securities; (2) a sum equal to 4
per cent of the company's legal reserve less the amount of the first
deduction. The effect of these provisions may best be explained by an
example. Assume two insurance companies, each with a reserve of
$100,000, the first receiving no income from exempt securities and the
122 The corporate franchise tax assessed under Section 14(d) of Article XIII
would seem clearly to be a personal property tax paid to the state in view of the
definition of "property" contained in Section 1 of Article XIII, namely: " . . . The
word 'property' as used in this article and section, is hereby declared to include
moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, dues, franchises, and all other matters and things,
real, personal, and mixed capable of private ownership . . ." To have permitted
the franchise tax for 1929 to be offset by the 1928 franchise tax would have re.
duced the 1929 tax in most instances to a relatively insignificant amount and in
many instances to nothing at all. If any substantial revenue was to be expected
from the new franchise tax, it was absolutely necessary to eliminate the provision
for offset of personal property taxes paid to the state.
123 (1928) 277 U. S. 508, 48 Sup. Ct. 591.
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second receiving $4,000 therefrom. The first company would be allowed
a deduction of 4 per cent on its reserve, i. e. $4,000. The second company would be allowed as deductions; (1) income from tax exempt
securities, i. e. $4,000; (2) a sum equal to 4 per cent of its reserve less
the first deduction, i. e. $4,000, - $4,000, or nothing: total deduction
$4,000. The effect of the statute, obviously, was that insurance companies deriving income from exempt securities amounting to not more
than 4 per cent of their reserves, nevertheless, paid an income tax in an
amount precisely the same as if they held no exempt securities. The
court held the statute invalid, so far as it required the deduction of
the tax exempt income from the sum of 4 per cent of the reserves. The
court was of the opinion that to deny the full 4 per cent deduction to
exempt security holders, allowed to those not holding such securities,
was, in effect, unconstitutionally to tax such securities. In the words of
the court, "One may not be subjected to greater burdens upon his taxable property solely because he owns some that is free."
It is at least arguable that the California statute violates the principle just discussed. The National Life Insurance case held invalid the
statute there involved because tax exempt security holders, under the
tax thereby imposed, were "accorded no advantage by reason of their
ownership of tax-exempt securities." In other words, a denial of a
deduction to tax exempt security holders (because of their securities)
granted non-security holders, was in effect to tax the exempt securities.
Under the recently enacted bank and corporation tax law, national and
state banks and other corporations are subject to a franchise tax measured by their total net income. National banks are exempt from personal property taxes by virtue of the fact that, by not allowing such
taxation, Congress has impliedly prohibited it. Other corporations are
subject to personal property taxes. The newly enacted law allows an
offset from the franchise tax of all personal property taxes and 10 per
cent of real property taxes paid, up to 75 per cent of 4 per cent of the
net income of such corporations. To allow a deduction of personal
property taxes from the franchise tax to said corporations, whereas
national banks are required to pay the full franchise tax (less, of course,
10o of their real property taxes), is in effect to "accord them no advantage by reason of their" exemption from personal property taxes
and is in effect to require them to pay personal property taxes to the
state. Of course the state could exempt all personal property from
taxation and thus accord national banks no advantage by reason of
their exemption from personal property taxes and the banks would have
no complaint. But, it may be argued, when franchise taxes, or their
equivalent, are imposed upon national banks, state banks and other
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corporations, and a percentage of the amount of personal property
taxes paid by the other corporations is allowed as an offset from the
franchise tax, the national bank is deprived of its exemption from per-.
sonal property taxes. To deny holders of tax exempt bonds an exemption to the extent of their bonds was held in the National Life Insurance
case to be in effect a tax on the bonds. And in the instant case, to levy
a franchise tax on banks and a franchise tax on other corporations and
to allow the other corporations to deduct the amount of their personal
property taxes (from which the banks are exempt) is to deprive the
exemption, which the banks enjoy, of any effect whatsoever and in
effect, as in the National Life Insurance case, to levy a tax which the
law prohibits. If the foregoing parallel be sound, the California tax on
national banks is invalid because it violates the prohibition implied in
Section 5219 against taxing the personal property of national banks.
An argument that the parallel is not sound may be stated as follows:
The purpose and effect of the California statute is not to discriminate
against national banks in favor of other corporations but simply to permit the local subdivisions of the state to collect part of the taxes exacted
of other corporations, the total tax burden imposed then being precisely
the same as that imposed on the banks. The division of the tax of these,
other corporations into a franchise tax less than that imposed upon the
banks and a personal property tax equal to the difference is simply a
convenient administrative device for distributing tax receipts between
the state and its subdivisions. The trouble with this argument, it might
be contended, is that there are involved two limitations on the state's
power to tax national banks and that the argument satisfies only one
of them: (1) The states cannot impose a discriminatory tax burden on
national banks; (2) the personal property of national banks is exempt
from taxation. Only the first of these limitations is met by the argument just stated and the existence of the second seems to bring the
statute clearly within the rule of the National Life Insurance case.
It is submitted, however (although a decisfon along the lines of the
foregoing argument seems perfectly possible), that the rule of the
National Life Insurance case is not violated by the California statute
for the following reasons. The National Life Insurance case involved
what was held to be an encroachment upon the exemption from taxation of the income from tax exempt securities, and this exemption is a
real exemption: these securities are intended to be actually favored
over other property in the matter of taxation. But the "exemption of
the personal property of national banks" from taxation is a different
matter. In enacting Section 5219, Congress did not intend that the
personal property of national banks should actually be exempt from all
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taxation; it intended simply that the form of state taxes on national
banks should be that prescribed in the statute. In order to insure
against discriminatory tax burdens on national banks, Congress prescribed certain alternative methods of taxing them which should be in
lieu of all other taxes. The exemption involved in the National Life
Insurance case is an exemption from taxation either in form or in effect
of the property exempted. The "exemption from taxation of personal
property of national banks" on the other hand, was not intended to be
an actual exemption from taxation but merely a substitution for any
form of taxation except the forms expressly consented to. In this view
the California statute is unexceptionable. So far as the present objection is concerned, the tax complies with the form prescribed and its
substantial operation in no way violates the purposes of Congress. It
may be said then that, although the rule of the National Life Insurance
case may be rather plausibly invoked in this situation, to so invoke it
would be a clear misreading of the intention of Congress and of the
California legislature.
(b) Has the Legislature Made an UnconstitutionalDelegation of
Power1 24 to the Franchise Tax Commissioner?

One of the outstanding features of the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax is the creation of the new office of Franchise Tax Commissioner. Section 22 of the statute provides that the commissioner "shall
have power and it shall be his duty to administer this act, and to prescribe all such rules and regulations as are necessary and reasonable to
carry out its provisions." It is difficult to see why the administration
of this tax should not have been left in the hands of the State Board of
Equalization along with the administration of other state taxes. As
stated in a comment by Mr. Keaton printed in the Assembly Daily Journal for February 20, 1929, pp. 8, 9, relative to Assembly Bill No. 1047
(introduced by Mr. Keaton as a substitute for the bill which was finally
adopted):
124 It is to be noted that in the provisions for deductions in computing net
income (Section 8(f) ) it is provided that depreciation shall be determined on the
basis provided for in Sections 113 and 114 of the 1928 Federal Revenue Act. Certain of the standards set forth in the Federal Act require determination by a federal
commissioner. Since the state act adopts in prospect regulations to be determined
by the federal legislature and by a federal officer it may be claimed that this provision amounts to an invalid delegation of the state's legislative authority. See
State v. Vino Medical Co. Inc. (1922) 121 Me. 438, 442, 117 Atl. 588; In re Opinion
of Justices (1921) 239 Mass. 606, 133 N. E. 452, where similar provisions were held
to be an invalid delegation of legislative power. Compare, however, Commonwealth
v. Sweeney (1915) 61 Pa. Sup. Ct. 367; Commonwealth v. Alderman (1923) 275
Pa. 483, 119 Atl. 551. See Note (1929) 17 CA.FoRNIA L. REV. 555.
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"If the State Board of Equalization is to be entrusted with the administration of other taxes aggregating in excess of $85,000,000 annually, it is
preposterous to suggest that its organization is incapable of administering
these taxes, which will in all likelihood not exceed $7,000,000 or $8,000,000.
The Board of Equalization has the staff available to handle the routine
work, all files and other necessary equipment, so that with the addition of
possibly one or two experts in the matter of income tax, preferably men
selected from the ranks of federal government agents, there is no reason to
apprehend that the matter could not be handled by them with entire satisfaction at an additional cost to the state probably not in excess of $15,000
annually."

See also the following, taken from an address by Professor Plehn before a conference of the California Manufacturers Association:
"For the administration of this statute a new commissioner is to be
appointed. That appears to be a political issue upon which perhaps I need
make no comment. It might be in order, however, to say in this connection a good word for the present State Board of Equalization. If so one
might point out that they and their staff have had years of experience
in the administration of tax laws. The present Chairman has been on the
Board over twenty years. As a result they probably know more about
taxes in California than anybody else living. They know all the assessors
and enjoy their confidence. They know property and property values in
every nook and cranny of the state. They know all about the different
lines of business in the state and know through many hearings, and
through the assessment of the franchise tax a great deal about the corporations. They are experts in the best sense of that term in the intricacies
of tax administration, and especially in what the tax authorities may,
may not and must do to protect the legality of the taxes and the rights
of the taxpayers. No new man or group of men could acquire like experience very quickly, and it seems a pity to discard all this acquired skill."

The contention may be made that the legislature in the Bank and
Corporation Franchise Tax Act has given such discretion to the Franchise Tax Commissioner as to violate the provisions of the constitution.
An analysis of the statute and the relevant decisions sufficiently full to
cover this difficult problem adequately would require a lengthy article
in itself. It is proposed here simply to outline the problems and express
an opinion.
The Act in Section 8, subdivisions (d), (e), (g), and (1), and in
Sections 12, 16, and 17,125 allows the Commissioner considerable power
in the final determination of "net income" and in Sections 10 and
125

For other provisions of the statute in which power has been delegated to

the commissioner, see Sections 13, 14, 15, 24, 25, 27, 28 and 34. There is not suf-

ficient space to quote herewith these provisions of the statute.
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222e the Commissioner is given power to allocate income in the tax
base. It might be claimed that these grants of authority violate the
terms of subdivision 5 of Section 16, which provides in part as follows:
"The Legislature shall define 'corporations' and 'doing business';
shall define 'net income' and may define it to be the entire income from all
sources; shall provide for the allocation of income

. . . "

(Italics added.)

and Article III which provides:
"The powers of the government of the state of California shall be
divided into three separate departments - the legislative, executive, and
judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except as in this Constitution expressly directed
or permitted."

Although the question is by no means free from doubt, it is submitted
that the authority granted the Franchise Tax Commissioner is not in
violation of the Constitution. In the first place, the power of allocation
given the Commissioner seems to be permissible under the wording of
the constitutional provision: for, while it states that the legislature
"shall define 'corporations', shall define 'net income' " as to allocation,
it reads, "the legislature . . . shall provide for the allocation of income."
It would, therefore, seem that if the intent had been that the legislature
should make the specific allocation the section would have read, "shall
126 Section 10 of the statute provides as follows: "If the entire business of the
bank or corporation is done within this state, the tax shall be according to or
measured by its entire net income; and if the entire business of such bank or corporation is not done within this state, the tax shall be according to or measured
by that -portion thereof which is derived from business done within this state.
The portion of net income derived from business done within this state shall be
determined by an allocation upon the basis of sales, purchases, expenses of manufacture, payroll, value and situs of tangible property, or by reference to these or
other factors, or by such other method of allocation as is fairly calculated to
assign to the state the portion of net income reasonably attributable to the business
done within this state and to avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double taxation.
"If the commissioner reallocates net income upon his examination of any return, he shall, upon the written request of the taxpayer, disclose to him the basis
upon which his reallocation has been made."
Section 22 of the statute provides: "The franchise tax commissioner, herein
referred to, shall be appointed by the director of the department of finance, the
controller of the state and the chairman of the state board of equalization, who are
authorized to provide him with such assistants as they may deem necessary, and
he shall serve for such period, and for such compensation, and under such conditions as they may prescribe.
"He shall have power, and it shall be his duty to administer this act, and to
prescribe all such rules and regulations as are necessary and reasonable to carry out
its provisions; and said commissioner and the state board of equalization, for the
purpose of administering their duties under this act, each shall have the powers
conferred upon said board by section 3669e of the Political Code of this state."
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allocate" instead of "shall provide for the allocation of." Therefore,
it is submitted that in delegating to the Commissioner the power of
determining upon the allocation under certain rules, the legislature was
"providing" for the allocation of income within the meaning of the
constitutional provision. However, if the words "shall allocate" had
been used the problem would have been somewhat like that raised by
the words, "the legislature . . . shall define 'net income'." The problem

is not identical in the two situations for the legislature has defined "net
income," defining it to be "the gross income less the deductions allowed." In the determination of some of the deductions, however, great
discretion is given the Commissioner comparable to the discretion given
in the allocation of income. Although the legislature may not delegate
strictly legislative functions, yet, in the application of legislative measures a certain amount of administrative discretion must of necessity be
granted to the executive agencies. The powers granted the Commissioner in the determination of the deductions allowable from gross
income in arriving at net income, and the powers granted in the allocation of that income, are, it is submitted, no more than are required to
carry into effect the objects of the constitutional provision, and are of
such a nature as to be properly delegated under the authority of well
established decisions.127
127 See McCabe v. Carpenter (1894) 102 Cal. 469, 473, 36 Pac. 836, 838, in
which the court held invalid an act which left the amount of a tax to be raised
for the establishment of high schools wholly to the discretion of county superintendents of schools. The language of the court, however, is quite relevant to the
problems discussed in the text: "The question as to whether, in a given case, there
'has been a delegation of the legislative power, is sometimes a very difficult question
to determine. Executive officers are often required to exercise a large discretion
in tie performance of purely administrative acts. The legislature cannot always
anticipate contingencies which may arise. So it has been sometimes said, as in
People v. Reynolds, 5 Gilm. 12 (quoted with approval in Savings and Loan Society
v. Austin, 46 Cal. 415), that there was a restricted sense in which legislative discretion may be delegated.
" 'We see, then, that while the legislature may nbt divest itself of its proper
functions, or delegate its general legislative authority, it may still authorize others
to do those things which it might properly, yet cannot advantageously, do itself,
... The object to be accomplished, or the thing permitted, may be specified, and
the rest left to the agency of others, with better opportunities of accomplishing the
object, or doing the thing understandingly.'
"This difficulty in drawing a precise line between legislative and administrative
functions is noticed by Judge Cooley in his work on Taxation, page 62. He says:
" 'We conceive that the legislature must, in every instance, prescribe the rule
under which taxation may be laid; it must originate the authority under which
the tax-gatherer demands the contribution; but it need not prescribe all the details of action, or even fix with precision the sum to be raised, or all the particulars of its expenditure. If the rule is prescribed which, in its administration, works
out the result, that is sufficient but to refer the rule to another would be in
excess of legislative power.' " See also Esberg v. Badaracco (1927) 202 Cal. 110,
121, 259 Pac. 730; Nevada Nat. Bank of San Francisco v. Board of Supervisors
of Kern County (1907) 5 Cal. App. 638, 649, 91 Pac. 122; Barnes v. Board of
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A situation very similar to the instant one was presented in the case
of Utah Construction Company v. Richardson.1 28 In that case the conSupervisors of Colusa County (1910) 13 Cal. App. 760, 766, 110 Pac. 820; McDonald v. Richards (1926) 79 Cal. App. 1, 248 Pac. 1049; People v. Roth (1911) 249
Ill. 532, 94 N. E. 953, Ann. Cas. 1912A 100; People v. Goldfogle (1924) 123 Misc.
399, 205 N. Y. Supp. 870, aff'd. (1925) 213 App. Div. 706, 211 N. Y. Supp. 110,
af'd. 242 N. Y. 277, 151 N. E. 452; Santee Mills v. Query (1922) 122 S. C. 158,
115 S. E. 202.
128 (1921) 187 Cal. 649, 650, 203 Pac. 401. In holding that the powers granted
to the Board of Equalization were valid under the constitution, the court said:
"In a statute expressly enacted for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Section 14, Article XIII, of the state constitution, the legislature has,
among other things, provided for the furnishing to the state board of equalization
of information deemed important in ascertaining the value of franchises, that the
board shall determine the value of the franchises from the information thus supplied and that the apportionment of taxes shall be based upon the value obtained.
. . . Consequently, in so far as the prescribing of the 'manner' in which assessments
are to be made imports the regulation of details of administration, the legislature
has left little to be desired in its compliance with the constitutional mandate that
such administrative machinery for making assessments be provided by law. Therefore, appellant necessarily takes the position that the expression quoted from the
constitution refers not only to the general procedure for assessing franchises, but
that the term 'manner' also signifies the rule to be followed by the board in determining the value of the franchises, or, in other words, that the constitution places
upon the legislature the duty of specifying the weight to be accorded the various
facts required to be reported and the mathematical process to be adopted by the
board in arriving at a valuation of a franchise from the information before it."
"The legislature has provided for the filing by the owner or holder of every
taxable franchise of a written report containing detailed information concerning
capital stock, bonds, debts, property, and other matters which the legislature evidently regarded as essential to a proper assessment of the value of franchises.
. . . No attempt was made to direct the board of equalization as to how it should
employ such information in arriving at the value of the total assets and tangible
property of the corporations; the selection of the method calculated to lead to the
most accurate valuation was left to the discretion of the said board. As a general
rule, it is not essential that the legislature prescribe the method of valuation to be
employed, but it may delegate to its taxing officers the power to adopt a suitable
method and, in the latter case, the assessors must value the property according to
their best judgment and with honest purpose. (Western Union Tel. Co. v. Missouri, 190 U. S. 412, 425 [47 L. Ed. 1116, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730, 733, see, also,
Rose's U. S. Notes]; Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. Bliss (R. I.), 110 Atl. 867, 871;
1 Cooley on Taxation, 3d ed., p. 754.) The general requirement in the state constitution that the legislature fix the 'manner' in which the assessment is to be
made does not limit the power of the legislature to invest the taxing board with
the right to choose a rule of valuation."
The court at this point cited cases from other jurisdictions, about which it
said in part: "Bearing in mind that these holdings were under state constitutions
which required that the legislature 'shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure
a just valuation' or that the 'value' is 'to be ascertained as provided by law,' there
can be no doubt that under the less specific provision of our own constitution to
the effect that the assessment shall be made 'in the manner to be provided by law,'
it was permissible for the legislature to commit to the board of equalization the
duty of selecting the mode of ascertaining the cash value of the different elements
dealt with in determining corporate excess instead of requiring the board to compute assessments according to a value-finding rule prescribed by the legislature."

?.' ~
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stitution (Article XIII, Section 14(d) ) in authorizing the old corporation franchise tax, declared that the assessment of franchises should be
made "in a manner provided by law." Although the legislature in establishing the tax provided that the actual valuation of franchises for
assessment purposes should be determined by the State Board of
Equalization the court held that this delegation of power to the board
was "in the manner provided by law" as required by the constitution.
If the power delegated to the State Board of Equalization in that case is
upheld as valid it is difficult to see how the delegation of power to the
Franchise Tax Commissioner in the Bank and Corporation Franchise
Tax Act can be invalid.
(c) Allocation of Net Income for Taxation in California When a
Corporation's Business Extends Beyond the Limits of the State.
If a corporation's business extends beyond the limits of this state
a difficult problem arises in determining the amount of its net income
that can fairly be said to be taxable in this state. At one time it could
be declared with some assurance that if the tax in question was an
excise tax, no difficult legal problem regarding allocation'was involved
in view of the well-established rule that an excise tax could be measured
by elements themselves not taxable. 129 But under the existing law,
whether a direct net income tax or an excise tax is levied, the state cannot, without running the risk of having its tax rendered invalid, include
within the tax base elements of value not taxable per se.130 Where the
business is spread out,.over different states the problem arises whether
the state is taxing values beyond its jurisdiction. The unit rule of
assessment'13 ' is designed to allocate to the state for taxation its fair
share of the taxable values of the taxpayer. In other words, the business is treated as a "unit" when that portion of the corporation's business done within the state cannot be physically segregated from that
done outside the state. The courts are aware of the inherent difficulties
in the way of segregating income for purposes of taxation in this kind
of situation, and the general rule seems to be that, unless the state's
129 Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York (1892) 143 U. S. 305, 12 Sup. Ct.
403. For other cases and a discussion of the measurement of excise taxes, see the
preceding installment of this article, 17 CAHiFoRNiA L. REv. 232.
130 See Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts (1929) U. S. -,
49 Sup. Ct. 432,
supra p. 456,i Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas (1910) 216 U. S. 1, 30 Sup.
Ct. 190, and subsequent cases discussed in 17 CALIFORNiA L. REV. 232 et seq.
131 For cases sustaining the use of the unit rule in property taxation, see State
Railroad Tax Cases (1875) 92 U. S. 575; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania (1891) 141 U. S. 18, 11 Sup. Ct. 876; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State
Auditor (1897) 165 U. S. 194, 166 U. S. 185, 17 Sup. Ct. 305, 604.
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method of apportionment can be shown by the0 taxpayer clearly and
substantially to reach non-taxable values, it will be upheld. 1 32
A typical situation in which the unit rule seems clearly applicable
arises when the corporation has a factory located in one state and
maintains selling agencies in other states. How much of the income
of the company is due to manufacturing? How much to the company's
sales? The entire business of such a corporation is so clearly unitary as
to require a fair system of apportionment in order to prevent overtaxation to the corporation or undertaxation by the state.' 3 3
A different situation, however, is presented where the business is
not unitary in character (as may be true in the case of certain personal
service corporations), but is of such a nature that the corporation can
present accounts which clearly show the income derived from business
done within the state as distinguished from the income derived from
extra-state business. The unit rule seems hardly applicable to such a
corporation and it is submitted that the income from business done
without the state should not enter into the calculations by which the
tax is assessed.1 3 4
Another situation arises where the business is unitary but the corporation receives income from sources or activities that have no connection with the business done within the state. If the corporation is a
domestic corporation this income is probably taxable.' 35 If the corporation is a foreign corporation there can hardly be said to be just grounds
for including such income in the tax base.' 6
132 Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain (1920) 254 U. S. 113, 41 Sup.
Ct. 45; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Doughton (1923) 262 U. S. 413, 416, 43
Sup. Ct. 620, 621; Bass Ratcliff & Gretton v. State Tax Commission (1924) 266
U. S. 271, 45 Sup. Ct. 82.
133 Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain (1920) 254 U. S. 113, 41 Sup.

Ct.45.
134 Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Thoresen (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) 29 F. (2d)
708; Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Wisconsin Tax Commission (1929) - Wis.
223 N. W. 85.
135 Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Stiles (1916) 242 U. S. 111, 37 Sup. Ct. 58.

136 See People ex rel Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp (1920) 230 N. Y.
48, 129 N. E. 202. See also Air-way Electric Appliance Co. v. Day (1924) 266 U. S.
71, 45 Sup. Ct. 12. See the following cases involving allocation in property taxation: Wallace v. Hines (1920) 253 U. S. 66, 40 Sup. Ct. 435; Meyer v. Wells
Fargo & Co. (1912) 223 U. S. 298, 300, 32 Sup. Ct. 218, 219; Fargo v. Hart (1904)
193 U. S. 490, 24 Sup. Ct. 498.
The problem raised in the text is of particular importance in regard to the
inclusion in the tax base of dividends received on stocks. Section 8(h) of the
statute provides that in arriving at "net income" there shall be deducted from the
"gross income," "Dividends received during the taxable year from income arising
out of business done in this state; but if the income out of which the dividends
are declared is derived from business done within and without this state, then

514

47 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

If the corporation is engaged in interstate commerce several problems arise particularly with regard to foreign corporations. Several
rules on the subject may be stated somewhat dogmatically as follows:
Foreign corporations: (1) If the corporation is a foreign corporation
and its business is exclusively interstate in character, an excise. on its
right to do business is invalid'8 7 and obviously no question of allocation
can arise. (2) If a direct net income tax rather than a franchise tax
measured by net income is levied, the income derived from business
done within the state seems clearly taxable, even though the corporaso much of the dividends shall be allowed as a deduction as the amount of the income from business done within this state bears to the total business done.
"The burden shall be on the taxpayer to show that the amount of dividends
claimed as a deduction has been received from income arising out of business done
in this state." The statute provides, therefore, that dividends that represent nonCalifornia business shall be included in the tax base. It is submitted that in the
case of foreign corporations doing business in this state these dividends are beyond
the taxing jurisdiction of the state, and should be excluded entirely from the tax
base on which the allocation calculations are made. The Franchise Tax Commissioner in Schedule C of the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Return has
excluded them from the tax base which is to be allocated, but in adding them back
to the amount allocated to the state has subjected them to greater taxation even
than would have been the case had allocation of them been made. Surely if
apportionment of a part of such dividends to this state for taxation is improper
the inclusion of the whole of them is unwarranted. It is submitted that this procedure by the Commissioner is of doubtful constitutionality and is contrary to the
provisions of Sections 8(h) and 10 of the statute. Section 13 of the act provides
that every corporation shall transmit to the "Commissioner a return in a form
prescribed by him, specifying . . . all such facts as he may by rule, or otherwise,
require in order to carry out the provisions of this Act.' It would seem to follow
from the language italicised that the Commissioner could not require in the return
information which was not necessary "in order to carry out the provisions of the
act." In view of the direction in Section 10, that in case the corporation's business
is not entirely done in California, the "tax shall be according to or measured by
that portion thereof which is derived from business done within this state," it is
difficult to see why a return of income derived from dividends representing nonCalifornia business, or income from extra-state business having no relation to that
done in California would be necessary "in order to carry out the provisions of this
Act." On the contrary, it would seem that such income is impliedly excluded by the
language of Section 10. Another objection to the inclusion of dividends representing non-California business is the double taxation resulting therefrom because of
the fact that the shares of stock on which the dividends are paid will be subject to
personal property taxes by the city and county in which the corporation holding
them is located. See comment by Mr. Keaton relative to Assembly Bill No. 1047,
Cal. Assembly Daily Journal, Feb. 20, 1929, p. 8, 9.
137 Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts (1925) 268 U. S. 203, 45 Sup.
Ct. 477 (franchise tax measured by gross receipts). See also Texas Transport &
Terminal Co. v. New Orleans (1924) 264 U. S. 150, 44 Sup. Ct. 242; Ozark Pipe
Line Corp. v. Monier (1925) 266 U. S. 555, 45 Sup. Ct. 184 (franchise tax measured by par value, capital stock and surplus).
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tion's business is exclusively interstate in character.188 (3) If the corporation combines some intra-state business with its interstate business,
an excise tax measured by net income properly attributable to business
done within the state whether intra or inter-state in character, seems
clearly valid. 139
Domestic corporations: (4) If the corporation is a domestic corporation, even though engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, income properly attributable to business done within the state may be
included in the tax calculations, 140 and probably, although the question
is by no means free from doubt, its entire net income (less that derived
from exempt securities) may be so included.14 1
Section 10 of the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act in providing for the allocation of net income, states:
"

.

and if the entire business of such bank or corporation is not done

within this state, the tax shall be according to or measured by that portion thereof which is derived from business done within this state. The
portion of net income derived from business done within this state shall
be determined by an allocation upon the basis of sales, purchases, expenses
of manufacture, payroll, value and situs of tangible property, or by reference to these or other factors, or by such other method of allocation as is
fairly calculated to assign to the-state the portion of net income reasonably
attributable to the business done within this state and to avoid subjecting
the taxpayer to double taxation."

The most important part of this provision seems to be the direction
that the method of allocation adopted by the Commissioner "be fairly
calculated to assign to the state the portion of net income reasonably
attributable to the business done within this state and to avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double taxation." The formula adopted by the Commissioner is set forth in Schedule C of the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Return, and is explained in his instructions relating to allocation as follows:
"ALLOCATION OF INCOME AND

DIVIDENDS:

The allocation formula in

Schedule 'C' fixes the percentage of business done in California by giving
equal weight to the amount and location of three factors: (1) property,
(2) payroll, and (3) gross sales. The percentage so fixed is applied to net
18 United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek (1918) 247 U. S. 321, 38 Sup. Ct.
499; Shaffer v. Carter (1920) 252 U. S. 37, 40 Sup. Ct. 221 (taxpayer in this case
was a non-resident individual); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Doughton (1923)
262 U. S. 413, 416, 43 Sup. Ct. 620, 621.
139 Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain (1920) 254 U. S. 113, 41 Sup.
Ct. 45; Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson (1922) 258 U. S. 290, 42 Sup. Ct.
305*; Bass Ratcliff & Gretton v. State Tax Commission (1924) 266 U. S. 271, 45
Sup. Ct. 82, and cases cited supra n. l. I 3'
140
United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek (1918) 247 U. S. 321, 38 Sup. Ct. 499.
141
Kans City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Stiles (1916) 242 U. S. 111, 37 Sup. Ct. 85.
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income, other than dividends (Items 10 and 26) from income arising out
of business done without the state, the full amount of which is required
to be included in net income (Schedule 'C' Item (i) ). If, in the opinion
of the taxpayer, the prescribed formula or the inclusion of all taxable
dividends is not fairly calculated to assign to the state the portion of its
net income reasonably attributable to the business done within this state,
the taxpayer may use such other method of allocation of income or treatment of dividends as is fairly calculated to determine such portion of net
income. If the taxpayer departs from the prescribed method of computation, it shall set out in a schedule attached to the return the reason for
the departure and full details of its recomputation. In any event, the information called for in Schedule 'C' must be submitted by all taxpayers.
The taxpayer's allocation, whether or not the prescribed method be used, is
subject to review and re-allocation by the Commissioner."

It seems safe to say, with the exceptions noted in the margin, 4 2 that
the formula is at least as fair and equitable as others which have been
examined and approved by the United States Supreme Court.' 43 In the
situations where the general formula set forth in Schedule C is not
found applicable, it is submitted that if the Commissioner carefully
follows the directions of the statute (that the method of allocation
"be fairly calculated to assign to the state the portion of net income
reasonably attributable to the business-done within this state, and to
avoid subjecting te taxpayer to double taxation") in accordance with
the rules discussed in the preceding paragraphs, corporations will have
no grounds for complaint because of improper allocation.
(d) Ambiguity of Certain Provisions of the Act.
Under the act, corporations subject to its provisions are taxed upon
the basis of the "taxable year" - and this may be a "calendar year" or
a "fiscal year" if the corporation closes its twelve-months accounting
period upon a date other than December 31, or it may be a fraction of
either if the return is made for a fractional period.'" Although the
corporation may choose either the fiscal or calendar basis for its taxable
year, if no selection is made, it is taxed upon the calendar year basis.'"
A corporation coming under the statute is taxed according to, or
measured by, its net income "computed" upon the basis of its net
14 2 Supran. 136.
143 See cases cited supra n. 131.
144 "Sec. 11 (a). The term 'taxable year', as herein used, means the calendar
year, or the fiscal year ending during such calendar year, upon the basis of which
the net income is computed herein. 'Taxable year' includes, in the case of a return
made for a fractional part of a year, the period for which such return is made.
"(b) The term 'fiscal year', as herein used, means an accounting period of
twelve months ending on the last day of any month other than December." Cal.
Stat. 1929, c. 13.
145 Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 13, § 12.
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income for the next preceding fiscal or calendar year.x4o This tax accrues "on the first day after the close of the taxable year." Within two
months and fifteen days after the close of its taxable year, the corporation must make a return to the Commissioner. Half of the tax disclosed by the return is "due and payable on or before the fifteenth day
of the third month following the close of the taxable year," the balance
is "due and' payable on or before the fifteenth day of the ninth month
following the close of the taxable year." 147
It is now proposed to discuss certain ambiguities in the statute with
regard to several situations of importance that may arise in the course
of its operation.' 4 s
(1) Is the Act retroactive? The Act went into effect March 1, 1929.
The Franchise Tax Commissioner has issued the forms for the 1929
returns with the requirement that they be filed on or before May 15,
1929, by all corporations coming under the Act. The return form provides that a return must be filed for "each period ending between January 31, 1928, and February 28, 1929." Apparently as the Act is being
administered, corporations taxable are to be taxed from the first of the
year 1929. This fact raises three questions of importance: (1) Was
it intended that the Act should operate retroactively? (2) If so, is
such retroactive operation valid? (3) What is the effect of the double
taxation produced in the case of corporations that have paid for a
part of the year 1929 under the old corporation franchise tax act?
The new act does not clearly state that the tax provided for is to
relate back to January 1, 1929. It may be criticized for this omission,
especially in view of the holding that it is to be presumed that no
statute is to operate retrospectively unless the contrary clearly appears.' 49 That the Act is intended to be retrospective must be inferred
from certain other provisions. The provision contained in Section 13
granting an extension of time for returns required to be filed March
15, 1929, is evidence of retroactive intent, for unless a tax accrued
under the new Act on January 1, 1929, there would be no returns due
on March 15, which is two months and fifteen days after January 1.150
146 Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 13, §4.

147 Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 13, § 23.

148The statute may be criticised for scattering through many different sections provisions which must be read together. For example, definitions of terms
used are found scattered in Sections 6, 7, 8, 11, and 36; provisions relating to the
method of taxation are found in Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, and parts of Sections 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 16, 17, 19, 26; provisions relating to returns are found in Sections 9, 13, 14,
15, and portions of other sections; the provisions relating to penalties are also
badly scattered. Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 13.
49
1 Pignaz v. Burnett (1897) 119 Cal. 157, 160, 51 Pac. 48, 49.
1oo Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 13, § 13.
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Further evidence is found in the provisio'n for prorating found in Section 13, providing that the tax for fiscal year corporations, for the
months of 1929 corresponding to the parallel months which fell within
the fiscal year ending in 1928, should be determined upon a proportional
basis.151 These provisions give support to the view that the Act was
intended to operate from the first day in 1929, and it is being administered in accord with this intention.
The question whether such retroactivity is valid must be considered, first in relation to the Constitutional amendment (Article XIII,
Section 16) in pursuance of which the Act was passed, and secondly
in relation to general constitutional limitations as they may affect retroactive taxation.
A consideration of the wording of the Constitutional provision and
the features of the tax system set up in Article XIII of the Constitution, 1 52 to which it was added as an amendment, leads to the conclusion
that the retroactive feature of the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax
Act is contrary to the intention of the constitutional section in question.
The amendment does not state that the tax should be effective from
January 1, 1929, so that the statute, in providing that it should be
so effective, went upon the assumption that this matter was unprovided
for by the amendment and hence open for legislative determination.
It would seem more reasonable to hold, however, that a constitutional
provision adding a new tax to a general tax system adopts the basic
features common to the whole system; for if it were intended to authorize the legislature to establish a tax at variance in fundamental particulars with the established procedure such intention would have been
expressed. The outstanding characteristic of the state's tax system is
that taxes are annual with the tax period beginning at a uniform date,
the common date taxes accrue being the first Monday in March of
each year. A further feature of that system is the provision that the lien
for those taxes shall attach upon the first Monday in March of each
year, i.e. upon the same date the taxes accrue. In other words under
our system of taxation the accrual of a tax and the attachment of its
lien are coincident. 53 Not only does the constitutional amendment fail
151 "on or before May 15, 1929, every bank or corporation with a fiscal year
ended during the calendar year 1928 shall file a return covering such fiscal year,
and its tax for the months of the year 1929, corresponding to the months of 1928
which fall within the fiscal year ended during 1928, shall be1 according to or
measured by such proportionate part of the net income of tha fiscal year as the
number of months falling within the calendar year 1928 bears to the total number of months in the fiscal year ended during that calendar year." Cal. Stat. 1929,
c. 13, § 13.
152CAL ConsTr. Art. XIII.
18 State v. Royal Cons. Mining Co. (1921) 187 Cal. 343, 202 Pac. 133.
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to provide specifically that this tax is to be at variance with the established system, but certain provisions of the amendment show a clear
intention that the customary system was intended to be followed. The
provision that the lien of the new tax should attach upon "the first
Monday in March of 1929 and of each year thereafter" seems to evidence a definite intention to integrate the tax provided for with the
taxes imposed under other sections of Article XIII.
It is also significant that the provision in the amendment, "Said
taxes shall become a lien on the first Monday in March of 1929 and of
each year thereafter" relates to the taxes imposed on solvent credits
and other forms of intangible personalty as well as to the new taxes on
banks and corporations. The apparent intent is to provide for methods
of taxation for these subjects which would be complete substitutes for
the taxes previously imposed, and to make the new methods effective
on the same date that additional taxes would have accrued under the
former laws save for this substitution. In other words, it is recognized
that payment of taxes levied in 1928 against these subjects discharged
the lien for taxes between the first Monday in March of 1928 and 1929.
All of the taxes sought to be replaced were annual and the most fair and
natural construction of the amendment is that all the substitutes were
intended to be annual. The retroactive provision in the franchise tax
act seems a clear violation of this intention.
The retroactive feature of the act might also be called into question
under the due process provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions.
It is not likely, however, that the act is invalid upon this ground. If
the tax provided for be regarded as analogous to an income tax, it is
within the rule that neither retroactivity covering months within a year
prior to the passage of the taxing act nor measurement of income by the
year previous to that of the act are sufficient to invalidate taxes otherwise valid.' 54 Since an income tax is a direct tax and the franchise tax
is an excise tax it may be claimed that, although a retroactive direct
tax is valid, a retroactive excise tax should be invalid in that the privilege taxed is one that has already been exercised. 5 5 This argument for
holdinga retroactive excise tax invalid seems to be lacking in judicial
support. The decisions from the standpoint of due process of law
would seem to indicate that the retroactivity involved does not amount
154

Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co. (1916) 240 U. S. 1, 20, 36 Sup. Ct. 236,
242; United States v. Boss & Peake Automobile Co. (D. Ore. 1922) 285 Fed. 410;
Updike v. United States (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) 8 F. (2d) 913, 916.
155 See Julius H. Amberg, Retroactive Excise Taxation (1924) 37 HARvARD L.
REv. 691.
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to that degree of arbitrariness constituting a taking of property without
due process of law.' 56
As the new act operates (assuming the retroactive feature to be
valid) there is an overlapping of taxes in certain cases. Many corporations in business in 1928 made their last payments under the old corporation franchise tax. It is uncertain whether the period covered by
these taxes ended March 4, 1929, or June 30, 1929,15' but in either
case there is an overlapping for corporations that made this payment are
also taxed from January 1, 1929, under the new act. The problem arises
only for the initial period of the act but is nevertheless of importance
to the corporations subject to such double taxation. While the overlapping may involve double taxation, a tax will not be held invalid for
that reason alone.' 5 s The most important point is that the overlapping
156 Even granting, despite the language of McCray v. United States (1904)
195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769; Billings v. United States (1914) 232 U. S. 261,
34 Sup. Ct. 421; Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co. (1916) 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup.
Ct. 236; and Barclay & Co. v. Edwards (1924) 267 U. S. 442, 45 Sup. Ct. 348,
that the fifth amendment does limit the taxing power of Congress (a result
achieved by the engaging logical device of saying that an exaction which is arbitrary is not a tax, hence is a prohibited taking-Nichols v. Coolidge (1927) 274
U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710; Blodgett v. Holden (1927) 275 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct.
105; Untermyer v. Anderson (1928) 276 U. S. 440, 48 Sup. Ct. 535; Tyler v.
United States (D. Md. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 887) and that the fourteenth amendment
should be similarly interpreted, it is not every retrospective tax which is held to
be too arbitrary. The retroactive operation of paragraph 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909,
imposing a tax on the use of foreign built yachts, was upheld in Billings v. United
States (1914) 232 U. S. 261, 289, 34 Sup. Ct. 421, 428, and United States v.
Bennett (1914) 232 U. S. 299, 34 Sup. Ct. 433; the retroactive application of an
estate tax imposed by certain sections of the Revenue Act of 1918 was upheld in
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Routzahn (N. D. Ohio 1925) 7 F. (2d) 483, and Farmers'
Loan and Trust Co. v. Bowers (S. D. N. Y. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 706. Moreover,
in Continental Oil Co. v. Walker (C. C. A. 9th, 1923) 285 Fed. 729, a license tax,
of one cent per gallon sold, on dealers in gasoline passed in March, was upheld
as valid even though applied to all gasoline sold during the year, including the
months prior to passage. It was thus held that such a' tax was not in fact retroactive, inasmuch as the privilege taxed was a present and continuing privilege, the
amount of tax being measured by transactions in tje prior period. Similar reasoning had been used, also, in People ex rel Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Kelsey (1906) 116 App. Div. 97, 101 N. Y. Supp. 902, off'd. 188 N. 'f. 541, 80
N. E. 1116, and American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Adams (1900) 28 Colo. 119,
63 Pac. 410; both privilege taxes. The California act would seem to be clearly
within the rule of these cases and hence valid.
157The receipts, given those paying under the old share and corporate franchise tax act, read: "Being one-half of the tax for 1928 assessed to said company as
shown by the assessment roll on file in controller's office and being State Tax for
Eightieth Fiscal Year, July 1, 1928, to June 30, 1929." See McLAREN AND BUTLER,
CALIFORNIA TAx LAws oF 1929, p. 51.

158 Kidd v. Alabama (1903) 188 U. S. 730, 732, 23 Sup. Ct. 401, 402; Cream
of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks County (1920) 253 U. S. 325, 330, 40 Sup. Ct. 558,
560; Baker v. Druesedow (1923) 263 U. S. 137, 141, 44 Sup. Ct. 40, 41.
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may be held to violate provisions of the constitutional amendment other
than those already mentioned. The amendment provides regarding national and state banks, that the tax "shall be in lieu of all other taxes,
and licenses, state, county and municipal," and as to other corporations
subject to the act, that the new tax is to be in lieu of the franchise tax
provided for in Section 14(d) of Article XIII of the State Constitution.
Inasmuch as the tax paid under the old act for this period was replaced
by the new tax it would seem, if the new tax is to operate retroactively,
that payment of the old tax was excused by virtue of the substitution
and should not have been paid. It is difficult to see. however, how it
can be recovered, as in most cases it was paid before the new act in fact
was passed and no doubt was not paid under protest. The argument
may be restated as follows: (1) the statute as interpreted by the Commisioner imposes a new tax which is retroactive and overlaps into a
period for which many corporations have already paid taxes under Section 14(d); (2) the Constitution by providing that the new tax on
corporations other than banks shall be in lieu of the tax imposed by
Section 14(d) seems clearly to mean that the corporations dealt with
shall not be required to pay both the new tax authorized and also the
old tax imposed by Section 14(d). If for example the legislature had
provided that the new tax should operate from and after March 4, 1929,
and that the old tax should continue to operate for a period of say six
months after that date the statute would clearly have been invalid since
it would have been squarely in the face of the constitutional provision
that the new tax shall be "in lieu" of the old. Yet it is difficult to see
any distinction in principle between the case just supposed and the
statute enacted in fact, if the retroactive construction which has been
given it by the commissioner is correct. If the foregoing construction
of the constitutional provision is correct two conclusions are possible:
the new statute must, in order to preserve its constitutionality, either
be interpreted (1) as being an implied retroactive repeal (for the overlapping period) of the tax imposed under the authority of Section
14(d) or (2) as not having been intended to operate retroactively at
all. The former construction would be obviously unreasonable since
the legislature must be presumed to have known that many corporations
had, at the time the statute was passed, already paid the tax for the
overlapping period imposed by Section 14(d) and that these taxes
could not be recovered. On the other hand the statute itself seems, as
has been seen, to require the conclusion that it was intended to operate
retroactively. It may be suggested, therefore, that if the courts interpret
the "in lieu" provision of the Constitution in accordance with the foregoing discussion they must either hold that the legislature intended the
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first of the possible constructions above suggested in spite of its unreasonableness or else hold the statute void.
As to national banks an additional objection is presented. Section
5219 provides that the states may tax national banks in one of four
ways and stipulates that the "imposition by any State of any one of
the . . . four forms of taxation shall be in lieu of the others." One of
the permitted methods was followed under the old share tax on national
banks. The new act follows a different method. Thus, while the state
may choose between one of the four methods, it does not seem that a
strict reading of the terms of the section would allow an overlapping
which would amount to taxation under the two methods simult eously.xsefh

When does the

become a lien?-

Mtitutal-a Pmndmnt apparently intended,4hat the new tax should

accrue upon a fixed date which, if in accord with the general tax system
set up in the constitutional article of which it is a part, would be the
first Monday in March of each year Apparently with this in mind
provided
pa c ~
the framers of the constitutional
that "Said taxes shall become a lien upon the first Monday of March
of 1929 and of each year thereafter," thus establishing a lien date in
accord with the lien date of the other taxes provided for by Article
XYTTT .Az wan peinted out a-e_ One of the outstanding characteristics
--Tf)
?Rhe tax system set up by Article XIII is the fact that the accrual of
a tax and the attachment of its lien are coincident." Thus, under that
Article, the fixing of the tax obligation on the subject of the tax and
the creation of the tax lien must be regarded as occurring simultaneously, although, of course, the amount of the tax may not be ascertained
until later, in which case there is a re ltion back to the date when the
tax first accrued and became a lien.
The attachment of the lien at
the date of the accrual of the tax is an essential feature of a sound tax
system, for no practical object could be served by having a lien attach
before any tax had accrued, or by having the lien attach at a date
after the tax had accrued.
Notwithstanding these basic propositions, the Bank and Corporation
Franchise Tax Act provides for an accrual date which shall be "the
first day after the close of the taxable year" and defines "taxable year"
as the "calendar year or the fiscal year

. . .

upon the basis of which

159 Supra n. 28.

V>&1 Estate of Backesto (1923) 63 Cal. App. 265, 218 Pac. 597.
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the net income is computed.""' As a result instead of providing for one
accrual day, the act establishes January 1 as the accrual date for calendar year corporations and the first day of any of the other eleven months
as the date for fiscal year corporations. By reason of the constitutional
provision, the act could not provide that the lien should attach at the
varying date of accrual, and instead was forced to provide for a single
fixed lien date. The provision is found in Section 29 of the act:
"The taxes levied under this act shall constitute a lien upon all property of the taxpayer, which lien shall attach on the first Monday in March
of each year. Every tax herein provided for has the effect of a judgment
against the taxpayer and every lien has the effect of a judgment duly
levied against all property of the delinquent . . ."

The language of this section is ambiguous. If the tax is to be a lien on
the first Monday in March the provision that every tax has the effect
of a judgment is superfluous if it means no more than that every tax is
to have the effect of a lien. The provision that every tax is to have the
effect of a judgment might be read as providing that every tax should
have the effect of a lien upon accrual; however, this interpretation is
precluded by reason of the constitutional stipulation that the lien attach
on the first Monday in March.
Section 29 apparently, therefore, provides that the lien shall only
attach on the first Monday in March. Since under the act taxes accrue
before and after the lien date, it is pertinent to ask, on what March
does the lien attach if the tax accrues after the first Monday in March?
Does the lien relate back to the preceding March, or must the attachment of the lien be delayed until the March following? The provision
must operate in one way or the other and the act leaves this important
question in doubt.
In so far as the language of the act is concerned, the view that the
lien relates back to the preceding March is as tenable as the view that
the lien attaches the March following. From the standpoint of their
effect one is as undesirable as the other. If the lien is considered as
*&S'Cal. Stat. 1929, c.,13, § 11. Applied, this might result in the accrual of the
s mposed under te law on February 1, 1928, or January 1, 1929, or any
first day of an intermedi te month. But the Constitution says the first lien shall
attach on March 4, 1929 There seems to be, as brought out above, a fundamental
divergence between the constitutional and legislative scheme. Nor can they be
reconciled by attributin no significance so far as tax burden is concerned to the
fact that the accrual o the tax is expected to antedate its lien. The tax is conceived as one for the rivilege of doing business from January 1, 1929 (the first
accrual date for corpo ations with calendar year accounting, which are in the vast
majority). By the de ice of making the accrual date on or before January 1, 1929,
it is clear that the a t seeks to avoid the logical intendment of the Constitution
that the new tax should become effective on March 4, 1929, and not before
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attaching on the March following the accrual a bad situation results,
for it means that after a corporation becomes liable for taxes a period
intervenes before the lien will attach. The corporation may sell its
property within that period free from any lien for the taxes due against
it. For example, suppose a fiscal year corporation ended its taxable year
on June 30, 192A on the next day its tax for the next fiscal year accrued; however, the lien for that tax will not attach until the following March, i.e. March, 193Q. Thus the corporation has a period within
which it may sell its property free of a lien for the accrued taxes. Such
procedure is fundamentally contrary to sound tax policy.
The other possibility is to have the lien relate back to the prior
March; for example if a corporation's taxable year ended June 30,
1929, its tax accrued on July 1, 19"9, and the lien for the tax attached
on March 4, 19A), four months before the tax accrued. Thus, if the
lien always related back to the preceding March the objection that the
tax might be avoided could not be raised. However, the effect of such
procedure upon the securing of a clear marketable title from a corporation selling its property would be extremely important for a purchaser
might find his property subject to a lien for taxes subsequently accruing
against the corporation, of which he could have no knowledge without
examining into the accounting system of the corporation in question.
A purchaser in May might subsequently find that a lien had attached
the month before for taxes accruiig against the corporation, perhaps
as late as the December following his purchase.
b
s
From the foregoing it is evident that the lien provisions of the act
create a situation of doubt, with a choice betn
undesirable alternatives cetiscuss
ove is condition seems to be tfe re t o the
statute's disregard of the intent of the amendment that there be a single
date for tax accruals; for a fixed lien date is a workable provision only
if the accrual date is also fixed. The situatign created by the statute

can onlby be classes fa change of the en provision of the amendment allowing the lien to ations rqi
e the tax accrues, or by
changing the act to provide for a uniform accrual date coincident with
18
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Monday in March.
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calendar year of 1928, and upon the basis of this return, its tax for the
calendar year of 1929 will be computed. The Act requires returns by
corporations whose fiscal years ended in 1928, and their tax for the
months of the year 1929, corresponding to the months of 1928 which fall
within the fiscal year ended during 1928, shall be according to, or
measured by, such proportionate part of the net income of that fiscal
year as the number of months falling within the calendar year 1928
bears to the total number of months in the fiscal year ended Ouring that
calendar year.
It is to be noted that the statute contains no provision as to fiscal
year corporations that began business in 1928 but whose fiscal year
does not end in 1928, nor as to calendar year corporations that began
business in 1929 before the effective date of the Act, although the Act
provides for corporations beginning business after March 1, 1929.
Suppose a corporation, doing business on a fiscal year basis, started
business July 1, 1928. Obviously, its fiscal year did not end in 1928.
Its taxable year does not end until June 30, 1929, and its tax does not
accrue, nor is it required by the statute to file a return, until July 1,
1929, which will be the tax for July 1, 1929, to July 1,1930. Is that
corporation not to be taxed at all for doing business during the first six
months of 1929? If not, why the discrimination?
Suppose a corporation commencing business in January, 1929, elects
to do business on a calendar year basis. Its taxable year does not end
until December 31, 1929, and its tax does not accrue until January 1,
1930. Does that corporation escape taxation for the year 19 29 ?1M
16 The following language of Section 23 raises an additional problem as to
returns: "One-half the amount of tax disclosed by the return, after allowing the
offset herein provided for, shall be due and payable on or before the fifteenth day
of the third month following the close of the taxable year, as defined in Section 11
hereof. The balance of the tax shall be due and payable on or before the fifteenth
day of the ninth month following the close of the taxable year." Cal. Stat. 1929,
c. 13, § 23.
Section 11 defines "taxable year" as follows: "The term 'taxable year' as
herein used, means the calendar year, or the fiscal year ending during such calendar
year, upon the basis of which the net income is computed herein. 'Taxable year'
includes, in the case of a return made for a fractional part of a year, the period for
which such return is made." Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 13, § 11.
What is the first taxable year of a corporation with a fiscal year ended June
30, 1928? By virtue of the Section 13 of the statute, it is clearly not June
30, 1929. Taken literally, the tax is due before the act went into effect. One-half
of the tax of a corporation whose fiscal year ended June 30, 1928, would seem to
be. due September 15, 1928, several months before the law was in existence or the
constitutional amendment submitted for adoption. If the corporation's fiscal year
ended in March, 1928, the first half of the tax would be due June 15, 1928, when
as a matter of fact, the old franchise tax, for which this one takes the place, was
not itself due until July 1, 1928. The statute should have provided an exception
in Section 23 of the act to the effect that, in the case of a corporation whose first
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(4) Do Certain Corporations Partially Escape Taxation? Under
the Act certain corporations may have their taxable year computed
upon the basis of a preceding fractional period with the result that
they pay for a full twelve-months year upon a fractional, and not
upon a twelve-months period, and thus, apparently, escape taxation
for that period between the fractional months and a full year. For
example: Suppose a corporation commences business July 1, 1929, on
taxable year was a fiscal period ending in 1928, the tax shall not be due until the
date for its return is due under Section 13 of the act.
It might be contended that the extension provisions of the statute meet the
situation and that such corporations should have filed returns on or before May
15, 1929. These provisions might very well be construed to meet the situation as
regards the first installment of the tax due, but as brought out in the discussion
following since they apply to first installments only it is difficult to see how they
can adequately solve the problem raised.
Section 13 of the statute provides that an extension of two months shall be
granted in the case of returns required to be filed March 15, 1929, and one month
in the case of those to be filed April 15, 1929. Section 15 allows the commissioner
to grant extensions for cause not to exceed ninety days. When extensions are
granted for cause corporations must make first payment before extended time expires. Thus it seems that while extensions are made for returns, the statute makes
no provision for extended time of payment for taxes subject to returns in March
and April 15, 1929. This is important in that a penalty is provided for delinquent
payment under the section. Return forms were not available to taxpayers to make
their reports on March 15, or April 15, 1929. It would none the less appear that
the 15% penalty imposed by Section 23 for failure to pay one-half of the tax on
or before its due date had already accrued in the case of all such corporations
before they could even make a return. Can the Franchise Tax Commissioner provide by rule that this penalty will not be exacted ? It is doubtful if he can thus
make such a gift of public moneys to the corporations affected.
In fact, there is some doubt because of the wording of Section 13 whether or
not the general extension of time of two months has been granted. The section
reads: " . . . there shall be granted a general extension of time of two months."

Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 13, § 13. It is not clear whether "shall be" means "is" or
whether it is contemplated that the Commissioner shall make a blanket order of
extension pursuant to its direction. If Section 13 b) its own terms grants an
extension, then it is obviously not one granted by the Commissioner under Section
15, and the relief from penalties in cases of extensions provided for in Section 23
refer expreisly to extensions made under Section 15.
The interest provision in Section 24b to the effect that interest shall run on
the extension granted applies only in the case of extensions granted by the Commissioner. The corporations filing returns in pursuance of the extension granted in
Section 13 would appear not to be liable for interest during the period of the
extension as would be true if the extension had been granted by the commissioner.
It should also be observed that the extension is only effective for the first installment and has nothing whatever to do with the second installment. Time for
paying the balance is totally unaffected by grant of an extension. Section 23 provides that "at the time of the delinquency of the second installment an additional
penalty of 5 per centum shall be added to the first installment unless that installment has theretofore been paid." Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 13, § 23. Thus though the
time for paying of the first installment be extended, 5% will be added to it if
the second installment becomes due before the extended time for paying the irst.
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a calendar year basis, taxable year ending December 31, 1929. On
January 1, 1930, the tax for the calendar year 1930 accrues. Suppose
the tax amounts to $500.00 on the basis of net income from July 1,
1929, to December 31, 1929. A $25.00 minimum tax was paid at the
time of commencing business; $475.00 is due for the 1929 tax. The
return on which this is determined is supposed to be filed by March
15, 1930, and the 1929 tax is adjusted on the basis of that return. The
$415.00 for the 1929 tax is due as well as half of $500.00 or $250.00
on the 1930 tax. The tax for the entire year 1930 is apparently figured
on the corporation's income for six months only. No subsequent adjustment is made as the tax for 1931 is calculated merely on the income
for the year 1930.
(e) Recovery of Taxes Illegally Collected Under the Act.
The Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act, in contrast with
prior California tax laws, contains in Sections 23, 27 and 30 provisions
establishing a regular method for the recovery of taxes illegally collected under the Act. A special fund called the bank and corporation
franchise tax fund is established' 6 5 and this fund may be subjected to
warrants of the controller for the purpose of paying the refunds provided for under the Act.' 66 Such refunds with six per cent interest will
be allowed where the claim for a refund has been approved by the
proper administrative officer as set forth in Section 27, or where there
is a favorable judgment in a suit for the recovery of taxes illegally
collected.' 67
In providing for refunds under a judgment the statute is not as clear
as it should be upon the point that the fund is to be subject to the
judgment; for to authorize the court to enter a judgment for the
amount of wrongfully collected taxes and interest is not exactly equivalent to the authorization of the controller to draw his warrant upon
the fund in favor of a corporation obtaining a judgment. However, the
sections in question must be read together, and as so read they may
possibly be construed as expressing the legislative intent that under the
judgment provision taxpayers were to be reimbursed by payment from
the special fund through warrants drawn by the controller.
An objection might be raised to the refund provisions upon the
ground that they violate Article IV, Section 22 of the State Constitution which provides that "No money shall be drawn from the treasury
but in consequence of appropriation made by law" in that the refund
CaL Stat. 1929, c. 13, § 23.
Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 13, § 27.
167 Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 13, §§ 27, 30.
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provisions of the statute are not in terms of appropriation. However,
this objection does not seem to be serious, in view of the holding that
no set form of words is necessary to constitute an appropriation if the
legislative intent is clearly expressed. 168 P$'
Another objection to the refund provisions may be raised under
Article IV, Section 34 of the constitution which provides that "No bill
making an appropriation of money, except the budget bill, shall contain more than one item of appropriation, and that for one single and
certain purpose to be therein expressed." Under this constitutional provision it has been held that a statute is unconstitutional that provides
for the issuance of warrants by the controller for the payment of
judgments rendered against the state in tax cases. The court declared
that the statute there involved, "does not contain but one item of appropriation; it embraces as many items as there may be persons having
such claims and obtaining final judgment therefor." *, In that case,
however, the court was concerned with an appropriation from the general fund. There is an intimation in the case that if the money was to
be drawn from a special fund the rule would not be the same. The .more
recent case of Ryan v. Riley gives support to this view. That case
upheld Section 30 of the Motor Vehicle Act appropriating money in
the motor vehicle fund for the expenses of maintaining the motor
vehicle department and the expenses incurred in carrying out the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act and providing that after deduction of
such expenses the balance of the fund was to be used as county and
state highway maintenance funds. This statute was objected to on
the ground that it was not one item of appropriation nor was it for a
single purpose. While the reasoning of the court is not convincing it
reached the conclusion that inasmuch as the money was to be taken
from a special fund and not from the general fund there need be no
specific designation either as to purpose or azyount.
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